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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the implications of the 
post June 1967 phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict for 
settlement patterns in the affected territories, both to 
elucidate important aspects of the world's most'dangerous 
regional dispute and for the broader purpose of illust-' 
rating the geographical impact of war. 
Two major aspects of the transformation in local 
settlement geography are considered :° 
a) Part I examines the effects of both the June 
1967 War and subsequent secondary hostilities (1967-70) 
on the Arab population of the West Bank, the Golan Heights 
and the East Jordan Valley. The main issue is refugee 
out-movement from the conquered areas and the new border 
zones, a subject which-is pursued through analysis of a 
survey of 944 displaced persons conducted by'the author, 
in an East Jordan refugee camp. 
b) Part II shifts the focus to 'the other side of 
the coin' - the Israeli colonization of occupied territory 
in the decade after the June 1967 War. The author's 
account combines consideration of the physical establish- 
ment of the new settlement structure with analysis of 
responsible political processes, the two being bound 
together in the framework of a model developed from 
General Systems Theory. The Golan Heights and the West 
Jordan Rift are given particularly detailed treatment as 
case studies. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
bt 
i 
I. The-Geographical Impact of War =- 
This thesis examines the implications of the 
June 1967'Arab-Israeli War for settlement patterns in the 
affected territories. Three dimensions are considered': '- 
a) Refugee outflows from affected territories during 
and immediately followingthe initial hostilities. 
b) The origins and effects of secondary hostilities 
along the new boundaries. 
c) Colonization of parts of the conquered territories 
by the victorious power, colonization causing major changes 
in the local cultural landscape. 
The three dimensions are bound together in an 
overall view of the geographical impact of war.. The author 
considers that the demographic and landscape. consequences 
of war can be divided into a number of categories: 
a) Landscape devastation and population displacement 
directly caused by hostilities or by an ensuing collapse 
of law and order. 
b) Re-organization of the cultural landscape for_ 
defensive purposes by the'combatant powers, whether in 
home territory or in occupied areas. The aims are generally 
to make terrain less hospitable to an enemy and to reduce 
the vulnerability of areas to capture or infiltration. 
There is a wide range of relevant facets, including para- 
military colonization, "scorched earth" policies, and the 
neutralization of populations of suspect loyalty, by devel- 
opment policies, by removal and/or by geographical concent-'' 
ration. 
2 
c) Re-organization of the cultural geography of 
conquered territory, primarily-to strengthen'ties with the 
new metropole. Motivation here may berto benefit the'home 
economy, to benefit the local population (perhaps preparing 
the ground for annexation) or simple territorial expansion. 
Again there is a range of relevant phenomena. ' Examples 
include population transfers (colonization. -again being a 
possibility) and the re-orientation of trade-patterns and- 
infrastructuralties. 
d) Multiple cycles of demographic and landscape 
alterations arising when-the same territory changes hands 
more than once, either through continued war or a peace 
agreement. 
The new phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict inaug- 
urated by the June 1967 War has already exhibited examples 
of the changes postulated in the first three categories. 
The geographical impact has been particularly marked not 
because of the scale of the initial hostilities, which was 
comparatively modest, but because of the extent of densely 
settled territory which changed hands, the length'of time 
that the Israeli occupation has persisted, and the ferocity 
of the intermittent secondary hostilities along the new 
boundaries. * 
ik As a general theme the impact of war received 
. very little attention from geographers before the mid") ry 
1960's. For example the March 1960 issue of the Journal 
of Conflict Resolution, entirely taken-up with the 'Geography 
3 
of Conflict' did not include a single paper concentrating 
on landscape effects of war. Even historical geography, 
where one might have expected some treatment'of the theme, 
proved no exception - as illustration H. C. Darby's work 
on the Domesday Book (The Historical Geography of England 
Before 1800,1936 The Domesday Geography of England, 
5 vols. 1952-67) provides some mention of military'activity 
associated with the Norman Conquest of England as anýagent 
of regional landscape devastation, but the-main contribution 
here is left to an historian (R. Weldon-Finn The Norman 
Conquest and its Effects on the Economy, 1066-1086,1971). 
The situation has altered somewhat since 1965. 
In particular, reflecting the concurrent upsurge of irregular 
warfare in Asia and Africa, several studies have been made 
of the impact of guerrilla compaigns on settlement patterns, 
most notably as regards the re-location of rural population 
to deprive guerrillas of potential support. One may cite 
here Sandhu's "Emergency Resettlement in Malaya" (Journal 
of Tropical Geography, 1965) and Sutton's "Population 
Resettlement.: Traumatic Upheavals and the Algerian 
Experience" (The Journal of Modern African Studies, 1977). 
Signs of a broader concern are also evident. For 
example Urlich's 'Migration of the North Island Maoris 
1800-1840' (New Zealand Geographer, 1972), which analyzes 
the introduction of fire-arms into Maori tribal conflict 
as a factor triggering massive migration and population loss, 
provides an excellent case-study of the disruptive implic- 
ations of a new technology of warfare. Further, the August 
4 
1978 special issue of the Transactions of the Institute 
of British Geographers, devoted to the theme "Settlement 
and Conflict in the Mediterranean World" explores at 
length the important general question of the, relationship 
between war and evolving settlement patterns;. Wagstaff 
("War and Settlement Desertion in the Morea, 1685-1830") 
examines a case where violent conflict simply aggravated 
settlement desertion already being caused by long term 
socio-economic processes whereas Harris ("War and Settle- 
ment Change : The Golan Heights and the Jordan Rift 
1967-1977") considers an instance where war has been the 
primary force in disrupting and moulding settlement. patterns. 
This thesis is an enlargement of the latter paper., _. 
Nonetheless, despite such studies the impact of 
war remains a little investigated field in geography. Up 
to the present the main interest has undoubtedly come from 
historians; from the late 1960's such writers as Henry 
Kamen (The Iron Century, 1971) and Theodore Rabb (The 
Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe, 1975) have 
laid great stress on war as a. dynamic agent of social, 
economic, demographic and landscape change,, and earlier 
traces of the same emphasis can also be found, as evidenced 
by Smail's Crusading Warfare (1954), giving some attention 
to cultural landscape, re-organization for strategic purposes, 
sections in Braudel's The Mediterranean and the Mediterr- 
anean World in the Age of Philip 11(1949) and Boutruche's 
challenging 1945 paper "The Devastation of Rural Areas 
during the Hundred Years War and the Agricultural Recovery 
of France" (in P. S. Lewis (ed. ) The Recovery of France in 
5 
the Fifteenth Century). The theme ranks aswa central 
aspect in the recent interest of some historians in exam- 
ining the fate of the mass of the population rather than 
"the gilt glittering on the surface" 
(l) for crucial 
periods of crisis and upheaval, and it incorporates many 
matters of great relevance to geographers such as spatial 
differentiation in population disruption, in material dev- 
astation and in rates of recovery, with implications for 
changed balances of power between regions and nations. 
Of special significance here is Wachtel's The Vision of 
the Vanquished i The Spanish Conquest of Peru through 
Indian Eyes (English translation, 1977). Using, contempor- 
ary Indian and Spanish documentation Wachtel considers in 
great depth the impact of the conquest and of subsequent 
revolts and civil wars on the mass of the conquered popul- 
ation, geographic variation in economic, social and demog- 
raphic disruption being an integral component of the analysis. 
II. Refugees and Settlers 
By placing the out-movement of Arabs from the- 
1967 war zones alongside the subsequent infusion of Jewish 
settlers into the same territories the author deliberately 
presents 'both sides-of the coin' as regards the implic- 
ations of the'June 1967 War for local settlement geography. 
The objectives of the dual analysis are as follows: 
a) To demonstrate, by means of the example of a 
relatively small-scale war, the decisive role-violent 
conflict can play in disrupting and transforming settlement 
patterns over extensive areas. In so doing the author hopes 
6 
4 
to contribute to a deeper understanding of war as ad ynamic 
agent in demographic and landscape change. 
b) To explore two critical aspects of the Middle 
East conflict. Although post 1967 Arab refugee flows 
and Israeli colonization activities are major elements in 
the current configuration of the conflict they have received 
only limited attention in academic writings. The author 
behaves that they deserve detailed examination as phenomena 
in their own right. 
c) To consider, in the case of the Israeli colon- 
ization of occupied territory, the emergence of a new 
settlement structure as a physical manifestation of under- 
lying responses in a national political system to opportun- 
ities opened-up by territorial conquest. The author proposes 
a model adapted from General Systems Theory as the most 
useful framework for analysis here, a model integrating 
decision-making processes and their landscape effects into 
a single operating entity. 
i The existing literature on refugee flows caused' 
by war consists, on the one hand, of a vast array of case- 
studies of particular instances of flight but, on the other, 
of only one major attempt to develop a "workable theory 
of refugee movements based on a fruitful typology". 
(2) 
In addition there has been a tendency to consider refugee 
movements either as distinct phenomena or as an appendage 
to the general subject of migration - not as an aspect of 
the impact of war. Only amongst historians can hints of 
the latter orientation be found, but here the refugees tend 
7 
to be lost amid the wider social and economic dimensions 
(see, for instance, Kamen's 'Economic and Social Consequences 
of the Thirty Years War' Past and Present, 1968)., By-. 
restricting the impact of war toimplications for settle- 
ment patterns the author hopes to be able to do full 
justice to a particular refugee flow yet at the same time 
to place it in a broader setting as one of two major facets 
of war associated settlement change. 
Kunz's "The Refugee in Flight : Kinetic Models 
and Forms of Displacement" (International Migration Review, 
1973) ranks as the sole comprehensive effort to create a 
general typology of refugee movements, whether resulting 
from war or other forms of political upheaval. Kunz's 
analysis proposes several major points-of-relevance to 
this thesis. 
a) The refugee can be separated from the voluntary 
migrant on the basis of differences in weight between 
'push' and 'pull' factors - the refugee leaves his home 
primarily because he is pushed out by circumstances beyond 
his control, with 'pull' from potential destinations being 
of minor significance only. 
Examination of the origins' of the 1967 Palest- 
inian exodus from the West Bank supports this concept in 
overall terms but some qualification needs to be made. 
First, as outright expulsion was a relatively minor element 
in the outflow most refugees had freedom of choice as to 
whether to stay or flee, though geographically extensive 
hostilities and the rapid Israeli advance of course exerted 
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a major pressure to leave. As a result such 'pulls' as 
family connections and interests at the prospective dest- 
ination, the East Bank of Jordan, when added to the 'push' 
sometimes made the crucial difference between remaining 
and going. In addition it may be noted that in one district 
(Nablus p. 68 ) many people stayed despite the 'push' owing 
to the unattractiveness of the prospective destination 
from the political viewpoint. Because of these factors 
the author believes that refugee links with prospective 
destinations prior to flight deserve more consideration 
than Kunz is evidently willing to give them. 
b) Refugee movements may be categorized as 
'anticipatory', involving flight before a deteriorating 
political or military situation becomes critical, and 
'acute' taking place as a response to the crisis itself. 
The movements discussed in this thesis are overwhelmingly 
of the 'acute' variety, though some small-scale 'anticipatory' 
migration did take place in the days immediately preceding 
the June 1967 War (p. 404) . 
c) The train of events involved in an 'acute' 
refugee movement takes one of several courses. The term 
'pressure' refers to the political, economic and psychol- 
ogical forces bearing down upon the refugee in his initial 
temporary destination, often an emergency camp. 
1. Push-pressure-plunge. In moving to a new long-term 
place of residence subsequent to flight the refugee, instead 
of enthusiastically reacting to the pull of a final destin- 
ation, takes a 'plunge' to escape deprivation, frustration 
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and harrassment at the initial place of asylum. For 
Palestinians one may cite here those who fled from present- 
day Israel to West Bank refugee camps in 1949 and then 
moved on to the East Bank or to other Arab countries between 
1949 and 1967. 
2. Push-pressure-stay. Some refugees are fortunate in 
having a relatively amenable first place of asylum, perhaps 
because of wealth or ability to quickly find an economically 
profitable niche. They thus make no further move. For 
Palestinians one may include many who fled direct to Amman 
in 1949. 
3. Push-pressure-return. At some stage the political and 
military circumstances may alter sufficiently to allow ' 
refugees to return home. In the Middle East conflict the 
only major example is the return of people to areas dev- 
astated in the 1968-70 War of Attrition (East Jordan Valley 
and Suez Canal Zone). 
One notable feature of the Palestinians relative 
to the Kunz scheme is the refusal of the great bulk of 
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refugees, even those from the 1948-49 War, to accept the 
notion of permanent resettlement in any new country. The 
hope and the expectation continues to be return to the lost 
homeland, a hope which has shown no signs of diminishing. 
This is particularly marked in the case of refugees from 
the June 1967 War, most of whom remain locked in the 
'pressure' phase - also termed 'midway to nowhere' - whether 
or not they live in refugee camps. 
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d) When a conflict persists over a long period several 
refugee movements are probable. People belonging to one 
movement in such a chain are defined as being of a partic- 
ular 'vintage'. Thus in the Middle East conflict one has 
1949,1967 and War of Attrition vintages, and post 1949 
movements have generally comprised at least two such elements. 
For example the 1967 West Bank exodus included both newly 
displaced persons and 1949 refugees fleeing for a second 
time. 
e) Within the 'acute' refugee category distinct forms 
of displacement can be detected. Kunz suggests a three-fold 
classification. 
1. Displacement by flight. Movement is by the refugee's 
own decision, albeit under great pressure. The main element 
is mass flight "impelled by immediate fear, often accompanied 
by shock caused by the sudden turn of events, and --- not 
infrequently augmented by hysteria". (3) 
2. Displacement by force. The refugee has no choice - he 
is expelled. 
3. Displacement by absence. The refugee is already absent 
from the zone of conflict at the time of crisis and is 
either unable or unwilling to return thereafter. 
The author's case-study predominantly involves 
mass flight, though expulsion and absence are also evident 
(p. 98 ). As regards the internal composition of the three 
forms Kunz further proposes that they tend to display distinct 
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socio-economic characteristics. Certainly in the Palest- 
inian series of movements the 1967 mass-flight represented 
a full cross section of the s-ource population (P. 78 ) 
whereas forced displacement from occupied territory after 
1967 has apparently been largely confined to the leadership 
class. 
(4) 
Turning from general theory to the case-study topic 
itself - refugee movements consequent on the June 1967 
Arab-Israeli War and the 1968-70 War of Attrition, especially 
as regards the West Bank and the East Jordan Valley - there is 
only one major study based on systematic survey work. This 
is Dodd and Barakat's River Without Bridges :A Study of the 
Exodus of the 1967 Palestinian Arab Refugees and it concerns 
the West Bank movement alone. Nothing at all has yet been 
published on the impact of the War of Attrition, whether in 
the Jordan Valley-or along the Suez Canal. Furthermore, for 
the West Bank the Dodd and Barakat study fails to consider 
two inter-related issues of major significance : geographical 
variation in the West Bank population losses and the historic 
context of the exodus. Here it is the author's contention 
a) that variations from place to place in the historic 
experience of village communities determined to a great 
extent local reaction to the 'push' exerted by the war-time 
situational pressures and b) that this theme, ignored in 
most refugee studies, should be accorded a more prominent 
place in broader discussions of the factors underlying 
refugee flows. 
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ii The territorial conquests of the June 1967 War 
presented Israel with twin opportunities which quickly 
produced irresistible demands within the Israeli political 
systems 
a) To absorb land to establish new defence lines 
under direct Israeli control in highly suitable terrain. 
b) To absorb land to implement perceived 'historic 
rights' to possess parts of the occupied territories. 
Jewish settlement, which would provide a physical anchor 
to the desired areas, was viewed as the best means of 
capitalizing on the twin opportunities. ' 
Establishing 'defensible boundaries' in the 
context of continuing conflict with the Arabs served 
as the principal initial rationale. A settlement pattern with 
a strong paramilitary orientation would not only secure 
land politically but would also itself provide an obstacle 
to attack. This type of landscape response to the results 
and exigencies of war has been a frequent feature of 
international conflict and it is not difficult to find 
mention of other instances in academic literature, though 
nothing at all for the twentieth century. For example, the 
Elizabethan colonization of eastern Ireland to secure a 
vulnerable flank against Spain, treated in depth by Canny 
in The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland (1976) makes a 
close parallel to Israel's post 1967 strategic settlement 
policies. Sir Henry Sidney's pressure for 
the introduction of collonys of English and 
other loyal subjects, whereby a perpetuall 
inhabitation would have ensued to the recom- 
pense as well of that which was spent, as for 
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a yerely and continuall profit --- and; stre th 
of the country against all foreyne invasion (5) 
exhibits a combination of strategic and (subsidiary) economic 
argument little different from that evident in the first 
phase of agricultural settlement on the Golan Heights (P. 195 ). 
Similar comment could also be made regarding the 
Habsburg use of colonization as dynamic forward defence 
on the military frontier with the Ottoman Empire.. 
"-- a whole new system was organized. The core of 
it was the chain of fortresses, the garrisons of 
which were generally German; while the population 
of the areas round and between the fortresses, this 
consisting largely of Serb and Croat refugees 
from the Balkans was -- given free land in return for a perpetual obligation of military service" (6) 
Finally, a somewhat bizarre case is described in Burns, 
'Immigrants from Islam The Crusaders Use of Muslims as 
Settlers in Thirteenth Century Spain' (American Historial 
Review, 1975). This concerns the importation of Muslim 
settlers to bolster Valencia after its capture from the Moors, 
in the wake of a disappointingly slow influx of Christians. 
The Israeli colonization of lands conquered in 
June 1967, however, had a second base for which few parallels 
can be found in other instances of strategic settlement - the 
temptation to re-establish the biblical Jewish presence on 
The West Bank. In the beginning it. formed only a subsidiary 
element in Israel's settlement policy but the very existence 
of the territorial opportunity to implement 'historic rights' 
quickly produced a steadily strengthening surge of religious 
nationalism in the Israeli political system. Ten years 
later this had gained such a hold that, in Menahem Begin's 
first year, it dominated official activity on the West Bank. 
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Perhaps only in the Crusades and in the Spanish 
'recongista' can one find echoes of colonization with such 
dual foundations - built on the strange but potent combin- 
ation of cold military logic encapsulated in mystical 
millenial vision. Certainly in the last two centuries the 
post 1967 Israeli colonization stands alone - there is 
nothing to relate it to except its own background in the 
history of Zionism and Zionist settlement in Palestine 
(for detailed comment here see P. 146). Above all its dist- 
inctive bases make it a quite different phenomenon from 
European colonization of the New World and any comparisons 
would be both facile and futile. In short one is dealing 
with a phenomenon unique in modern history and as this thesis 
is the first substantive analysis of it what follows is to 
a large degree a voyage through uncharted waters. 
III. The Thesis Structure 
After a brief description of the author's activities 
in gathering primary materials the remainder of the introd- 
uction is devoted to describing briefly the physical and 
cultural environment of the principal areas considered in 
the thesis - the West Bank, the Jordan Rift and the Golan 
Heights. Thereafter, with the regional setting provided, the 
main analysis of settlement change resulting from war and 
boundary shifts breaks into two parts. 
a) The Refugees 
Chapter II provides an overview of the various refugee move- 
ments caused by Arab-Israeli hostilities between 1967 and 
1970. It also incorporates a critique of the published 
4 
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statistical sources. 
Chapter III opens a detailed consideration of the 1967 
flight of native West Bankers to the East Bank of the Jordan. 
Topics examined include the existence of two types of move- 
ment, the reliability of the data base, possible reasons 
for spatial variation in the scale of settlement desertion, 
and the paradox of a lack of correlation between the geog- 
raphy of the flight and the geography of the June 1967 
fighting. 
Chapter IV continues the analysis of the flight of native 
West Bankers by presenting the results of a survey of 944 
displaced persons conducted by the author in an East Bank 
refugee camp. This provides an opportunity for deeper 
discussion of some of the topics raised. in Chapter III as 
well as for a detailed description of the actual mechanics 
of the 1967 exodus. 
Chapter V considers the immediate sequel to the June 1967 
War - the War of Attrition in the Jordan Rift. The strands 
linking the 1967 West Bank exodus, the beginning of secon- 
dary hostilities, the generation of new refugee flows, and 
the origins of the Jordanian Civil War are examined in some 
depth, as also is the impact of the War of Attrition on 
the general cultural landscape of areas bordering the new 
cease-fire lines. 
b) The Settlers 
Chapter VI shifts the scene from settlement desertion to 
the creation of new settlement structures - from out- 
movements of Arabs to in-movements of Jews. First a frame- 
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work for analyzing 'Israeli occupied territory colonization 
in the context of underlying political processes is est- 
ablished. ' The author then proceeds to review the origins 
of the colonization in the light both of Israel's historic 
experience and the geo-strategic opportunity created by 
the territorial conquest. 
Chapter VII presents the first of two case studies exem- 
plifying the steady growth of the new settlement structures 
in the decade after the June 1967 War. On the Golan Heights, 
because of near-total settlement desertion by the Syrian ' 
population, Israeli colonization implied a complete trans- 
formation in the regional cultural landscape. The progress 
of the transformation,, encompassing agricultural activities, 
a new physical infrastructure and the progressive extension 
of the settlement pattern, is documented and associated 
planning analyzed. The impact of the October 1973 War 
between Israel and Syria is also considered. 
Chapter VIII examines the establishment of the new Jewish 
settlement structure in the Jordan Rift. The Jordan Rift 
case is significant owing. to its centrality in the Israel 
Labour Party's concept of 'defensible boundaries' and also 
because of resource conflict between the new structure and 
the residual Arab population, as regards both lands and 
water. 
Chapter IX returns to 'a general consideration of the'Israeli 
colonization in all the occupied territories, moving from 
the overview of the first six years presented in Chapter VI 
to an overview of developments between the October 1973 War 
and the'end of the first fifteen months of the Likud 
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Government (September 1978). Central themes include the 
strengthening of 'historic rights' and religious mysticism 
as a major motivation for colonization between 1975 and 
1978 and the fluctuating influence of factors acting against 
settlement programmes, the latter assuming particular 
prominence in 1974-75 and, above all, in the wake of the 
September 1978 Camp David Summit. To conclude the author 
attempts to briefly assess factors relevant to the future 
of the colonization. Will this war associated landscape 
feature survive or prove merely ephemeral? Could its fate 
differ from area to area? 
IV. Gathering Research Material 
To obtain the necessary data for the thesis the 
author made two field expeditions to the Middle East; the 
first to Jordan and Israel between March and November 1976 
and the second to Israel alone between November 1977 and 
February 1978. 
On the 1976 visit the author spent four and 
one-half months in Amman and three months in Jerusalem. 
Amman was used as a base for work both on 1967 displaced 
persons and on the effects of the War of Attrition in the 
East Jordan Valley. The author received considerable- 
assistance from the Supreme Ministerial Council for 
Displaced Persons, the Jordan Valley Commission, UNRWA 
and the University of Jordan and used records kept by the 
first three institutions. Regular short excursions were 
also made into the East Jordan Valley, and in July the 
author conducted a sample survey of displaced persons in 
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Baga'a emergency camp, on the East Bank plateau I north of 
Amman (figure 24). The survey procedure-is described in 
full in Chapter IV. 
In mid-August 1976 the author moved to Jerusalem, 
to continue work on the West Bank refugees in the 'source' 
region and to initiate the study of Israeli settlement. 
policy. Institutions from which information was gathered 
and whose personnel aided the author included, the, Jewish 
Agency, the Jewish National Fund, the United Nations 
Disengagement Observor Force and local offices of UNRWA. 
The author also travelled extensively in the Golan, Heights, 
the West Bank, the Jordan Rift, -Sinai and the Gaza approaches, 
making useful contacts with both Arab-, residents and Israeli 
settlers. 
The 1977-78 visit involved ä stay of two and 
one-half months in Jerusalem, which the author devoted ' 
almost exclusively to deepening his understanding of Israeli 
settlement policy. Further valuable assistance and inform- 
ation was obtained from the Jewish Agency and the Jewish 
National Fund and much time was spent in perusing such 
sources as the Knesset debates and the Hebrew Press. The 
author was also aided by staff at the Hebrew University, 
the University of Bar Ilan and Tel Aviv University and 
interviewed Knesset members. Several excursions were made 
to Israeli settlements on the Golan Heights and the West 
Bank. 
Finally, the author has invested much time and 
effort in learning both Hebrew and Arabic, especially in 
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1976-77. Without some command of the two languages the 
work in this thesis would have been impossible. 
V. The Regional Setting 
(i) Historical Background 
Figure 1 shows the regions examined in the thesis. 
The pre June 1967 boundaries were established as a result 
of the 1948-49 Arab-Israeli War, which saw the emergence 
of the state of Israel on 77% of the territory of mandatory 
Palestine. Of the remainder the bulk (20% ), thereafter 
known as the 'West Bank', became attached to-the-Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan while Gaza (3%) passed under Egyptian 
control. More than 700,000 Palestinian Arabs fled from 
lands incorporated into the state of Israel, including 
c. 180,000 to the West Bank, c. 190,000 to the Gaza Strip 
and c. 170,000 to East Jordan. Because of the unreliability 
of the relevant statistics (discussed in Chapter II) it is 
difficult to assess what proportion of the total popul- 
ations of the West and East Banks these refugees and their 
children represented in early 1967, but in each case it 
would appear to have been at least one-third. By 1967 
large numbers were living outside the UNRWA refugee camps, 
principally in the main West Bank towns and in Amman. 
The Six Day War of June 1967 has been the most 
important episode of Arab-Israeli fighting to date as 
regards geographical coverage and the most dramatic of 
the post 1949 confrontations as regards effects on settle- 
ment patterns. During the campaign Israel captured 
territories amounting to three times her own size - 
20 
70,000 km2 including Sinai, Gaza, the West Bank and the 
Syrian Golan plateau. Figure 1 shows the cease-fire lines 
established on the eastern front, lines only slightly 
modified by the October 1973 War. The new territorial 
status-quo has now persisted for more than eleven years. 
(ii) Environmental Context 
From the geo-strategic aspect perhaps the single 
most important feature of the regions under study is their 
relatively small scale. Israel's entire eastern front 
from Hermon in the north to Eilat in the south is only 
550 km in length, and none of the relevant capital cities 
(Jerusalem, Amman and Damascus) is more than 50 km from 
the zone of confrontation. Furthermore, Jordan's main 
belt of settlement is everywhere within 60 km of Israeli 
military positions while, for Israel, the distance from the 
front to the coast at Tel Aviv is a mere 80 km. In this 
highly compact space the two sides can muster an awesome 
and highly sophisticated military arsenal, including up 
to 6000 tanks (comparable with NATO's total strength in 
Western Europe) and more than 1000 modern strike aircraft. 
Such considerations. of small scale and concen- 
trated force, with populated heartlands acutely vulnerable 
to surprise attack, make both sides super-sensitive to the 
military value of any topographical feature which can 
offer the slightest advantage either in delaying or speeding 
an offensive. Thus, on the one hand, Israel is desperately 
unwilling to surrender the terrain benefits accruin_g from 
her post 1967 military presence in the West Bank mountain 
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block'and onthe Golan plateau; above all. she has refused to 
return to the pre-June 1967'boundaries (figure 1) which 
1) were dominated by the afore-mentioned two-features; 
2) restricted the width of Israeli' territory to 12 km in 
her' central-heartland; 3) imposed a need to defend'984 km 
of land frontier as opposed to 673-km after June 1967. 
Equally, from the opposite viewpoint,,. Jordan and Syria. 
are deeply fearful of Israel's current commanding position, 
especially as Israel has the more, advanced and powerful, 
armed forces and has a well-known propensity for, making 
anticipatory. offensives. 
Against this geo-strategic setting the author 
now briefly surveys the various regional environments. 
a) In central Palestine the area considered comprises 
three physiographic units - the humid uplands of Judea 
and Samaria (West' Bank Highlands), the semi-arid Jordan 
Rift, and the humid East Bank plateau (Transjordan). The 
two upland units, 'as divided from the Jordan Rift by the 
300 metre-line (figure 1), are broadly similar in land- 
scape, climate and settlement characteristics. Fertile 
basins and valleys alternate with barren limestone hills, 
average annual rainfall varying between 400 and'750- 
millimetres"and concentrated into the months November-March. 
Both units are densely settled, the populations immediately 
prior to the 1967 War being c. 760,000 An the West Bank 
Highlands (c. 136-per km2) and c. 800,000 on the East Bank 
plateauý(c. 130"per km2) 
(7) 
t 
Turning to the West Bank alone, including the 
western side of the Jordan Rift, post 1967 settlement 
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density varies considerably in detail, both between the 
Highlands and the Rift and within the Highlands (figure 36). 
The variations were markedly accentuated by geographic 
differentiation in the population reductions caused by 
1967 refugee out-movements, movements which generally affected 
peripheral districts disproportionately (see Chapter 3). 
Such losses opened the way to Israeli strategic 
colonization in large areas. This especially applied to 
the Jordan Rift and, outside the West Bank, to the Golan 
Heights. Discussion now concentrates on these two territories, 
which receive special attention in the thesis. 
b) The Jordan Rift, the entire west side of which has 
been under Israeli rule since 1967, is a great trench 
descending from 210 metres below sea level at Lake Tiberias 
to 398 metres below sea level at the northern end of the 
Dead Sea. South of Beit Shean the floor of the Rift consists 
of the narrow entrenched flood-plain of the Jordan River 
(the Zor), the bordering bands of dissected saline wastes. 
(the Katar) and the higher plain (the Ghor), by far the 
largest component and the locale of the great bulk. of Rift 
agriculture. On each side the floor is flanked by mountain 
walls. To the east the hills rise directly to the Trans- 
jordan plateau, between 800 and 1300 metres above the Rift 
bottom. To the West the transition to the highlands of 
Judea and Samaria is more complex. It generally comprises 
a first range flanking the Ghor, an intermediate series of 
mountain basins, and a final rise to the watershed. In 
West Bank territory the entire ascent takes place over a 
distance of 15-25 km, involving an average difference in 
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level between floor and watershed of c. 1000 metres. The 
transition area, termed 'wilderness', is almost entirely 
devoid of substantial vegetation, partly because of low 
rainfall and partly because of destructive grazing 
practices. 
Both flanks of the Rift provide excellent topog- 
raphy for military defence, though the more complex West 
Bank ascent gives a greater opportunity for defence-in- 
depth (plate 1). 
In climate the region varies from semi-arid to 
arid, due to the rain-shadow effect of the West Bank 
highlands. Rainfall (figure 4), 400 m. m. per annum at 
Lake Tiberias, declines rapidly as one moves south, being 
only 100 m. m. per annum at the Dead Sea. Consequently, in 
the Lower Jordan Valley, irrigation is essential for all 
but the most extensive forms of agriculture. Furthermore, 
temperatures increase as rainfall decreases, both from north 
to south and from flanks to floor, reaching their highest 
in the vicinity of Jericho where the mid-winter mean is 
14°C and the mid-summer mean 32°C. This all year-round 
green-house environment provides opportunities, if irrigation 
is available, for continuous cultivation and, in particular, 
for a lucrative investment in winter vegetables. The only 
hazards are strong winds and occasional inversion frosts. 
Figure 5 is a simplified soil map for the western 
side of the Rift, in occupied territory. The best soils 
for agriculture are the brown alluvial deposits found in 
the Zor, along the sides of the Ghor and in the mountain 
PLATE 1 
Plate 1 
West Jordan Rift - final ascent to the Highlands 
(view north from the Ramallah - Jericho road). 
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Plate 1 
West Jordan Rift - final ascent to the Highlands 
(view north from the Ramallah - Jericho road). 
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basins. These have the lowest salt content, the highest 
mineral content and are the easiest for working. Intensive 
cultivation, whether Arab or post 1967 Jewish, follows 
their distribution closely (figure 5 and 64). However, 
since 1967 the western Zor, declared a security zone by 
the Israelis, has been almost entirely deserted. Away 
from the alluvial deposits soils are either thin, stony 
lithosols and rendzinas or, on the Rift floor, saline 
serozems. The latter require considerable effort and 
investment in washing out the salts if they are to be 
utilized, but this can and has been done by some of the 
new Jewish settlements, in particular by Qalia on the 
Dead Sea shore (figure 60). 
The eastern side of the Rift has remained 
Jordanian, but local settlement patterns have been a 
hostage to the repercussions of Israel's occupation of the 
West Bank throughout the period under study. Jordan has 
exploited the 'green-house' potential of the area under 
her control by building the East Ghor irrigation canal 
to convey water southwards from the Yarmouk. The canal, 
on which construction began in 1958, is the focal point 
of an integrated water scheme for the whole length of the 
East Valley, a scheme which will draw water from a Yarmouk 
barrage, from side valley reservoirs and from springs and 
artesian bores. By 1967 the project was already well- 
developed as far south as Damiya. 
c) The area under Israeli control on the Golan 
Heights, as set by the Israel-Syria Disengagement Agreement 
of June 1974, covers 1150 km 
2, 
with a north-south length 
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of approximately 65 km and an east-west dimension varying 
from 12 to 25 km (figure 3). 
` 
Of the region's physiographic 
components the most important is the basalt plateau which 
rises from 300 metres above sea level in the vicinity of 
Lake Tiberias to 1200 metres in the far north, where it 
is crowned by the Hermon massif. Four cross-sections of 
the plateau are depicted in figure 6, representing its 
northern, central and southern portions. In general it 
is a tilted table-land, the main body sloping down towards 
Israel at an average angle of 4°30". 
To the east the watershed is marked by a prominent 
range of volcanic hills (plates 2 and 4) which, together 
with the Hermon shoulder (Ketef ha Hermon) and the Rouqad 
ravine, form the logical base either for defence or attack. 
This is because the watershed line offers downhill access 
to both Galilee in the west and Damascus in the east. On 
the one hand Israel has been extremely reluctant to 
surrender the strategic advantage conferred by her post 
1967 possession of the volcanic hills. Conversely Syria 
regards an Israeli presence only 35 km. from Damascus as 
completely unacceptable. 
As qualification it should be noted that, despite 
the line's evident positional advantages, a major weakness 
exists in the twelve kilometre gap between Rafid and the 
upper end of the Rouqad ravine (figures 3 and 6d). Here 
there are no dominating terrain features and the South 
Golan plateau continues unbroken into Syria. It was in 
this area that the Syrian Army made its major penetration 
in October 1973. (Figure 51). 
PLATE 2 
Plate 2 
North Golan - volcanic peaks and Hermon 
(view north across Druze village of Buqata) 
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To the west the plateau presents a steep-scarp 
to neighbouring portions of metropolitan Israel. ' Prior 
to 1967 control of the scarp gave the Syriaris'a commanding 
military position over the Hula Valley and the Tiberias 
basin, a situation which Israeli Governments have been` 
determined to prevent recurring. From north to south the 
feature may be divided into three parts (figure 3). 
1) In the Hula Valley the scarp towers 400-800 
metres above Israel (plate 3). Further, its strategic 
dominance is enhanced by the fact that the Baniyas spring, 
a major Jordan source, is located on its lower slopes. 
In this sector Syria, as well as engaging in sporadic 
bombardment of the Hula settlements, made open preparations 
for diverting a vital component of Israel's water supply. 
2) Between the Bnot Ya'aqov bridge and the northern 
shore of Lake Tiberias the scarp is less prominent, though 
still quite steep (13025), and is faced by equal or greater 
heights on the Galilee side of the Jordan. Israel's pre 
1967 position here was not particularly disadvantageous. 
3) In the Tiberias basin the scarp again dominates, 
rising 400-500 metres above the lake. Before 1967 the 
city of Tiberias lay open to bombardment while valuable 
agricultural areas from Ein Gev to-the Central Jordan Valley 
lay directly beneath Syrian artillery. . 
Israel has made it abundantly clear that she 
regards her retention of the scarp to be a vital security 
interest; a position which stems from the psychological as 
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much as from the physical benefits of not being visibly 
over-looked by Syrian forces - after all from their 
current locations Syrian missiles, if not artillery, can 
still strike deep into Upper Galilee. Further, Israel 
feels she needs a large part of the plateau to act as a 
'cushion' against attack, giving time to bring reinforce- 
ments up the scarp and to stop any Syrian offensive bursting 
into metropolitan territory.. This does not however mean 
that Israeli forces can make no withdrawal at all from 
the plateau crest. As noted the watershed line has its 
defects and there are alternative, though less satisfactory, 
possibilities. For instance, a line could be drawn from 
Hermon through Har Odem (figure 6a and plate 18) to Har 
Shifon (foreground, plate 4) and thence to Afiq, bissecting 
the Central Golan (figure 3). Indeed, with comprehensive 
demilitarization of sufficient territory to maintain the 
security 'cushion', even larger withdrawals could be made. 
The Hermon shoulder, western-most peak of the 
Hermon massif (2224 metres), is also of great geo-strategic 
value to whichever power occupies it. It is a commanding 
observation point, giving excellent views of southern 
Lebanon (especially over Palestine guerrilla concentrations 
in neighbouring 'Fatahland'), the Golan plateau, much of 
southern Syria and northern Israel. 
In climate the Golan is generally humid and, 
in the north, relatively cool (at Quneitra the average 
monthly temperature range is -2.6°C to 13.6°C in January 
and 14°C to 35°C in August). 
(8) 
Average annual precipit- 
ation is 800 millimetres, though as elsewhere it'is 
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Plate 3 
Golan scarp - Looking down into the Hula Valley 
(telephoto view west across Nimrood castle) 
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concentrated into the November-March period. In addition 
there is great geographic variation (figure 7), rainfall 
on the southern plateau being only 450 millimetres per 
annum, runoff is rapid and above'1000 metres winter snow- 
fall can be heavy (figure 7). As regards the north it 
is often asserted that the intense winter rains, with 
blizzards, mud and freezing temperatures being frequent 
conditions, -inhibit mobile warfare. Such European examples 
as the 1944 Ardennes offensive, however, would suggest 
that this is not necessarily the case. 
Figure 8 depicts the region's soil distribution. 
In the south and in the Batiha (Bethsaida) Valley there 
are considerable tracts of rich alluvium and grumusols, 
while in the north the Quneitra basin and its immediate 
surrounds contain a valuable alluvial pocket. There are, 
however, two factors which militate against a high density 
of agricultural settlement, certainly at Israeli living 
standards. 
1) Apart from the above areas most soils are thin 
and stone-strewn, particularly in the centre and north. 
2) The south, where the most productive land is 
located, is the lowest rainfall area, leading to water 
supply problems. 
In sum, although the cool wet climate of the north has 
offered opportunities for crops hitherto little known in 
Israel, the Golan's physical environment dictates that 
any large scale Israeli colonization include an urban- 
industrial component. 
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(1) Kamen, H. The Iron Century Foreward P. XIV 
(2) Kunz, E. 'The Refugee in Flight'. International 
Migration Review, 1973. P. 125. 
(3) Ibid. P. 141. 
(4) Results of 'American Friends Service Committee' 
study of 1,136 deportees from the West 
Bank 1967-1977. Report in the Financial Times 
9-11-77. 
(5) Canny, N. The Elizabethan Conquest of Ireland. P. 91. 
(6) Macartney, C. Hungary :A Short History, p. 75. 
(7) Estimates based on Jordan's First Census of Population 
and Housing 1961 (Dept. of Statistics, Amman). 
For eriva ion of West Bank figure see table 2: 2. 
East Bank figure assumes a 3% annual growth rf 
1961-67. 
(8) Tokhnit Pituah ha Golan (Settlement Dept. of the 
Jewish Agency, 1 4) P. 9. 
30 
For the reader's convenience it should be noted 
that this thesis contains several aids to a full compre- 
hension of the text, in addition to the specified append- 
ices, tables and figures. Such aids may be classified 
into five categories. 
a) Maps are provided locating virtually all place- 
names (figure 1- general, figure 2- West Bank, figure 3- 
Golan Heights, figures 10 and 12 - West Bank areas, figure 26 - 
Jordan Rift). 
b) Three special maps locate all Jewish settlements 
in the Golan, the Jordan Rift and the Rafiah approaches 
(figures 40,60 and 70). 
c) Appendix I is a full glossary, in particular 
explaining all Hebrew terms used in Part II (e. g. political 
faction labels, technical vocabulary for colonization). 
d) Appendix II gives full lists of the composition 
of Israeli Governments and Parliaments for the period 
1967-1978. 
e) The front pages of the thesis contain : 
1. Tables for converting Israeli lirot and Jordanian 
dinars into sterling. 
2. Acre and square metre equivalents of the 
Israeli/Jordanian area measure known as the dunam. 
3. A list of abbreviations. 
PART. 
THE REFUGEES 
CHAPTER TWO 
FUGITIVES FROM CONFLICT, 1967-1970 
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Demographic upheaval is a frequent though not an 
invariable consquence of war. The occurrence, scale and 
character of a-refugee movement depends on the circumstances 
of the relevant hostilities - on the image an invaded 
population holds of its enemy, on the extent and location 
of the fighting, and on the discipline of the armies. 
Perception is perhaps the most important consid- 
eration. If because of a long history of friction populations 
have little contact and hold distorted and unfavourable images 
of one another conflict between them is likely to lead to 
massive refugee out-movements from invaded territories. The 
operation of this factor may be seen as substantially respon- 
sible for the difference between events like the 1866 Austro- 
Prussian War, which caused relatively little population dis- 
placement, and an event like the 1974 Turkish invasion of 
Cyprus, which led to widespread settlement desertion. In the 
former case one had populations of similar language and culture 
with a high degree of pre-war contact and virtually no pre- 
war animosity - in the latter one had populations with little 
in common and divided by generations of bitter antagonism. 
T. June 1967 i The Arab Exodus from 
Occupied Territory 
The Arab-Israeli War of June 1967 was an example 
of the second type of conflict. All the territories occupied 
by Israel during the June War experienced an immediate and 
substantial out-movement of their Arab residents, both of the 
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native population and of persons who had fled present-day 
Israel in 1948 (table 2: 1). 
Details, however, varied considerably from place 
to place. On the Golan and in the West Jordan Valley,, which 
neighbour lands untouched by the fighting, there was near 
total settlement desertion. In contrast Gaza, Sinai and the 
West Bank Highlands, where most population centres are widely 
separated from territories lying beyond the 1967 war-zone, 
experienced a relatively moderate exodus, nowhere"in excess 
of 30% of the source population. A distance constraint is 
clearly evident, with Gaza being particularly affected 
(table 2: 1) and Sinai providing evidence of both extremes. In 
parts of the peninsula with direct access to mainland Egypt, 
from East Kantara south to Et Tur, most residents fled, as on 
the Golan, whereas in the remote and mountainous centre little 
population loss occurred. 
Overall, out of a pre-war occupied territories 
population of c. 1.4 million between 320,000 and 500,000 left 
their homes in the period June - December 1967, the vast 
majority in June. 
(') 
The discrepancy of 180,000 largely arises from 
uncertainty regarding the magnitude of the out-movement from 
the West Bank, the largest of the 1967 refugee flows. According 
to a Jordan Government estimate 355,000 people had left the 
West Bank by December 1967. 
(2) 
The figure was based on the 
number of ration cards issued and consisted of "two'elements - 
c. 180,000 West Bank natives (Jordanian responsibility) and 
c. 170,000 second-time refugees (United Nations Relief and Works 
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Agency responsibility). 
The estimate of 355,000, however, differs very 
considerably from calculations based on official West Bank 
enumerations conducted before and after the hostilities 
(table 2s2). Jordan's 1961 census gives a West Bank population 
of 805,450, which, when projected forward to 1967 (assuming 
a continuation of 1952-61 trends) increases to 843,263. 
Israeli enumerations of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, 
taken between 17 and 27 September 1967, record a post-war 
residual of 661,739. Comparison with the pre-war projection 
indicates a population loss of 181,524 - only 52% of the 
December Jordanian estimate. 
A small fraction of the gap can be accounted for by 
emigration between September and December, but in the main one 
has to look elsewhere for an explanation. In theory there 
are two possibilities. 
First, the Jordanian out-movement figure of 355,000 
may be a gross inflation. This could arise from such factors 
as families obtaining more than one ration card, which would 
exaggerate family sizes, and continued registration of deceased 
persons. The author has personal knowledge-of cases of West 
Bank refugees holding several ration cards, generally, as, a 
device to extract additional support from the authorities,, 
while both the above noted faults are known to affect United 
Nations statistics for 1948 refugees, many of whom fled for a 
second time in 1967. UNRWA continues to warn that registration 
numbers do "not necessarily reflect the actual refugee popul- 
ation --", 
(3) its 1960-61 report observing that "at least 
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100,000 dead persons must now figure in the Agency's rolls" 
(para. 41). The 1967 ration-recipient total for Jericho 
(97,233), which exceeds the estimated 1967 population of the 
entire West Jordan Valley by 12,454, provides a graphic 
demonstration of the implications for statistical credibility. 
As the rolls remained unreformed after 1967 there seems little 
doubt that such inflation crossed theriver with the exodus - 
indeed in the chaotic situation prevailing on the East Bank 
in late 1967, with tens of thousands of West Bank displaced 
persons being registered and shuffled from place to place, the 
distortions could easily have been not just perpetuated, but 
reinforced. (Appendix IIIb, 1968 and 1969 reports). 
Second, with regard to the census based out-movement 
total of 181,52k, there may be errors in one or both of the 
quoted enumerations, errors tending to depress refugee numbers. 
Specifically, either the Israeli census exaggerates the post- 
war West Bank population or the Jordan census understates the 
1961 situation. The position in Hebron district (table 2s2 ), 
where pre-war and post-war figures are almost identical despite 
Jordanian statistics to the effect that Hebron stood second 
only to the West Jordan Valley as 
(figure 12), would certainly seem 
is amiss with at least one of the 
jection of the 1961 population to 
conclusion that Hebron numbers ac- 
mid-1967. 
a displaced person source 
to indicate that something 
censuses. Indeed the pro- 
1967 leads to the ludicrous 
tually increased through 
Concerning the Israeli census it might be hypothesized 
that some Hebron people, anxious to have Arab numbers as large 
as possible, inflated family sizes when answering the 
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questionnaire. Nonetheless when dealing with the West Bank 
as a whole it is difficult to see how this or any other possible 
bias (see census publication No. 1. "Limitations of the results 
and possible errors",, XXX - XXX11) could account for more than 
a fraction of the monumental gulf between the exodus estimates 
of 181,524 and 355,000. Israel's census, though organized in 
haste and conducted amongst a population which was partially 
hostile, appears to have been efficiently and honestly 
implemented, not least because accurate results were desirable 
for military government purposes - for the planning of public 
services and for the issuing of identity cards. The only 
plausible dissent comes from UNRWA, which alleges that 1948 
refugees are under-estimated owing to a restrictive Israeli 
definition of refugee status. 
(4) 
However, any under-estimation 
of refugee numbers is almost certainly not accompanied by an 
undercount of the total population, as UNRWA charges not present 
in the refugee category are presumably included with the native 
community. In any case even if an overall undercount took 
place the effect of a correction would be to widen the gulf 
between alternative out-movement totals, not to narrow it, 
because inter-censal loss would shrink. 
(5) In fact if the 
Israeli census is taken alone the gulf can only be explained, 
in full or. in part, by a deliberate over-count of massive 
proportions. It is impossible to imagine how'such an over- 
count could be either concealed or be in Israel's interests. 
Consequently it may-be assumed that the answer to the numbers 
problem does not lie in the Israeli figures. 
Difficulties posed by the Jordan census are both 
more tangible and more serious. Here ambiguities in the 
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introduction, including contradictions between the English 
and Arabic texts, raise some question as to whether several 
West Bank refugee camps, particularly those in urban areas, 
are enumerated. Section 6.2 of the English introduction 
observes "fully urban includes the population resident in 
all localities of 10,000 inhabitants or more (excluding 
localities inhabited only by-Palestinian refugees)" and 
A, a 
"mainl rural includes the population resident in all'other 
localities (including Palestinian refugee camps lying outside 
towns)". As these are the only "mode of living" categories 
(apart from scattered tents) there is immediate-uncertainty as 
to whether urban refugee camps are counted at all, despite 
the general claim for major geographical divisions that "the 
entire population of the district is included. " The implic- 
ations are far-reaching - for example if the census excludes 
Hebron urban refugees and so substantially under-estimates 
the real 1961 district population the impossible phenomenon 
of a 1967 "increase" immediately becomes explicable. 
Generally, then, the possibility arises that the 
Jordan census is an under-count. 
The uncertainty is intensified when the English and 
Arabic introductions are compared. In a footnote to section 
6.2 the English reads "no data were collected on refugee 
status" whereas a direct translation of the Arabic states "no 
particular data were collected on refugees". There is a 
considerable difference between "refugee status" and "refugees" 
and the Arabic could be interpreted as implying that camp 
residents are entirely excluded from the census. There 
is 
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also the divergence between 
The inhabitants of Palestinian refugee camps are a 
distinct category, but cannot be presented as such 
because of a commitment by the department not to 
reveal the numbers reported. (English - implies 
that refugee camps are incorporated, but not 
independently listed). (6) 
and 
The inhabitants of the refugee camps form a distinct 
category, but an exposition of particular data on them 
is not possible because the department has undertaken 
not to publish their number (translated Arabic - vague 
as to inclusion). (6) 
The above-mentioned footnote is appended to this statement 
ambiguity compounded by contradiction. A studied avoidance 
of the term "Palestinian" in the Arabic text may also be 
noted. 
Three possibilities exist concerning the position 
of the West Bank refugee camps in the 1961 census : total 
exclusion, partial exclusion or total inclusion. 
(7) No 
clear-cut statement is provided and because there is no 
"refugee" category conclusions fron the district data can 
only be inferences. 
Camp populations, if present, are buried in the rural 
residuals and in urban and village totals. In towns where 
numbers are large relative to likely camp totals, for example 
Nablus and Jerusalem, no inferences are possible. For an 
answer, at least as regards detectable cases (mostly rural), 
one thus has to rely on rural residuals and the Jericho 
distr. ct statistics. 
With regard to rural residuals there are, two cases - 
Qalandia and DeirDibwan - where quoted figures are very:, 
substantial relative to area populations and where the only 
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conceivable explanation is that the residuals represent the 
two local refugee camps. In Qalandia the residual figure is 
63% of the total and its size (5734) is almost exactly equal 
to the 1967 UNRWA estimate for Qalandia camp (51+71). 
Jericho is a slightly more difficult case, though 
again an inference can be made with some confidence. A popul- 
ation of 10,166 is quoted for Jericho town, the total for the 
remainder of the district being 53,814. It is of course unknown 
what proportion of the latter figure is"taken up by the outer 
fringe of the urban area, but there are two strong reasons for 
suspecting that the 53,814 does in fact"include the three large 
refugee camps (Aqabat Jaber, Ain-as Sultan and' Nuweimah -' 
figure 2 ). First, because of th& desolate environment'and 
the paucity of rural settlement it is absolutely certain that 
the native farming population could not have been more than a 
small fraction of the figure. Even if one assumes the 
inclusion of several thousand urbanites there would probably 
still be a gap of at least 30,000. Second, Jericho differs 
from most other enumeration districts in that no statistics 
are given for individual villages. In view of the introductory 
comment 
distribution data are presented for all principal 
administrative and census divisions, except where 
such would have cast light on the population 
enumerated in Palestinian re ee camps or Jordan 
Army encampments (English) 
it may be assumed that an element is incorporated which the 
Jordan Government wished to conceal. Although there were 
several small army bases in the vicinity in 1961 the only 
element which could conceivably inflate the "remainder of 
district" figure to 53,814 would be the camp. refugee population. 
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An age-sex profile which closely follows that for the 
Jerusalem governorate as a whole, unlikely if there was 'a 
substantial military component, supports this' conclusion 
(table 2s3). 
(9) 
On the basis of the above remarks the author is 
forced to one (or a combination) of three conclusions con- 
cerning the Jordan census. 
a) That all refugee camps are included but, in view 
of-the fact that the total indicated for the. Jericho camps 
(c. 30,000), is substantially below the corresponding UNRWA 
estimates (c. 50,000), 
(10) 
are deliberately concealed owing 
to fears regarding the political repercussions of revising 
Palestinian refugee figures downwards. Such revision could 
have caused friction between the Jordan Government and UNRWA 
on the one side and Palestinian organizations on the other 
(see Appendix IIIb for cases of hostile reaction to UNRWA's 
own attempts to rectify anomalies in refugee registration) 
or might have been used by Israel to discredit UNRWA and 
intensify attacks on Arab estimates of 1948-49 refugee flows. 
A hint that the census-takers did in fact find some camp 
populations to be lower than UNRWA reports and Government 
sources had suggested is given in'the note - 
of those normally resident in camps some were tempor- 
arily absent on Census Day in part-time jobs. To 
present data on size of refugee cams would substant- 
ially understate their numbers. (6) 
the absentee excuse is possibly a diversion tactic - in 
reality it could apply to any population centre. 
b) That some-urban refugee camps have been entirely 
excluded from the final census tables. This suspicion arises 
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from the confusion in the 'mode of living' categories and 
from the fact that exclusion of urban as opposed to rural 
camps would be extremely difficult to detect, especially 
as no statistics areprovided for internal sub-divisions 
of major West Bank urban areas. 
(11) 
The Hebron case has 
already been noted and in Jericho exclusion of Ain as 
Sultan camp (on the fringes of the town) would provide an 
alternative explanation for the incompatability between the 
census derived estimate for Jericho refugees and the UNRWA 
statistics. Reasons for dropping some urban camps; if 
this has occurred, -can only be-surmised - perhaps-the -, 
Jordanians wished to keep the number, and hence-the perc- 
entageýof Palestinians in the national total, as low as'' 
possible without manipulation being too obvious. 
On the other hand the author's comments on the 
matter of rural residuals indicates that most, if not all, 
rural refugee concentrations are definitely included in the 
census tables. 
c) That, if all camps are included (as the Jordanians 
strenuously insist), the census as a whole is an undercount, 
both for 1948 refugees and for the native population. This 
possibility is suggested because, if one assumes all camps 
are present and the 1967 Israeli census is substantially 
accurate, a general 1961 undercount is the only explanation 
remaining for the difficulties arising when one compares, 
for example, the 1961 and 1967 Hebron totals. (table 2i2). 
There are thus severe problems with the Jordan 
census, but because of the impossibility of coming to a 
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definite conclusion about the exact nature of the defects 
on the evidence available, the author has had no choice 
but to use the census figures as they stand as one of 
the data sources for the analysis conducted in Chapter 3. 
Difficulties are, however, alleviated by two considerations: 
a) most geographical distinctions discussed in! 
Chapter 3-are of such magnitude that there can be little 
doubt that they reflect reality. 
b) for the central part of the West Bank the author 
has a second source entirely independent from Jordanian 
official statistics, a source which supports the comment 
made in (a) (P. 59 and Appendix Iila). The main warning 
that needs to be made, therefore, is that calculations 
partially based on the 1961 census should not be seen as 
exact reflections of real world circumstances, but merely 
as approximate indications of reality - in many cases the 
only indications possible. Much the same may also be said 
regarding the detailed Jordanian statistics for displaced 
persons (P. 58 and Appendix IV a). 
To conclude, insufficient information is available 
for an exact apportionment of responsibility for the gap 
of 180,000 between the highest and lowest estimates for the 
1967 West Bank exodus. Two observations can, however, be 
made. First, because the evidence for inflation in the 
Jordanian official estimate of c. 355,000 is clearer and of 
more obviously far-reaching effect than is the evidence for 
census error, it is probable that the actual scale of the 
exodus was closer to the census derived figure of 181,524. 
On this basis a compromise estimate would place the true 
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out-movement total at approximately 250,000. Second, any 
census error that does exist is more likely to accrue from 
a Jordanian undercount than from an. Israeli overcount, if 
only because doubt is more. readily cast on the 1961 census than 
on tha-; for September 1967. 
It should be stressed that revision of the Jord- 
anian official figures does not in any way detract from the 
magnitude of the human tragedy or from the scale of settle- 
ment desertion,. which in some parts of the West Bank. was 
almost total., A loss of 250,000 from a population of only 
843,000 (30%) remains a very significant event. k 
II. The War of Attrition Secondary 
Population Movement 
The 1967 refugee flows were only the first of two 
sets of demographic upheaval associated with the new phase 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict. In the atmosphere of 
intensified bitterness the new border-lines quickly 
became the scene of a second stage of hostilities - the 
War of Attrition. The War of Attrition, which lasted from 
late 1967 to August 1970, proved a quite different 
phenomenon from the June war which preceded it and the 
Yom Kippur War which followed it. . Instead of short mobile 
engagements it involved prolonged periods of in-situ 
fighting, generally of low intensity but occasionally 
flaring-up into major clashes. In both, the, Suez Canal 
zone and the East Jordan Valley the aerial and artillery 
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bombardments quickly created conditions intolerable 
for the local populations. As a result 1968 and 
1969 saw the almost complete evacuation of these two 
areas -a displacement of almost one million people. 
Population movement caused by the War of 
Attrition differed from that caused by the June War 
in several major respects. First the displacement 
was much larger - the exodus from the Canal cities of 
Port Said, Ismailiya and Suez was greater than any of 
the out-movements of June 1967. Second the displace- 
went was essentially short-term, lasting only until 
tolerable security conditions were restored. Repop- 
ulation (Jordan Valley 1971 - 72, Suez Canal 1974 - 75) 
has occurred because, unlike the June War, "attrition" 
did not lead to a change of ruling authority in the 
regions it affected. Hence there was no intervening 
barrier erected like that which still precludes the 
return of the people who fled the occupied territories. 
Iii. The Golan Exodus 
The West Bank exodus has been the most pub- 
licised of the out-movements sparked by the events of 
1967-1970. Yet, putting it into a wider perspective, it 
involved lesser absolute numbers than did the Suez Canal 
shifts and, even when analysis is restricted to 1967, 
it takes second place to the Syrian exodus in terms of 
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magnitude relative to source population (table 21l). 
Out-movement from the Golan Heights deserves comment both 
for itself - an extreme case of settlement desertion - 
and as an introduction to themes explored in greater depth 
in following chapters. 
Discussion is here based on a comparison of the 
1960 Syrian census with the August 1967 Israeli count. 
Again there is the possibility that the enumerations do 
not give an entirely accurate portrayal of reality. Con- 
cerning the Syrian census the sensitive location of the 
Golan must raise some question as to whether village totals 
include military personnel and their families, despite 
an introductory comment asserting that 
"all persons found in one place at the time 
of the enumeration were counted, whether (12) they were residents'or temporary visitors. " 
Furthermore if there is any truth in the observations 
made-in the United Nations Gussing report (p, 46 ), 
the possibility arises that Israeli figures may not include 
residual populations regarded as inconvenient and hence 
liable to be encouraged to leave. Certainly, although 
a cross-check between the out-movement estimate obtained 
by census comparison and the post-war refugee counts made 
by UNRWA does not reveal any discrepancy equivalent to 
that existing in the West Bank case, the official statistics 
need to be treated with some caution. 
The 1960 Syrian census indicates a Golan popul- 
ation of 91,933, distributed as depicted in figure 41. 
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Despite several obvious concentrations no part of the region 
could be said to have been poorly peopled. It is assumed 
that the pattern includesc. 17,000 1948 Palestine refugees 
registered with UNRWA. 
Israel's 1967 enumeration shows a drastic change - 
total desertion of all parts of the Golan with the exception 
of six villages in the north, five of them Druze. This is 
the situation depicted in figure 42. 
Calculation of the difference between the two 
enumerations gives a population fall of 85,537,93% 
of the 1960 census total, though this must not be inter- 
preted as being synonymous with the war-provoked exodus. 
To represent it as such one has to make two dubious 
assumptions - that there was no change between 1960 and 
the war and that the two censuses are entirely reliable. 
Nonetheless the calculation provides a strong indication 
as to the scale of the out-movement, if not an actual figure, 
and it accords reasonably with the subsequent counts 
made of refugee concentrations in and around Damascus, 
counts which pointed to an exodus of approximately 
100,000. 
Unfortunately even this degree of confidence 
vanishes when one comes to the matter of the exact fate 
of these people during and after the fighting and the 
reasons for the near-totality of settlement desertion. 
Here official accounts are entirely contradictory. 
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Israel claims that all except 5875WDruze, 385 
Alawis and a few hundred others, mostly Circassians in 
Quneitra, were either evacuated before the fighting or fled 
with the retreating Syrian army in 9-10 June. 
(13) 
According 
to aHa-aretz report 
(13) 
even the Quneitra`residual 
rapidly declined after the war, with 90 crossing the cease- 
fire line in July, departees being obliged to sign concern- 
ing their "voluntary departure". The scale of the movement 
is accounted for, at least in part, by the assertion that 
the bulk of Golanites depended on the region's military 
system for their livelihood and so could be expected to 
leave immediately that system collapsed. 
Syria, though not denying a panic-stricken exodus 
during the battle itself, hotly disputes the Israeli version. 
Syria claims that large numbers remained behind in agricul- 
tural villages after the cease-fire and these were gradually 
forced to move by the Israeli Army, through physical and psych- 
ological pressure, in following months. The implication is that, 
as the relative size of the displacement was much greater than 
on the West Bank, intimidation was also more extensive. 
(14) 
Tentative observations by the United Nations Special 
Representative (on the Golan 7-8 August 1967) incorporate 
elements of both views. The Gussing Report notes "there 
are strong indications that the majority -- had left before 
the end of hostilities" but then goes on to indicate the 
presence of a residual population (size unspecified) in the 
post-war period, a residual which gradually disappeared. 
Some allusion is made to residents being - 
"frightened by incidents such as shooting in the air 
and the rounding up of civilians -- the Special 
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Representative felt that it was likely that many such 
incidents had taken place and that the Israel Defence 
Forces had not viewed unfavourably the impact qf juch 
incidents on the movement of the population" (15 
However, concrete evidence is not provided and 
hence, as with the West Bank exodus figures, a final con- 
clusion is impossible. The relevant point is that the Israel 
Government had from an early stage an almost deserted 
territory with which to work - on which to impose its own 
population pattern. Figures 41-44 depict the continuing 
demographic and settlement transformation on the Golan, a 
process given detailed attention in Chapter 7. 
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(1) See analysis of refugee camp survey results, P. 80 
88.3% of the sample left either during the 
war or immediately beforehand. 
(2) Supreme Ministerial Committee for Displaced Persons 
(Amman - also = Joint Ministerial Committee for 
Relief) - reports for May and June-July 1968. An 
estimate of 361,000 for June 1968 is given (both 
first and second-time refugees), from which 5,938 
January - May arrivals are here subtracted. 
(3) UNRWA - Report of Commissioner-General for 1966-67#P-11- 
(4) Elaboration in Buehrig, The U. N. and the Palestinian 
Refugees P. 40. 
(5) A similar result would ensue if the pre-war West Bank 
population was slightly lower than indicated 
in the author's projection from the 1952 and 
1961 censuses, owing to an acceleration in out- 
migration after 1961. The possibility of such an 
acceleration is discussed by Uziel Shmeltz in 
Shmueli, Grossman and Zevi (editors), Judea and 
Samaria - Studies in Settlement Geography P-82-92 (Hebrew). 
(6) Jordan Census, 1961. Arabic and English Introductions, 
section 6.2. (Volume 1, Final Tables). 
(7) One passage in the census Methods Report comments that due to the 'commitment' not to reveal camp numbers "special attention was paid to them (the camps) 
during all phases of the census". The phrase 'special attention' clearly has ominous overtones. (Volume 4, Methods Report, P. 41). 
(8) Jordan Census, 1961. English Introduction, section 6.3., 
P. xv. 
(9) In fact the Jericho military encampments do have a 
slight influence on the table2: 3 figures, as may 
be seen from the proportions in the male age- 
groups 15-24,25-29, and 30-39 - somewhat higher for Jericho : rural than for Jerusalem in general. 
(10) The 1967 UNRWA ration 
camps = 53,645. 
(Source - UNRWA, 
recipient total for the three 
Ramallah). 
(11) Except such crude distinctions as 'Old City' and 'New 
City' in Jerusalem. 
(12) Census of Syria, 1960 - Damascus Muhafaza 
(13) Ha= 16-8-67 P. 4., 12-9-67 P. 1. (on 'evacuees') 
(14) United Nations - Report of the Secretary General under 
General Assembly Resolution 2252 (ES-V) and Security 
Council Resolution 237-A/6797 and. S/8158-P. 7. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE 1967 WEST BANK EXODUS : GENERAL THEMES- 
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I The Highlands s Short and Long-range 
Movements 
As on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts the most- 
notable feature of the June 1967 Israeli campaign on the 
West Bank of Jordan was the extraordinary speed of execution, 
largely owing to overwhelming Israeli air superiority. 
Fighting lasted less than three days. The first Israeli 
thrusts were launched at 5 p. m. on Monday 5 June, following 
eight hours of Jordanian sniping and shelling along the West 
Bank border. These were directed at East Jerusalem and the 
surrounds of Jenin, where Jordanian artillery was threatening 
the Ramat David air base. The development of the campaign 
through 6 June and 7 June is depicted in figure 9. On 
Tuesday the Israelis captured Jerusalem and pushed north to 
Ramallah, the Jordanian headquarters. Ramallah was also the 
target of an up-hill thrust from the Latrun area in the west. 
Further north, Qalgilia and Jenin were taken and a two-pronged 
drive on Nablus was set in motion. By the following 
afternoon the West Bank highlands were completely overrun, 
fighting being concluded on Wednesday evening with swift 
advances on the Damiya and Allenby bridges in the Jordan 
Valley. 
The character of the campaign affected the scale 
of the refugee out-movement in several significant respects. 
First the local population had not expected either war or, 
an Israeli victory. The speed of the Israeli advance thus 
had a severe demoralizing effect. - In their report on a 
survey conducted among 1967 refugees three months after the 
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war Peter Dodd and Halim Barakat comment - 
The sudden, unexpected and rapid defeat threw many 
people off-balance. A state of turmoil existed and 
very few knew what to do. It is relevant here to 
recall the case of the woman who picked up a pillow 
and ran away with it, thinking it was her child -- 
Arab civilians simply were not prepared for h 
war -- nobody was available to give advice. 
lý 
Psychological pressure was reinforced by intensive Israeli 
aerial activity, terrifying to a people unused to this type 
of warfare. Villages adjacent to main roads, along which 
the Israelis harried the retreating Jordanian army, were 
particularly liable to air attack. 
In such conditions of extreme stress it is not 
surprising that large numbers abandoned their homes and 
sought safety in flight. On most parts of the West Bank 
Highlands, however, the initial movement was not in the 
direction of the Jordan bridges, but merely involved a shift 
to places away from actual or potential axes of fighting : 
to hills, orchards, caves or villages at a distance from 
the main roads. Beit Ur Tahta (1400 people), on the line 
of the Israeli thrust from Latrun to Ramallah town, illust- 
rates the point well. This settlement was one of 39 local- 
ities visited by Antranik Bakerjan, UNRWA area officer'at 
Ramallah, in the fortnight after the war. Here he noted - 
was fighting in and around village and one woman killed. 
Whole population fled for safety with exception of some 
elderly people who stayed behind. No houses demolished. 
Villagers who fled returned after four days. Village (2) 
was searched - considerable looting has been reported. 
Qalandia, a camp for 1948 refugees on the Jerusalem-Ramallah 
highway (5,500 people), was similarly affected. Here several 
artillery shells fell around the mosque minaret, causing an 
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immediate evacuation. 
The border town of Qalgilia. (14,000 people), where 
numerous Jordanian troops and artillery pieces had been con- 
centrated, was the largest centre to experience such tempor- 
ary desertion. 'Three-quarters of the residents left-before or 
during the Israeli assault on Tuesday 6, June, the remainder 
being advised to depart by the Israeli-military commander 
after-the town's capture. - Those on-foot-took refuge; in nearby 
hills and caves while those with vehicles proceeded to Nablus. 
Of course once the population had been destabilized 
in this fashion further movement quickly followed. Large 
numbers, fearful "of dishonour coming to the family through 
molestation of its women -- of'young, men in the family being 
arrested -- and of massacres such as the one at Deir Yassin, "(3) 
headed for the East Bank almost immediately and by the late 
afternoon of 6 June streams of Highland refugees were crossing 
the Jordan Valley floor. B' 
At the forefront went the people fleeing Jerusalem. 
Jerusalem was the scene of the earliest and most intense - 
fighting-and, as the city and its-'environs-had their back to 
the Wilderness of Judea little local refuge existed for those 
wishing to escape the bullets and shells. -Israeli advances 
through Abu Tor and Silwan (figure 9 during which many 
men were taken into custody, produced mass panic in these , 
suburbs, and as residents fled-eastward they generated 
further movement. Their destination was Jericho' nearest` 
haven on the route away from the invasion (35 kilometres), "-. 
and from Jericho the final shift across the Allenby bridge, 
was a short and logical step. 
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The first refugees were soon joined on the East 
Bank by many who had left villages and UNRWA camps for 
temporary shelter in the fields and thereafter by others 
who had remained in their homes throughout the war but who 
were frightened by the behaviour of the Israel' security 
forces'in'the initial weeks of the occupation. ' With regard 
to the post-war refugees it'should however be noted that 
although out-migration between the cease-fire and mid July 
involved'considerable numbers in absolute terms its signifi- 
cance relative to the war-time exodus is problematic and 
probably secondary, its proportion of the total possibly 
being less than 20%. (4) 
Gussing makes some hints as to factors responsible 
for the continuing outflow, but as with the Golan exodus he 
is unable to arrive at a definite conclusion - 
There are persistant reports of acts of intimidation 
by Israel armed forces and of Israel attempts to 
suggest to the population, by loudspeakers mounted 
on cars, that they might be better off on the 
East Bank. (5) 
At the local level the pattern of war-time events 
on the West Bank was extremely complex, village experiences 
varying greatly over short distances. Again Antranik 
Bakerjan's 39 village; record provides excellent exemplif- 
! cation. In Kharbata, five kilometres from the frontier, 
where residents fled into the countryside on the first day 
of the invasion "because of the danger of fighting" 600 out 
of a pre-war population of 1100 soon left for the East Bank, 
despite the fact that "no looting was reported and no damage 
to houses". Kharbata's neighbour to the west, Deir Qaddis, 
target of much firing owing to "the existence of a military 
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post" within the built-up area, also, experienced an early 
temporary evacuation (for three days) and a permanent 
reduction in numbers amounting to approximately half the 
pre-war total. In contrast at Kufr Ni'ma, six kilometres 
to the east, people stayed in their homes throughout the 
fighting and virtually no population loss occurred, "with 
the exception of a few married women who escaped to join 
husbands working on the East Bank". Hostilities did not 
affect Kufr Ni'ma, which is set back from the main'roads, 
and "no looting was reported". 
From these cases it is clear that some correlation 
existed between temporary settlement desertion and the 
occurrence of large-scale permanent movement - once destab- 
ilized people were more likely to flee to the East Bank. 
However, the one did not always lead to the other. For 
example Beit Ur Tahta, subject to wholesale desertion during 
the war, eventually lost only 350 people out of 1400. A 
similar recovery took place in Qalgilia. Initially the 
Israelis tried to prevent the town's repopulation, claiming 
that many buildings were in danger of collapse and that there 
was a public health risk. Qalgilia people travelling back 
from Nablus were thus stopped at Azun, but after the Mayor 
had seen the Minister of Defence in Jerusalem the military 
authorities allowed resettlement to proceed, albeit reluc- 
tantly. The road-blocks to the east were lifted 'at '5 ä. me 
on 28 June and by the end of the month most of the 14; 000 
residents were back. They returned to a town which had 
suffered large-scale looting and which was in part reduced 
to rubble. Of 2000 houses the Mayor claimed that 850 had 
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been demolished - 830 after the occupation. 
(5) It is 
possible that the Israelis had at one stage toyed with the 
idea of clearing the entire Qalqilia area, perhaps in 
similar style to the bulldozing of three villages in the 
Latrun salient, so paving the way for de-facto incorpor- 
ation into metropolitan Israel. 
It. The Emptying of the West Jordan Valley 
One of the notable features of the West Bank 
exodus was the contrast in magnitude between the outflow 
from the Highlands and that from the West Jordan Valley. 
Even on the most inflated estimates the Highlands could not 
have lost more than 37% of their pre-war population 
(probably c. 20%) whereas in the West Valley, according to 
census based estimates (table 2: 1) 87% left. This is 
particularly curious as virtually all the fighting took 
place in the Highlands, which, except in the north, lie 
between the Valley and Israel. On the Highlands themselves 
frontier districts suffered the greatest demographic upheaval 
(figure 11 ), both for short distance flight within the West 
Bank and for out-movement across the Jordan river. Why then 
should the reverse apply in the relationship between the 
Highlands and West Valley outflows? 
Three factors peculiar to the West Valley go some 
way toward providing an explanation. First, because of the 
immediate proximity of the bridges, much of the movement that 
on the Highlands never developed beyond temporary settlement 
desertion internal to the West Bank was in the Valley trans- 
ferred to the East Bank, from which there was little prospect 
of return after 10 June. In distance terms the West Valley 
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equivalent of a Qalgilia-Nablus shift is a 'Jericho-Amman 
one and hence a comparison between out-movements which does 
not take account of shifts within-Highland districts may 
well be invalid.; I 
Second, as intermediate zone between Highland- 
sources and East Bank destinations, the West Valley exper- 
ienced in full the psychologically disturbing effect of-being 
an area of -passage for large refugee flows. In such conditions 
the fact that it saw none-of the major ground fighting merely 
rendered-its-inhabitants especially prone to rumours, and 
exaggerations, presumably including highly coloured. accounts 
of evictions and atrocities. Asa result-it may be assumed 
that the West, Valley exodus was at least in part a chain- 
reaction response to the larger eastward movement from the 
Highlands. 
Third, in the huge UNRWA camps surrounding Jericho 
town, the West Valley housed-the West Bank's . greatest. single 
concentration of persons who were already fugitives from 
conflict - from the 1948-49 war.. Aqabat Jaber, Ain as Sultan 
and Nuweimah supplied at least 65% of the region's refugees, 
being abandoned by the vast majority of their 53,645(7) 
residents on-Wednesday, 7 June, despite the fact, that no. . 
hostilities occurred in their vicinity. An examination of 
the peculiar conditions of mounting psychological insecurity 
which precipitated the abandonment, accounting for perhaps 
25% of the overall West Bank exodus, is highly instructive. 
(8) 
Jericho's first view of the war was unsettling. 
On the afternoon of 5 June three local army bases were 
bombed and napalm victims were evacuated via Jericho to Salt 
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on the East Bank. On 6 June the refugee flows from the 
Highlands began to reach the town, on which all three roads 
leading to the Allenby bridge converge (figure 2 ). Mixed 
in with this human flood was the retreating Jordanian army, 
which had evacuated its Ramallah head-quarters at 11 p. m. 
the preceding night. 
Thus on the morning of 7 June Jericho was host-to 
tens of thousands of Highlanders, bearing all sorts of lurid 
tales. The consequent apprehension was further. reinforced 
by concurrent Israeli bombing of ripening crops round-about 
the town, creating a "ring of fire" impression; whether or 
not this was a deliberate tactic it was executed at an 
obviously critical moment. 
The breaking-point for the camp residents came 
at 11 a. m., when. the, UNRWA area officer, who had experienced 
the Gaza occupation of 1956 fled Jericho in an UNRWA car. 
At about the same time another UNRWA vehicle was commandeered 
at gun-point by the town's police, chief,, who made a-similar 
exit. These two departures, known throughout the neighbour- 
hood almost immediately, finally sparked the mass flight. 
With Karameh. on the East Bank only 12 kilometres away the 
distance constraint was minimal. and by the late afternoon the 
three Jericho camps were virtually empty. 
HI. Problems with Numbers 
In structural terms the 1967 West Bank exodus had 
three components ' native West Bankers, residents of the 
UNRWA camps, and 1948-49 refugees who lived outside the camps. 
For each component estimates of the numbers who crossed the 
58 
river are suspect, though to differing degrees. 
The UNRWA figures are perhaps the most distorted, 
principally because of the accumulated errors of nearly two 
decades. Although ration recipient numbers are available 
for each UNRWA district (Jericho, Hebron, Jerusalem and 
Nablus) for before and after the war such factors as families 
holding several ration cards and the continued registration 
of thousands of dead persons inflate the totals so seriously 
that it is impossible to conduct an inter-regional analysis 
of the out-movement of "second-time refugees". (Appendix IIIb). 
In consequence one is restricted to the native 
West Banker component - "first time refugees" or "displaced 
persons". Numbers by origin and destination region were 
obtained from the Jordanian Supreme Ministerial Committee 
for Displaced Persons in Amman, the complete table being 
given in Appendix IVa. These figures depict the situation 
existing in September 1973, but can reasonably be assumed 
to depict the origin-region pattern of December 1967. First, 
post 1967 births are excluded. Second, additions and 
subtractions resulting from post 1967 movement to and from 
the West Bank are relatively minor. Third, there is no 
reason to suppose that losses through death vary proportion- 
ately between the origin-regions - in fact as with earlier 
UNRWA statistics such losses may not have been recorded at 
all. Finally, the December 1975 table is included with that 
for September 1973 to show how little the figures change 
through time, so buttressing the above observations. 
Yet although the origin region statistics of 
September 1973 may be little different from December 1967 
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equivalents, 
(9) there remains the question of whether. the 
displaced person registration built up by December 1967 
in fact reflected the actual numbers who crossed the river 
in that year. Here one must assume considerable inflation, 
for despite the fact that it represents only one major 
element in the exodus the September, 1973 displaced, person 
figure (181856) equals the out-movement total derived from 
the comparison of the Jordan and Israel censuses (181,524 - 
though this is probab.. y itself 
,a 
grossly inaccurate 
measure) and is not far. below an early combined estimate 
for first and second-time refugees (c. 200,000). 
(9) Sources 
of inflation are presumably similar to those cited in the 
UNRWA case; for example there. is the factor of second-time 
refugees illicitly obtaining displaced person identification 
to collect extra rations., On the other hand defects are 
probably of lesser magnitude simply because of the shorter 
time-period and, despite shared distortions, Jordanian 
displaced person figures have major advantages over UNRWA 
second-time refugee totals from the point of view of 
geographical analysis - they offer much greater detail as 
regards origin-regions and for one major West Bank district 
they can be checked against an independent source. 
In Ramallah district village population reductions 
recorded in the Bakerjan survey (full details in Appendix 
III a) may be used to give estimates for out-movement 
from various areas, estimates which can be weighed 
against the Jordanian Ramallah statistics. Taking 
Deir Qaddis nahiya (figure 13) as an example, the popul- 
ation losses from the five villages visited by Bakerjan 
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are added together, the losses as a proportion of the pre- 
war village totals calculated, and, assuming that the five 
cases are typical, the same proportion used to derive a 
general displaced person figure for the nahiga. In Deir 
Qaddis the Bakerjan based figure is thus 4174 (47.6% of 
the pre-war population) as against a Jordanian statistic of 
6749 (76.9% of the pre-war population). 
Similar results for Nabi Saleh nahiya and for the. 
remainder of Ramallah may be seen in table 311" The Bakerjan 
and Jordanian figures agree in indicating a very large popul- 
I If 
ation loss in Deir Qaddis, a frontier territory, compared 
with lesser outflows elsewhere, but for two of the three 
Ramallah areas Jordanian numbers are much greater in absolute 
terms. As the Bakerjan survey, taken soon after'the war, may 
be assumed to be reasonably reliable this is yet further 
evidence pointing to an inflationary distortion in the 
Jordanian displaced person statistics. Hence it is only safe 
to draw broad conclusions from the 'spatial pattern depicted 
in table 31 2 and figure 11 , as one' has to make the 
assumption that the degree of distortion is similar between 
the origin-areas. 
i V. Displaced Person Origins 
Figure 11 , together with table 3.2, is a 
representation of the magnitude of the. exodus of first-time 
refugees - native West Bankers - for seventeen West Bank 
areas and it is entirely based on Jordanian official,.,, 
statistics. It is re-emphasized that second-time refugees 
are excluded from the analysis. 
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Unfortunately the source population used - non- 
refugee camp West Bankers - is not exactly congruent with 
the actual displaced person source - native West Bankers. 
However, as no figures are available to enable a subtraction 
of 1949 refugees living outside camps, it is the best possible 
approximation. 
Three features are of interest. First the promin- 
ence of the West Jordan Valley as a region of massive out- 
movement persists even with the exclusion of second-time 
refugees. Second, on the Highlands, there is a clear distinc- 
tion between the areas surrounding Nablus, which generated 
relatively small outflows, and districts to the south, partic- 
ularly Ramallah and Hebron, where the exodus was substantially 
greater. Third, within both Ramallah and Hebron districts 
the magnitude of the exodus appears to have been especially 
massive in the vicinity of the border with Israel. 
Hebron. and the West Valley will be dealt with at 
length in the next chapter, in the analysis of the author's 
East Bank refugee camp survey, but one important theme can 
be discussed immediately - the extent to which geographical 
variation in the magnitude of the out-movement from the West 
Bank Highlands can be attributed to flight from frontier areas. 
V. Ramallah : flight from the frontiers. 
Figure 12 shows the seventeelareas of'figure. 11 
reduced to five major divisions. Four of. these are-on-the 
Highlands and here the average reduction of the non-refugee 
camp population caused by the displaced person'outflow is 
24.6%, according to the Jordanian statistics. Jerusalem 
stands near the average, with Nablus below and Hebron and 
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Ramallah above. As already noted Hebron and Ramallah exhibit 
a marked contrast between frontier and interior. With regard 
to-Hebron the geographical differential is not enough to 
account for the high overall outflow, as even without the 
Dura frontier villages the relative loss remains well above 
the Highland average. In Ramallah however events along the 
border with Israel hold the key to 
, 
the' district's high 
ranking as a displaced-person source, for if abnormal out- 
movements from the Latrun salient and a few-villages in Deir 
Qaddis nahiya are discounted the district as a whole is; - 
immediately reduced to the Jerusalem mean (table-3: 2 ). 
Ramallah border events thus merit close attention. 
The geography ofýthe Ramallah exodus is depicted 
in figure 13 , 'based'on Bakerjan's village survey. Bakerjan 
estimates allow more detail than do Jordanian statistics and, 
being on-the-spot assessments, are less suspect. Heavy 
population losses along the border are the`most notable 
feature of figure 13 , particularly the total abandonment 
of the Latrun salient. 
(i) In the pre-1967 period the Latrun hills, a small 
finger of the West Bank jutting eight kilometres into central 
Israel, had considerable strategic significance, perhaps 
greater than that of any other stretch of the 1949 Israel- 
Jordan armistice line. Rising 150 metres above the adjacent 
lowlands the salient commanded the northern approach to the 
Israeli corridor running inland to Jerusalem. In 1948 an 
Arab Legion detachment in the police fortress was able to 
close the main highway from Tel Aviv, cutting Israeli access 
to the capital and forcing the construction of a detour road 
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to the south. The Israelis made five abortive attempts to 
capture the position between May and August 1948, 'at a cost 
of 700 dead, -'10% 6f the Israeli'losses in the 1948-49 War'. 
Not surprisingly, when presented with their next 
opportunity in June 1967 the Israelis determined to eliminate 
the strategic irritant once and for all. Latrun and its 
environs were captured in a quick thrust on the night of 
5 June and at 4': 30 a. m. the ' nextImorning, 'according to 
displaced personsV, 
(10) 
the 5000people of the three Latrun 
villages - Umwas, 'Yalu and Beit Nuba '- were called to 
assemble'by Isräeli officers and then ordered to leave in the 
direction of Ramällah town. Some did not go further than the 
second-line, settlements of Beit Liqya, Beit Sira and Beni 
Hareth, but'most walked up to Ramallah itself, being joined 
on the way by numbers of people from localities they passed 
through or near, as the story of their experience had an 
unsettling effect. After three days at Ramallah groups of 
villagers tried to re-enter the-salient but-were stopped at 
the second-line settlements. 
On 13 Jurie Israeli bulldozers levelled the Latrun 
villages - the most far-reaching'act of demolition carried 
out on the West Bank under the occupation. 'Gussing notes - 
The Minister of Defence (Moshe Dayan), in his meeting 
with the Special Representative, stated that he had 
ordered the destruction of these damaged villages for 
strategic and security reasons,. as they dominated an 
important strategic area. (11) 
A 
It was abundantly clear that Israel intended to absorb 
Latrun - part of a policy to buttress the country's coastal 
waist - and that not the slightest prospect existed of the 
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i 
Arab residents being allowed back. 
, 
Faced-with this hopeless-situation the great majority 
of the people from Umwas, Yalu and Beit Nuba made the-final 
shift across the Jordan. Only a week after the initial flight 
to Ramallah UNRWA estimated that at least three-quarters had 
already moved on to the East Bank, and by January 1968,. most 
of the remainder had followed suit. 
(ii) To the north of the Latrunsalient, "in Deir Qaddis 
na hiya, the permanent population loss was also of unusual.. 
dimensions -- in proportionate terms the largest for any 
administrative unit ýon the Highlands (figures 11,13). It did 
'not of course compare with the totality of the Latrun expul- 
sion but it was nonetheless extraordinary. considering eviction 
was not a significant factor. 
Here the explanation is-probably historical and, 
psychological. _On 
14-October 1953, -in retaliation-for, the 
killing of a woman and her two children in Yahud, near Lod, 
the Israelis made a night attack on the border village 'of 
Qibya, in the centre of the Deir Qaddis area. During the 
raid forty-five houses-were dynamited, generally while ; the 
occupants-were still-inside. The-final civilian death-toll 
amounted to 65, with 75 wounded- -, for Palestinian Arabs 
an atrocity ranking second only to Deir Yassin. " In Israel 
there were immediate repercussions. Foreign Minister Moshe 
Sharett, who had noted in his diary concerning the Yahud 
murders "the Jordanians are shocked and will certainly do 
something -- under such circumstances is it wise to 
(12) 
retaliate? ", was horrified. He referred to the 18 October, 
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when a Cabinet discussion was held on the Qibya events as 
a "bitter, cursed day", and thereafter his rift with Ben 
Gurion widened rapidly, leading ultimately to his resignation 
(June 1956). 
In the villages surrounding Qibya itself the 
psychological legacy of the raid was an image of Israel in 
which the central elements were massacre and mayhem.. - Direct 
experience presumably etched such perceptions much deeper in 
the local consciousness than was the case-elsewhere-ön"the 
West Bank, predisposing Deir Qaddis people to similarly 
greater degree of fear, panic and out-migration in June 1967. 
Certainly no readily available alternative explan- 
ation exists for the unusual extent of flight to the East Bank 
from this nahiya. First, although much of Deir Qaddis has 
a notably barren physical environment and several villages 
have lost lands across the 1949 armistice line, circumstances 
which could be used to sustain arguments that the holding- 
power of the local resource base was less than elsewhere, 
the same applies to frontier areas further north which, in 
sharp contrast, had relatively low out-migration losses. 
Second, Deir Qaddis did not see any major-fighting (note 
axes of Israeli thrusts depicted in'figure 9 as they relate 
to-area boundaries in figure 10, ) and little-evidence for 
looting or expulsion exists. 
Finally, and perhaps decisively, it may be observed 
that abnormal out-migration declined steeply with distance 
from Qibya - in figure 11 Deir Qaddis is sharply 
differentiated even from neighbouring territories. This'is 
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exactly the pattern one would expect 
'ifa 
fourteen year old 
local event is assumed to have been, the operative factor. 
(iii) It remains to complete the Ramallah mosaic with a 
description of conditions elsewhere in the district and with 
a brief comment on the wider impact of the frontier exodus. 
The Ramallah interior 
, exhibited 
local variation 
in out-migration levels similar to that between Latrun and 
Deir Qaddis, though on a much reduced scale. A major contrast 
quickly emerged between villages on the Latrun-Ramallah- 
Jericho alignment, with more substantial losses (c. 20%), and 
those elsewhere (c. 10%). Here there is no problem. in finding 
responsible factors. The Latrun-Jericho axis, incorporating 
an important east-west highway, was the route of the Israeli 
advance into the district and carried the great bulk of the 
refugee stream generated near the border. The latter factor 
may be interpreted as having a chain reaction effect - 
people being demoralized by the movement already in progress 
as well as by rumours spread by passers-through and so in 
turn rendered liable to displacement. 
Bakerjan's survey contains several useful descrip- 
tions of the frequently traumatic experiences of villages 
which served as transit points for displaced persons. With 
regard to Ain Arik, five kilometres west of Ramallah town, 
he notes - 
"it is said that the village was a stopping-point for 
people evicted from Umwas, Belt Nuba and Yalu.. This- 
caused considerable damage to the, g roves of the village--" 
At Taibeh, on the descent into the Jordan Rift, he observes - 
The village is on the road to Jericho and was therefore the stopping-point for all escapees. The groves of the 
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village and its fields are reported to have suffered 
considerably from. the, fleeing people. The village 
maintains there is considerable need for assistance. 
Clearly, in some cases the economic destruction wrought'by 
"fleeing people". would have been itself enough to cause 
secondary flight from. -the affected villages, especially-if 
combined with looting by Israeli soldiers - as appears to 
have occurred at Ain Arik. (Appendix IIIa). 
VIA A Geographical Paradox 
Turning from Ramallah, to wider inter-district-and 
frontier-interior comparisons one comes to the most curious 
feature of the West Bank displaced person exodus; the fact:, 
that the geography of the flight was in large measure the.,. 
inverse of the. geography of the.. fighting. In-the, Jerusalem 
and Nablus sectors, where Israeli forces were -concentrated"-, ' 
and where fighting, particularly on the borders, was-fiercest, - 
one would have expected, both_the most substantial out-movement 
and the strongest frontier-interior contrasts. -In the "r 
Ramallah and Hebron districts, subordinate theatres where 
relatively little fighting took place, one would have 
expected the opposite -. alesser exodus and a, lack of 
frontier-interior differentiation. 
Instead the situation is reversed (figure 12- 
In Jerusalem district, which because of-the limited space 
between the border and the' Judean Wilderness (figure 36 ) 
can be considered entirely . 
"frontier" the displaced person 
exodus was little above the average,, this despite the fact 
that the area saw the most intense battles of the June War, 
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including the two-day struggle for the Old City of Jerusalam. 
The pattern in Nablus is even more interesting. 
Here the Israeli thrusts through Jenin and Qalgilia 
(figures 9,10) produced some sharp local engagements, yet 
almost everywhere population losses were below twenty per- 
cent and in one case (Salfit) are down to the ten per-cent 
level (figure 11 ). 
Political factors provide a possible explanation. 
Under Jordanian rule Nablus had a well-earned reputation for 
radicalism and Palestinian nationalism, unsurpassed by any 
other West Bank district, a characteristic which may have 
exerted a powerful restraining influence on June 1967 out- 
ý" 
migration. Considerations here include the role of radical 
nationalism in intensifying attachments to home localities, 
but primarily concern the bitter psychological legacy left 
by the vigorous Hashemite counter-measures against nationalist 
upsurges. In particular it could be hypothesized that, because 
of their unfortunate experience of Jordanian rule, Nablus 
region people had much stronger inhibitions against fleeing 
to the East Bank during and after the war than did people 
in other districts, owing to a more pessimistic perception 
of what might await them in the Hashemite heartland. 
Aside from the political factors there are also 
special wartime conditions which may have acted to constrain 
out-movement from the Nablus border areas of Jenin, Ya'bad, 
Tulkarm and Qalgilia. In particular the Israeli push south 
from Jenin quickly produced a battle-zone intermediate 
between west Nablus villages and the East Bank, a battle- 
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zone which probably discouraged people from making the 
relatively long journey to the river, so keeping much of the 
demographic disruption purely short-range. 
Indeed far`fröm'stimulating high-outflow rates 
intense hostilities in both the Nablus governorate and the 
vicinity of Jerusalem may actually have led many people to 
lie low and stay at home. ' None of this is of course to imply 
that out-migration from Wither Nablus or Jerusalem was 
miniscule in absolute terms - even a proportion as low as 
ten per-cent of a source population involved large numbers 
of people. 
Hebron and Ramallah, -where minor military engagements 
were combined with high levels of population loss, confirm 
the spatial paradox. - Here it was conclusively demonstrated 
that the chain-reaction consequences of such local events as 
the Latrun eviction and, more broadly, the geographically 
varying psychological legacy of the past, as symbolized in 
the impact of the Qibya incident on Deir Qaddis nahiya, 
generally played a more important role in shaping differential 
out-movement patterns than did the geography of the war itself. 
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(1) Dodd and Barakat, River Without Bridges, P. 19. Report 
on a survey of 100 families in Zizzia 
emergency camp, September 1967. 
(2) Bakerjan file, UNRWA, Ramallah. See Appendix Iila. 
(3) Dodd and Barakat P. 45. 
(4) For evidence from the Baga'a camp survey see P. 404. 
(5) United Nations A/6797 and S/8158 P-13- 
(6) Ibid P. 15. Also see Ha-aretz 29-6-67 P"9. 
(7) UNRWA camp statistics for Jericho district, June 1967 
(Source - UNRWA, Ramallah). 
(8) Source for Jericho account - Antranik Bakerjan (On the West Bank throughout the 
June War) 
(9) Die Welt 30-10-67 
a) Gives a Jordan Government figure of 177,165 refugees 
for the period 5 June -1 July 1967. This 
probably refers to displaced persons only, as 
others were an UNRWA concern, and if so its 
closeness to the 1973 displaced person total 
strongly supports the author's back-dating of 
the 1973 numbers. Source - Department of Statistics, Amman. 
b) As the figure of 200,000 is also supplied by the 
Jordan Government it too may exclude many 
UNRWA refugees who fled across the river in 
1967. Hence it could well under-state the 
total exodus by a wide margin. 
(10) United Nations A/6797 and S/8158 P. 16. 
(11) Ibid., P. 16. Also see Divrei ha-Knesset Vo1.49. 
P. 2811 1-8-67 (Question. U. Avnert 
to Minister of Defence) 
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I. The Survey Method 
(i) Purpose and Setting 
The principal objective of the sample survey of 
displaced persons conducted by the author on the East Bank 
in July 1976 was to assess whether inter-regional differences 
in the magnitude of the West Bank displaced person outflow 
were paralleled by differences in the personal characteristics 
and migratory behaviour of the departing population. If so, 
can the latter differences be used to help explain the 
differences in out-movement magnitude, so adding to the 
interpreta, ion outlined in Chapter 3? 
Baga'a, the largest East Bank camp for 1967 refugees, 
was chosen as the survey site, partly because it provides the 
largest single concentration of displaced persons and partly 
because of its proximity to the author's base in Amman. 
Plate 6 gives an aerial overview of the camp, which comprises 
six residential blocks and a central market and services 
area. The population as of March 31 1976 was 54666 
(7781 families), made up of 44066 second-time refugees and 
10,600 displaced persons. Accommodation currently consists 
of dosely packed concrete huts, in general one for each 
family unit. The huts contain between one and three rooms 
and living conditions vary from the extremely primitive to 
the moderately affluent (ownership of a television set or a 
refrigerator), depending on whether household members hold 
jobs and on the nature of the jobs. 
It was decided to take a ten per-cent sample of the 
displaced persons in the camp. In the final form this covered 
PLATE 
Plate 
Baga'a emergency camp, East Jordan. 
, ýý# 
tý 
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163 family units (out of 1061), encompassing 944 persons who 
had crossed from the West Bank as a result of the Israeli 
occupation. Extension of results obtained from such a sample 
to the generality of displaced persons is obviously problem- 
atic. Baqa'a residents, simply because they are still in a 
camp, are likely to be somewhat over-representative of 
poorer rural strata. However in view of the logistic imposs- 
ibility of surveying non-camp displaced persons on the East 
Bank information from the Baqa'a survey was the best 
obtainable. 
(ii) The Questionnaire 
An English translation of the questionnaire may be 
found in Appendix V, which also provides reasons for 
individual lines of inquiry where these are not self-evident. 
In broad terms questions are of three types 'o 
a) those designed 
family characteristics, 
exploring inter-regional 
b) those designed 
influences. 
c) those designed 
of the exodus itself. 
Questionnaire layout was 
of interviewing, for one 
and for easy transfer of 
to establish a profile of June 1967 
a profile here used as a base for 
differentiation. 
to test possible "push" and "pull" 
to elicit information on the mechanics 
determined by the need for speed 
item to lead logically to the next, 
data to computer punch cards. 
On 11 July 1976 a pilot survey was conducted by the 
author and the camp leader to test the questionnaire. Four 
families in C block, originating in Jericho and Ramallah 
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districts, were interviewed. The pilot led to two modific- 
ations in the questionnaire. First, because only vague 
estimates of 1967 property values could be obtained, provision 
was made for house sizes (in rooms) and land areas (in 
dunams) to be recorded. Second, a "military vehicle" category 
was added to the "mode of travel" question. This addition 
was initially prompted by the discovery that some families 
with military attachments crossed to the East Bank with the 
retreating Jordanian Army, but later also proved useful in 
identifying persons transported to the river in Israeli Army 
vehicles. 
The main survey began on 14 July and continued 
until 28 July. As assistants the author employed an official 
from the Ministry of Social Welfare and three camp residents 
(students at the American University of Beirut, then closed 
by the Lebanese Civil War). Permission for the exercise was 
obtained from the Supreme Ministerial Committee for Displaced 
Persons and from UNRWA, the support of the Executive Secretary 
of the Ministerial Committee, who took an active interest in 
both the organizational and academic aspects of the survey, 
being particularly valuable here. Interviews were conducted 
between 5 p. m. and 8 p. m. each evening, when household heads 
were most likely to be at home. The five interviewers 
(including the author) split into three groups, each operating 
in a different residential block. The questionnaire was 
administered to the household-heads, who answered solely on 
the basis of the situation existing in the family unit in 
June 1967 and during the period prior to their arrival at 
Baqa'a (January - March 1968, in 71% of the cases for which 
data are available). 
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Although nine years had passed memories concerning 
the events of 1967-1968 remained vivid and responses to most 
questions were excellent. Significant difficulties only arose 
with regard to 1967 property values, West Bank house sizes 
and dates for secondary movement on the East Bank. 
In the first case, although there were few failures 
to respond, considerable inaccuracy is suspected. Camp 
residents tended to interpret property value questions as 
having some vague relation to future compensation and were 
consequently tempted to exaggerate. Fortunately their estimates 
can be checked against the detailed property characteristics 
(house size and land area), a check which shows, for example, 
that seven of the nine cases giving values of JD 100,000+ 
are plainly ludicrous. 
On the matter of dates for secondary movement failure 
to respond became a significant feature, leading to missing 
value figures of 20.9% of total cases for the "second East 
Bank destination", 23.3% for the third and 12.9% for the 
fourth. As people often have poor memories regarding the 
timing of secondary events such results are not unexpected. 
In addition a missing value figure of 16.0% was recorded for 
"number of rooms at (West Bank) place of residence". 
Otherwise failures to respond were nowhere above 
3.1% and out of 56 questions 34 recorded no missing value 
figures at all. 
(iii) Sample Selection 
The most important criterion in sample selection, 
in view of the purpose of the survey, was to achieve both a 
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reasonable coverage of all origin regions and a reasonable 
spread of origin points within each origin region (figure 15 ). 
Because it is dubious whether Baga'a is representative of 
displaced persons in general the author considered that this 
would be at least as likely to achieve a result characteristic 
of the wider displaced person population as would a slavish 
adherence to the principle of a sample representative of the 
camp. Indeed the latter would have been directly inimical 
to the over-riding imperative of geographical spread - it 
was discovered in the course of the survey that resident 
origins were heavily biased in favour of the West Jordan 
Valley. 
A register of all Baga'a residents, held in the 
camp leader's office, was the sole available source for sample 
selection. The register gives separate listings of hut 
numbers for each of the six blocks and distinguishes between 
displaced persons and second-time refugees. There is no 
alphabetical ordering of names and each block contains a mix 
of origin-regions. 
A severe problem immediately arose regarding the 
achievement of a good spread of origin points - in many 
cases the register either did not give precise displaced 
person origins or gave obscure place names (location unknown 
even by the camp leader). Hence it was impossible to discern 
before the survey was actually underway exactly how the 
regional balance would work out. In this situation it was 
thought best to take a systematic sample of one in eight from 
the register's record of displaced person hut numbers 
(family residences). This gave a total of 201 families, 38 
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more than the ten per cent coverage aimed for. It was hoped 
that a reserve of six for each block would provide sufficient 
back-up in the event that representation of some Highland 
origin regions proved deficient. 
Theoretically the problem could have been circum- 
vented by the running of a large-scale pre-survey test to 
give some indication as to the pattern of origins, but 
political and financial constraints militated against this. 
The Civil War in Lebanon had produced a tense atmosphere in 
the camp, as the Jordan authorities were then supporting the 
Syrian offensive against the Palestinians. Consequently 
there was the ever present possibility of operations by the 
Jordanian security forces, operations which might render the 
survey impossible. In such conditions it seemed best to 
complete the main task as quickly as possible. 
Interviewing thus began on the basis of the one-in- 
eight systematic sample. Origin bias soon emerged - after 
three days it became clear that the sample would heavily over- 
emphasize Jericho district and the Jiftlik area of Nablus, 
(figure 2 ), even with the reserve. It was immediately 
decided to put a ceiling (c. 50) on numbers taken from the 
West Jordan Valley and to concentrate on increasing the repres- 
entation of Highland districts (especially Hebron, Bethlehem, 
Ramallah and western parts of Nablus). A list of all persons 
who could be identified as coming from these districts was 
obtained from the camp register and hut numbers from this 
list (from all blocks) were progressively fed into the sample 
to replace people found to have originated in Jericho or 
Jiftlik. It was not considered likely that a mid-stream 
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elimination of Jericho would cause a bias toward particular 
origin-points in that district beyond bias that might be 
inherent to the camp, largely because sampling proceeded in 
all blocks simultaneously. It may be noted that such dis-. 
tortion would have emerged if all initial interviewing had 
been conducted in one block, as people from particular villages 
tend to concentrate. 
A second difficulty was. the . lesser problem of house- 
hold heads who had displaced person identification but who 
were in fact second-time refugees. These household-heads 
had generally acquired displaced-person cards in order to 
collect additional rations, and they were identified either 
by information from neighbours or by their regional accents. 
For instance there was one person who purported to be from 
Beit Liqya in Ramallah district but who in fact had an inton- 
ation characteristic of the Lod area. When encountered such 
people were removed from the sample, one of the reserve being 
put in their place. 
Overall co-operation from the sampled population 
was excellent, there being very few who refused to be 
interviewed. The fact that students living in Baga'a were 
actively involved in the survey clearly minimized suspicions# 
although any disturbance in the' external` political' environment 
might have'negated this. The origins of the final sample of 
163 are depicted in figure 15 . As maybe seen the require- 
ment for a good spatial spread, both within and between West 
Bank regions, is well satisfied. 
I 
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Ij. The Survey Results 
Computer analysis of the sample and its responses 
involved the use of the FREQUENCIES, CROSSTABS, and 
DISCRIMINANT programmes from the Statistical Package for the 
Social Sciences. 
The investigation proceeds in two steps. First, 
the sample is described as a whole, with particular reference - 
to the issue of whether displaced persons are fully repres- 
entative of the pre- 1967 West Bank population or derive 
disproportionately from classes prone to locational instability. 
Second the sample is divided by origin-district to enable an 
examination of regional differentiation, especially concerning 
factors which may have contributed to the spatial variation 
in out-movement. 
111. Full Sample Analysis 
Appendix V gives a detailed record of results 
for the full Baga'a sample, results which enable conclusions 
to be drawn regarding the sample's relationship with both 
the pre-war West Bank population and the overall displaced- 
person exodus. 
A central finding of the Dodd and Barakat survey of 
1967 refugees was that they comprised genuine cross-sections 
of source communities - 
"-- there is no disproportionate number of poor people, 
and there is little basis for alleging that most of the 
1967 refugees were poor people -- lacking in close ties (to home areas) and therefore potential migrants -- this 
finding is relevant to our central question, why did they 
leave their homes? - It rules out the answer that 
thgy) 
left because they had little or nothing to lose. " l3 
79 
Evidence from the Baga'a survey gives no reason 
for doubting such observations. Two Baqa'a data sets which 
can be directly related to the 1961 Jordan census (table 4: 1 )- 
those for-question 4 (education levels) and question 5 
(employment) - as well as the information derived for 
property ownership (question 7) may be used here. 
With regard to education levels there is admittedly 
a significant tendency for survey household-heads to score 
less well than the general 1961 population (70.6% without 
formal education compared with a census proportion of 59.7%). 
This can however be largely attributed to the fact that the 
household heads, with an average age of 39.8 years in 1967, 
were children in a period when the education system was much 
less extensive than in 1961 and thus could not have been 
expected to have attained the same levels as a subsequent 
generation. The only surprise is that the proportions com- 
pleting elementary school are so close (23.9% to 28.8%), which 
would not have been the case had the Baga'a household-heads 
all been from the lowest socio-economic strata in their home 
communities. 
Similar observations can be made regarding the two 
sets of employment statistics. Baga'a household-heads, with 
a limited showing for professional, administrative and clerical 
classes if military personnel are discounted and with a 
relatively high proportion in the "miscellaneous labourer" 
category, seem to be somewhat over-representative of lower 
socio-economic levels, but again the main surprise is that 
the divergence from the general population is so limited. 
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After all, with a time-span of nine years in which wealthier 
displaced persons could leave the camp for more salubrious 
surrounds, chiefly in suburban Amman, one would expect some 
bias toward the poorer fraction amongst the refugees. Thus, 
for instance, Baga'a camp contains virtually no Christians, 
in general more highly placed in socio-economic terms than 
Moslems. This is not because there were no Christians in the 
West Bank out-movement, but because Christian refugees prefer 
not to live in the emergency camps. 
Conclusive support for Dodd and Barakat comes from 
the survey data on property ownership. Despite the fact that 
the Baqa'a sample is probably biased toward poorer elements 
in the exodus 83.4% possess immovable property in their orig- 
inal place of residence and 51.3% hold agricultural land, the 
average plot size being 46.3 dunams. If this is true of its 
poorer strata quite clearly the exodus as a whole involved 
people who had plenty to lose in their home communities. The 
riff-raff hypothesis that the bulk of refugees lacked real 
property and steady jobs and thus were especially prone to panic 
and flight*is confirmed as substantially false. 
Further, the survey data also point to an out-move- 
ment almost entirely comprised of full nuclear family units, 
with no detectable age or sex bias (average 1967 family size 
for sample = 6.16, average number fleeing = 5.65). 
Turning to the mechanics of. the out-migration 
question 8 (date of move) indicates that 88.4%cf the sample 
families left the West Bank before the end of the war 
(June 10 1967). Although the figure only refers to native 
West Bankers such a finding must throw doubt on the relative 
significance some, including Dodd and Barakat, have attached to 
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post-war experience of the occupation regime as a precipitating 
factor. Comment made earlier (p. 74 ) about poor memories 
with regard to dates referred entirely to secondary events - 
one would expect recall concerning the primary migration 
to be considerably clearer, a supposition supported by the 
100% response rate on the question. 
Other salient features are that 93.2% considered the 
move purely temporary, 85.9% had no East Bank destination in 
mind when they fled their homes, -75.5% reached the Jordan 
crossing-points by walking and 96.3% had no thought of-moving 
before the war, a figure which counts against the notion that 
the 1967 exodus can be linked to pre-war west-east migration. 
Finally, after arrival on the East Bank the average 
sample family made 2.3 additional shifts before settling in 
Baga'a, generally in February - March 1968. Major destinations 
for the first shift within the East Bank were the East Jordan 
Valley, Amman and Suweilah (Baga'a), reflecting either early 
moves between Plateau and Ghor or the later move to Bäga'ä. 
Accompanying dates confirm this, moves being concentrated into 
the periods June - July 1967, September 1967 and February - 
March 1968. For later shifts the penultimate Baga'a stage 
naturally becomes more-and more predominant, with dates showing 
a progressively greater emphasis on early, 1968. This question 
is explored in depth in Chapter 5. 
IV. Regional Analysis 
For regional analysis of the sample two forms'of 
organization are employed, the West Bank being split first into 
two units and then into five. 
The two unit division, producing a wide range of 
statistically significant regional differences, provides more 
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clear-cut results than does the more complex investigation. 
This division -a simple comparison between people origin- 
ating in the West Bank Highlands and those originating in the 
West Jordan Valley - has two powerful advantages. First, ' 
by preserving large sub-samples for each region it has-a 
greater chance of yielding results representative of, real- 
world differences in the generality of displaced persons 
than have the necessarily much smaller sub-samples for the 
five region division. Second, it faithfully reflects the 
West Bank's greatest environmental and human contrast - 
between the humid uplands of Judea and Samaria with their 
larger, wealthier more educated more urbanized populations, 
and the hot dry wasteland of the Jordan Rift, with its poor 
oasis based settlement clusters, dominated between 1949 and 
1967 by the huge Jericho refugee camps. Some fundamental 
divergence in the personal characteristics and migratory 
behaviour of the displaced person sub-samples from the 
Highlands and the Valley is thus to be expected, irrespective. 
of variation in such things as perception of Israel and war- 
time experience. 
Such inherent contrast is more subdued within the 
Highlands and so the five unit analysis, designed to examine 
the area's internal variation, cannot be expected to produce 
the sharp divergences which should be evident in a Highland- 
Valley comparison. This is especially the case as the 
Highland subdivision is of necessity based on administrative 
districts with artificial boundaries, the only spatial units 
for which comprehensive displaced person statistics are 
available. 
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On the other hand, the five unit analysis proves 
valuable in highlighting those differences between displaced 
person populations which have no apparent link with "natural" 
variation, particularly differences in historical experience' 
and hence in the psychological legacy of past. events. 
(i) Highlands and Valley 
A comparison of the displaced person out-movements 
from the West Bank Highlands and from the West Jordan Valley 
(figure 12 ) exhibits the geographical paradox discussed on 
page67 in its most extreme form. Even when second-time 
refugees are excluded the West Valley outflow figure still 
represents a much greater proportion of the source population. 
than does that for the Highlands - c. 59% compared with 
c. 25%. Yet virtually all the fighting of 5-7 June 1967 
took place on the Highlands, with only a limited amount of 
Israel Air Force activity extending down into the Jordan 
Rift. Clearly in the West Valley and Highland out-movements 
one has distinct phenomena, with or without the special case 
of the Jericho refugee camps. 
It was hoped that the two unit analysis of the Baga'a 
survey population would allow some firm conclusions to be . 
drawn regarding the detailed character of the Valley-Highland 
distinction. Dividing the population gave sub-samples 
of 51 familes (311 persons) for the West Valley and 113 
families (699 persons) for the West Bank Highlands. 
Much of the explanation for the greater relative 
magnitude of the West Valley displaced persons exodus 
probably lies in the already noted fact that on the Highlands 
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only part of the demographic upheaval amongst native residents 
involved movement across the river. Whereas on the Highlands 
short-range shifts were confined to the West Bank, with 
an extensive return home after the war, in the Valley short- 
range settlement desertion as well as more deliberate 
eastward movement was transferred across the river, to areas 
from which return was extremely difficult. Examination of 
the first destinations of people in the divided survey 
population lends support to. tbis interpretation. Figures 17 - 21 
depict origin-destination patterns and the contrast between 
largely long-range shifts from the Highlands and largely 
short-range shifts from the West Valley is plain. 60.8% of 
West Valley families moved entirely within the Jordan Rift, 
while 58% of Highland families moved direct to the East Bank 
Plateau. 
Table 4: 3, which lists the detailed differences 
between the two sub-samples and provides X2 tests assessing 
the statistical significance of the results, indicates further 
inter-regional contrasts. One of the more prominent features 
is the disproportionately rural character of both groups. 
The Valley sub-sample is undoubtedly the more extreme, in part 
reflecting a more agriculturally oriented economy and in part 
a consequence of the short-range rural settlement desertion. 
That this rural emphasis has a real-world base and is not just 
a Baqa'a bias is demonstrated by a comparison of the general 
pre-war non refugee camp population of the West Valley with 
the post-war residual (table 4.2). The area's rural rump 
of September 1967 amounted to only 20% of the pre-war figure 
whereas Jericho town retained 59% of its original residents - 
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despite the emptying of the nearby camps. 
The rural emphasis is reinforced when the occupat- 
ional structure of the Valley sub-sample is considered. In 
the comparison with Highlanders table 4: 3 indicates a much 
higher proportion of Valley household heads involved in 
farming. It is also worth noting that Valley rural refugees 
tended to be poorer than their Highland counterparts, as 
evidenced by the proportions of landless. 
Further inter-sample differences, some of consider- 
able magnitude, are evident when one examines migratory.... 
behaviour. More of the Valley sub-sample travelled by foot, 
though foot-travellers were a definite majority in both 
sub-samples, and more crossed the river at fording points as 
opposed to bridges. Some of-this may be attributed to the 
immediate proximity of the East Bank - with refuge from the 
war only a few kilometres-distant wheeled transport was of 
less relative advantage than for Highlanders. Also in the 
poorer Valley economy it was probably less readily available. 
For both sub-samples there is an interesting 
distinction between the move toýthe river and immediate 
subsequent travel within the East Bank. The move from. the 
river to the first East Bank destination 
(4) involved substant- 
ially less foot traffic than did the exodus itself, the main 
increase being in the proportion, travelling by taxi 
(table 4: 3 ). Obviously cab owners from Amman and elsewhere 
saw financial dividends in being on-hand to meet the 
refugees at the bridges. Other lesser changes included 
'a 
-=rise in the fraction. ferried by bus and truck and a decline 
in that carried by military vehicle, the number travelling 
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in private cars remaining at near-zero. 
On a rather different dimension of the migration 
itself - the question were you attacked during your move ? 
West Valley people gave a more positive response than did 
Highlanders. This probably stems from the fact that a much 
greater proportion of the Valley flow occurred during the 
war and presumably refers to Israel Air Force activity in the 
vicinity of the bridges. 
Finally a clear proximity effect may be discerned 
in the tendency for the Valley sub-sample to have had more 
pre-war ties with the East Bank. Specifically this refers 
to the figures for families with one or more workers öutside 
the West Bank and for household heads with property outside 
the home-region - usually land just across the river. Such 
ties may have been a secondary factor in the greater relative 
magnitude of the West Valley exodus. 
On all the survey questions not recorded in 
table 4: 3 (Appendix V) there is no substantial divergence 
between the two regions. Concerning such considerations 'as 
family size and number of rooms in house one seems to be 
dealing with essentially the same population regardless of 
geographical origin. 
Nonetheless the numerous and substantial divergences 
that do exist leave no doubt that the two unit survey analysis 
bears out the proposition that the out-movements of native 
West Bankers from the West Valley and the Highlands must be 
viewed as separate phenomena. Among other things the greater 
magnitude of West Valley settlement desertion, the incorpor- 
ation of short-range flight which on the Highlands was confined 
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to the West Bank, and the substantially different-rural-urban 
proportions all point to a considerable dichotomy. This is 
not to deny the critical significance of the exodus from the 
Highlands in triggering a similar exodus from the West Valley 
nor to deny that the two movements shared many features. 
(ii) Five Regions 
The five unit analysis is based on the geographical 
division depicted in figure 12 , foundation for much of'the 
discussion in Chapter 3*. The West Valley is retained as 
above but the Highlands are split into four areas - Nablus, 
Ramallah, Jerusalem with Bethlehem, and Hebron. This allows 
individual sections of the Highlands tobe contrasted both 
with one another and with the Valley. Variations are fewer 
and less dramatic than in the two unit analysis but some 
interesting intra-Highland differences emerge. ' The relevant 
variables are displayed in table 4: 4, with 3C2 tests for the 
inter-regional contrasts and a list of sub-sample sizes. 
Perhaps the most significant feature of table 4s4(a) 
is the variation uncovered in the perception of Israelis as a 
"threat", a variation founded on differences in historic 
experience. This emerges in answers to the question Did You 
have special reason to fear the Israelis because your home 
region had a history of strained relations with the' Jews? 
Here Hebron, which suffered the greatest relative population 
loss of the four Highland regions, gives by far the highest 
positive response. Explanation almost certainly, lies in the 
fact that Hebron's historic experience is distinguished from 
that of all other West Bank districts by-the atrocity 
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committed against the local Jewish community during the 1929 
Arab riots, an event leaving Arab Hebronites with an unpar- 
alleled fear of revenge. The Royal Commission set up to 
investigate the 1929 disturbances gives a graphic account of 
what took place. 
About 9 o'clock on the morning of 24th of August Arabs 
in Hebron made a most ferocious attack on the Jewish 
ghetto and on isolated Jewish houses lying outside the 
crowded quarters of the town. More than 0 Jews - including many women and children - were murdered and 
more than 50 were wounded. This savage attack --- was 
accompanied by wanton destruction and looting. Jewish 
Synagogues were desecrated, a Jewish hospital --- was 
attacked and ransacked---. (5 ) 
Thereafter the surviving Jews left Hebron and the 
Jewish community ceased to exist. Nonetheless a psychological 
legacy persisted amongst the Arabs, as evidenced by the 
response to the survey's fear question, and it seems reasonable 
to relate the unusual extent of flight from Hebron in June 
1967 to this legacy. In brief the Israeli invasion provoked 
a widespread terror of belated reprisals, leading to panic- 
stricken multitudes streaming out of the district. 
Extra impetus was possibly given to the flight by 
some activities of the occupying authorities immediately 
after the war. Along the north-western border Gussing reported 
instances of village demolition almost as severe as at Latrun, 
though in Hebron these were not accompanied by permanent 
eviction. 
"At Beit Awa in the Hebron area, out of some 400 houses, 
more than 90 per cent have been completely demolished 
and the remainder partly damaged. A second village in 
the area, Beit Mersim (original population approximately 
500), was completely destroyed. 
The Special Representative visited Beit Awa'on 11 
August. The Arab Mukhtar stated that Israeli troops 
entered the village on 11 June at 5.30 a. m. The inhabitants were then asked to take two loaves of bread 
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and to go to the hills surrounding the village. - At 
7.30 a. m. the Israeli troops started to demolish the 
houses with dynamite and bulldozers. Groves around the 
village were burnt. The belongings of the inhabitants 
were also burnt since they were unable to take them 
along. The population stayed in the hills for a week. 
They were then authorized to return by the military , governor. Out of the original population of 2,500 
some 300 had left--- 
The Mukhtar said he presumed that the reason for the 
demolitions was that the Israel authorities believed that 
there were members of the 'El fatah' organization coming 
from the village --- In this connexion the Israel 
authorities informed the Special Representative that 
this village was an 'El fatah' base where members of 
this terrorist organization used to stay overnight 
and where they received ammunition and supplies. (6 ) 
Concerning economic factors interesting results come 
from both Hebron and Ramallah, the two highland districts with 
out-movement numbers above the West Bank average. Hebron 
stands out on total value of property at-place of residence, 
recording a markedly lower average than any other district# 
so hinting at comparative weakness in home community ties. 
Ramallah records the leading highland score for family with 
one or more workers outside the West Bank. As noted in the 
West Valley case the fact that some Ramallah family members 
were already on the East Bank may have acted as a "pulling" 
force, because of the fear of being cut off from income earners 
under Israeli-occupation. 
Aside from such historic and economic considerations 
the main source of inter-regional,, differentiation is the 
migratory behaviour of the sample. Much highland detail 
emerges and this can be discussed from three viewpoints -, 
route to the river, mode of transport and first destination 
on the East Bank. 
Routes taken by the 944 people in the Baga'a sample 
are depicted in figure 16 . Outflow patterns from each 
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region are largely as expected, people taking the nearest 
road down to the river crossings, but there are some pecul- 
iarities which deserve comment. 
First, in . the north the Toubas refugees, used the 
direct road to the Valley, though this ran very close to the 
Israeli border and brought-them to a ford rather than a, bridge,, 
involving some risk even in Summer. Some then braved the 
ford, producing a Nablus fording proportion exceeding that 
for any other district-(table 4: 4(a) ) while others preferred 
to walk south to the Damiya bridge. Why none of those 
crossing at Damiya took the slightly shorter Nablus road, more 
distant from the frontiers, is a mystery. s-ý 
Second, in Hebron and Bethlehem districts ' most " 
refugees, deterred by the presence to the east of the Dead 
Sea and the forbidding Judean'Wilderness, 'headed north to' 
Jerusalem and took the main highway down to Jericho and the 
Allenby bridge. This ofcourse meant a long journey through 
areas which were either active war zones or controlled by 
Israeli"troops. Only a minority took "short-cuts" through 
the Judean Wilderness, either by a rough secondary road 
through Mar Saba-to Nabi Musa or by a track running north 
from Hebron to Nabi Musa (figures 2,16 ). l-, 
Third, with the exception of the West Valley 
there was-little cross-country"movement'from any of the regions. 
This maybe explained by the fact that away from'the estab- 
lished highways the descent- into the Jordan Rift is-an' 
extremely' arduous undertaking, especially for people with, 
little food or water. Conditions were difficult enough on the 
roads themselves, but people chose to'keep to them, -'even at 
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the risk of bombing and strafing. 
Concerning mode of travel there are several features 
of interest. On the matter of foot traffic as against wheeled 
transport considerable differentiation emerges within the- 
Highlands, quite apart from the broader Highland-Valley 
contrast. Ramallah stands out as the region where the greatest 
proportion of sampled refugees moved to the river by some 
form of motorized transport (I. 2. l%), principally by truck 
(21.1%) or taxi(15.8%). If this reflects significantly 
greater mobility for Ramallah people as compared with people 
elsewhere it may be a further element in explaining the high 
rate of local outmovement - the friction of distance being 
less of a constraint here. Jerusalem (including Bethlehem) 
stands at the opposite end of the Highland spectrum with only 
22.9% moving on 'wheels. There may be some connection with 
the fact that almost one quarter of the local sample were 
tent dwellers, without exception extremely poor. This is a 
higher proportion of bedu than for any other district except 
the West Jordan Valley. It should of course be reiterated 
that in all districts, even Ramallah, the motorized were in 
a distinct minority. 
Within the motorized category one also finds some 
interesting inter-regional variation according to the 
weighting of individual modes. For instance Hebronites showed 
the strongest tendency to travel by bus (13.6%) whereas 
people from Nablus and Ramallah used taxis most (13.9% and 
15.8%). Such variation probably reflected differences in 
what was physically available rather than actual refugee 
preferences. There were even some instances of refugees 
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travelling in Israel Defence Force vehicles, particularly 
from western border areas. A Tulkarm grocer told of being 
taken to the river in an Israeli truck with four other 
members of his family while a Qalgilia blacksmith reported 
a three stage journey - by foot to Nablus, by Israeli 
vehicle to the Damiya bridge and by Jordan Army truck from 
there to Karameh. 
First destinations on the East Bank for people from 
each of the four Highland districts appear in figures 18 - 
21 .A contrast is immediately evident between Nablus, 
with a majority making an initial stop in the East Jordan 
Valley, and the other districts, with first destinations 
primarily on the East Bank Plateau. Two factors seem to have 
been. operative in the Nablus case. First the distance to the 
major Plateau attraction - Amman - was greater than for, any 
other West Bank region. Second the North Ghor, with its 
irrigation schemes and modern development, was more potent 
as an intervening opportunity than was the largely barren 
central Ghor, which stood opposite the southern West Bank 
regions. Ramallah gave the largest proportion moving directly 
to the Plateau, as would be expected from the most motorized 
group. 
On the East Bank Plateau the major destination for 
all origin districts was the Amman-Zerqa area. Amman's 
dominance was, however, substantially less for Jerusalem and 
the West Jordan Valley than for Ramallah, Nablus and Hebron. 
This largely stemmed from the presence in the sample of numbers 
of Bethlehem and Jericho bedu with connections in Madaba and 
Kerak, rural localities to the south of Amman. 
93 
(iii) Discriminant Functions Analysis 
Discriminant analysis is used here both as a check 
on the regional variation discussed above and'to derive deeper 
insight into that variation. The aim of the analysis is to 
identify those variables contributing most to spatial different- 
iation and to assess in what manner and to what extent the 
origin-regions differ on the basis of such variables alone. 
A number of qualifications must be made before 
proceeding further. First, discriminant analysis can only 
handle variables based on continuous data or on two-alternative 
answers (i. e. yes - no). In consequence all variables 
employing categorical information (e. g. type of transport) 
have to be excluded, reducing the number of survey variables 
that can be considered to 21 out of an original 59. Second it 
is desirable that the data set for each variable be normally 
distributed and that within group co-variance matrices should 
exhibit homogeneity. In many instances survey data do not 
fulfil the former condition and it is difficult to tell whether 
the latter is adequately satisfied. () 
Two analyses are employed - one for the two-region 
division and one for the five regions. Because. of the exclusion 
of all cases recording missing values for any relevant variable 
the number of survey families examined in each analysis is 
reduced from 163 to 147 (regional totals in table 415), covering 
894 individuals. This means that for some regions in the five 
unit division the case numbers are very limited, with the 
result that extreme values recorded on certain variables, for 
example property size, may have a distorti-ig effect. 
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For the Highland-West Valley (two, region) comparison 
seven variables are found to . contribute -significantly 
to 
regional differentiation (table L: 6), before the F level 
becomes insufficient for further computation. 
(8)_ 
Out of 
these a single discriminant function emerges (table4: 6), 
with strong loadings for family with workers outside the 
West Bank (WOREXWB), connections at intended East Bank 
destination (CONPLAC) and home attacked before-move (HOMATT). 
On this function the two regions are strongly differentiated 
(figure 22 ), so giving support to the. observations made earlier 
about a fundamental divide between the West Bank Highlands and 
the West Jordan Valley. Furthermore the list of discriminating 
variables includes several already discussed as powerful 
inter-regional differentiators - especially family with workers 
outside the West Bank and attacked during move (MOVATT). 
After deriving discriminating variables and functions 
the analysis makes provision for a predicted classification 
of cases into the relevant groups (here the two regions) on 
the basis of case behaviour on the discriminating variables. 
For the Highlands-West Valley division the prediction gives 
a classification of the 147 families which is 60.54% accurate. 
further indication as to the extent of the inter-regional 
difference. West Valley families emerge as a particularly 
distinct and homogeneous group, with a prediction which is 
95.5% correct. The Highland families on the other hand, are 
shown to be without any coherent identity - here the prediction 
is only 45.6% correct. Clearly there is profit to be had 
in 
a subdivision of the Highlands, as produced in the five region 
analysis. 
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For the five regions eleven variables contribute 
significantly to differentiation and four discriminant functions 
are derived. The functions and associated variable loadings 
are given in table 417. Function I is heterogeneous, with 
high loadings for attack on family before move (FAMATT), ' 
perception of local history of poor relations with'Jews 
(REGPRJ) and family with workers outside the West Bank: 
function II is a property/employment factor; and function IV 
is the most sharply defined, being very strongly oriented 
toward three variables-- poor relations with Jews, attack.. 
on home village before move, attack on family before 
move. 
Functions I and II are of much greater weight-in 
terms of accounting for variance amongst the eleven: discrim- 
inating variables than are III and IV (eigenvalues in' 
Itable 
417) and hence discussion of regional differences'is. 
restricted to the former two. Figure-23 depicts the position 
of region centroids 
(9) 
on a graph of function I and II 
scores. Measures of the statistical significance of the 
divergence between regions are given below the graph. 
Three comments can be made. First, 'samples 'from 
Ramallah and Jerusalem, comprising the geographical core of-. ' 
the West Bank, appear to have a great deal in common, per=' 
forming similarly on both functions. For most variables ' 
with strong loadings on I or II the core districts-give inter- 
mediate results, the extreme generally being taken by the 
outer regions. 
Second, the three peripheral districts - Nablus, 
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Hebron and the West Valley - appear to be'distinct, whether 
from one another or from the West Bank core. Nablus and the 
West Valley do, however, have a limited amount in common with 
the core, particularly as-regards function I, presumably in 
part because of a joint tendency to score on or below average 
for poor relations with Jews, the most powerful discriminating 
variable with a high function I loading. 
Third, Hebron emerges as the most distinctive 
district, sharply and significantly differentiated from all 
others. In terms of variables with strong function'I loadings 
Hebron takes the extremes, rating highest on poor relations 
with Jews by a wide margin, lowest on family attacked, before 
move, lowest on family with workers outside the West Bank 
(no positive responses) and highest on home village attacked 
before move. As the district saw relatively little fighting 
"attack on home village" is probably a reference to house. 
demolitions and looting observed by the 14% who left after 
the cease-fire. 
On function II, considered alone, Hebron has a close 
affinity with the West'Valley, its extreme opposite on 
function I. Important variables here are family members 
employed with the Government (GOVT) and amount of land at place 
of residence (LANDA). On the former neither region records any 
positive response and for the latter both'stand at the bottom 
of the regional list. Hebron and the West Valley have the 
poorest and least sophisticated economies on the West Bank, 
local displaced person samples scoring accordingly. The 
third peripheral region, Nablus, stands at the upper end of 
the function II scale, primarily because the Nablus sample 
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gives the largest number of Government employees. GOVT is 
the most potent of the eleven discriminating variables. 
Ramallah and Jerusalem, though recording intermediate results 
on II as a whole, in fact give the most substantial land- 
holding figures. The core-districts, especially Ramallah, 
have long led the way in wealth, and the local samples, despite 
their small size, again seem to be economically representative. 
Turning to case classification (table 4e8) the 
five region analysis produces a prediction which is 44.9% 
accurate. The West Valley and Hebron samples (predictions 60% 
correct) appear to be the most homogeneous, followed by that 
for Ramallah. Those for Nablus and Jerusalem, however, display 
little internal coherence. 
In sum, although certain desirable conditions for 
discriminant analysis are at best only partially satisfied, 
the results obtained here can be defended on the basis that 
they both reflect what has been said earlier and are intuitively 
reasonable. Furthermore, beyond buttressing findings already 
made the discriminant analysis gives additional insight into 
the character of the regional sub-samples, for example pointing 
to a West Bank core - periphery contrast amongst displaced 
persons and emphasizing the role of images of Israel, as 
represented by perceptions of poor historic relations with 
Jews, as a powerful differentiating factor. 
(iv) Reason for Move 
In the final section of the questionnaire household 
heads were asked to give reasons for their flight from the 
West Bank. The question was open and unstructured, to enable 
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an uninhibited answer. 394 responses resulted, some people 
giving as many as five reasons, and these were later classified 
into seventeen categories, as listed in table 4s9. t., The 
seventeen categories comprise two groups of factors! - reasons, 
of fear and reasons stemming from concrete events or situations. 
Examples of the former are fear of massacre and fear of arrest 
and the latter include such conditions as forced to move by 
the Israelis, looting, shelling of home neighbourhood (events) 
and head of household out of the West Bank at the time of the 
war (situation). 
Fear factors were overwhelmingly predominant, ' making 
up 87.9% of the total response. Fear o, f rape, -'fear of 
massacre' and unfavourable perception of Israelis take pride 
of place, in descending order (respectively 29.2%, 23.1 
and 16.8% of total responses). Such reasons derived, at least 
in part, from memories of past events, the 1948 massacre of 
Arab villagers at Deir Yassin being specifically mentioned 
several times. 
Superficially war-time and post-war events and 
situational pressures, heavily stressed in the Dodd and 
Barakat survey, appear to'have been of subsidiary significance. 
In fact, because many of the "fear" answers may have had their 
origin in concurrent events not mentioned by respondents, the 
present survey probably understates their actual importance. 
Nonetheless as the majority of the Baga'a survey sample fled 
during the war itself, before the full weight'of occupation was 
brought to bear, the undoubted strength of pure fear provides 
further testimony to the potency of the historic legacy and 
of inbuilt perceptions of the enemy. 
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Inter-regional differentiation appears to support 
this view. Regional ratios of response numbers involving. the 
two principal fear factors, fear of rape and of massacre, 
to response numbers involving "event" or "situational" pressures 
are given in table Lh lO. Fear factors receive strongest 
emphasis amongst people from Hebron and the West Valley, - 
districts of very high out-migration. Hebron in particular 
stands out, not surprising considering both its position in 
the discriminant analysis and the comments already made 
regarding perception of poor historic relations with the Jews. 
Of course for both Hebron and-the West. Valley much can be 
attributed to the relatively late arrival of the Israelis and 
the consequent absence, 'at least initially, of some of the 
more concrete conditions affecting-areas which experienced 
fighting and occupation in the first two days. 86% of the 
Hebron sub-sample and 94% of the West Valley sub-sample left 
their homes before 10 June. 
People from Nablus, Ramallah and Jerusalem, where 
the chief battles took place, give event and situational 
pressures greater prominence. These pressures encompass 
phenomena ranging from forced movement (three Jerusalem families) 
and physical attack to such special circumstances as the 
household-head being in the Jordan'Army. 
V. -. Conclusion 
There have been only two major surveys of 1967 
West Bank refugees for the purpose of investigating the cond- 
itions of the 1967 exodus - the present exercise and the Dodd 
and Barakat survey of September 1967. 
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Dodd and $arakat lay heavy emphasis on-'situational 
pressures arising both out of the war itself and out of post- 
war events. 
Pressures were generated by the aerial attacks upon 
a defenceless country -- the occupation of the West 
Bank villages by the Israeli army, and the actions 
of the occupying forces. Certainly the most drastic 
of these actions was the eviction of civilians and the 
deliberate destruction of a number of villages. Other 
actions, such as threats and the mass detention of 
male civilians, also created -- pressures. 
-- the Arab villages were not well-equipped to resist 
these pressures. They were caught by surprise, ill- 
informed and unfamiliar with the terrifying nature of 
aerial bombardment. Their family centred social 
structure decreased attachment to community and 
nation. They fled to protect their families, including 
-- the honour of their womenfolk. (10) 
That such conditions played a notable part in 
precipitating flight is undeniable. However the analysis 
presented in the past two chapters, primarily for native West 
Bankers, indicates that the chain of causation was much more 
complex than Dodd and Barakat suggest, and varied substant- 
ially between the various parts of the West Bank. Hence, 
although the Latrun case evidenced strong situational pressures 
the Hebron district, where early large-scale out-migration 
occurred in the absence of such pressures, shows the Dodd and 
Barakat interpretation to be gravely inadequate. 
The author's displaced person analysis attempts to 
rectify the central deficiency in the earlier work - the 
failure to give in-depth attention to either geographical 
variation or historic context. Geographical differentiation 
in historic circumstances is here held to have been of immense 
significance in rendering some district populations either 
more or less prone to flight than others. Hebron provides 
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clear evidence of the role of a locally poor Arab-Jewish 
historic experience in triggering relatively high out- 
movement during the Israeli advance, while Nablus' indicates 
the possible influence of locally poor historic' relations 
with the defending Jordanians in discouraging flight to areas 
still controlled by the Hashemites. 
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(1) B block contains a noted cluster of families from 
the Jiftlik area, near the Damiya bridge. 
(2) Such suspicions ranged from the comment that the 
author was a Jew to the fear that the survey 
might be an UNRWA device to track down house- 
hold heads holding excess ration cards. 
(3) Dodd and Barakat , River Without Bridges P. 29 and 37- 
(4) First place where respondent stopped for one 
night or more. 
(5) Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances 
of August 1929, Pp. 1929-1930 xvi Cmd. 3530" P. 64. 
(6) United Nations A/6797 and S/8158 Pp. 17-18. 
(7) SPSS version 6 has not yet implemented Boxes M, 
which tests the homogeneity of within-group 
co-variance matrices. 
(8) Variables are accepted or rejected according to the 
value of the F ration of between/within group 
variance. In the present study the point at 
which variables were no longer accepted was 
set at 1. 
(9) Centroid = mean for region case scores on a part- icular function. 
(10) Dodd and Barakat P. 54. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
THE WAR OF ATTRITION IN THE JORDAN RIFTF 
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The West Bank exodus of June-July 1967 was but 
the first, albeit the greatest, of a succession of dem- 
ographic upheavals provoked by continued hostilities along 
the Israel-Jordan border. These hostilities, involving 
three years of intermittent fighting between Palestine 
guerrillas and the Jordan Army on the one hand and the 
Israel Defence Forces on the other, came to be known, 
together with more severe exchanges along the Suez Canal 
and occasional clashes on the Golan plateau, as the "War 
of Attrition". On the eastern front the principal theatre 
was the Jordan Rift between Lake Tiberias (Kinneret) and 
the Dead Sea. The restriction of major clashes to a rel- 
atively restricted area stemmed in part from Arab inability 
to launch a war of movement and in part from external 
political constraints on Israel. 
In large measure the War of Attrition in the Jordan 
Valley may be seen as a direct outgrowth of the refugee 
flows set in motion by Israel's occupation of the West Bank. 
The existence of large and extremely bitter new refugee 
clusters on the East Bank quickly led to a massive expansion 
of Palestine guerrilla organisations, determined to take 
revenge for the sufferings of their people. More coolly 
the Palestinians also saw the abject failure of regular 
Arab arms as leaving them little choice but a reliance on 
their own resources in a long irregular campaign. The 
humiliation of the exodus had thus provided both the means 
and the will for the inauguration of fresh fighting. 
This fighting led in its turn to additional economic 
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dislocation and population movement. The East Jordan Valley, 
the northern section of which irrigation water from the North 
Ghor Canal had converted into a highly productive farming 
region, accounting in 1968 for c. 20% of Jordan's agricul- 
tural income, was almost completely. evacuated'between 1969 
and 1971, temporarily reverting to its former wasteland 
condition. 
I, Jordan and Israel i from War to War 
In 1967 the population, ofthe East' 'Jordan Valley 
was approximately 95,000 - 60,000 in the North Ghor, where 
the canal project had reached as far southýas'Ardha, and 
35,000 in the Central Ghor. Some 60% of the farmers-'settled 
in the project area were 1948 Palestine refugees, so demonst- 
rating a degree of refugee re-integration. The refugee 
proportion was of course much greater. further south, where 
Karameh camp contained at least 20,000 fugitives from the 
first Arab-Israeli War. In general terms the years since 
the 1961 opening of the Ghor canal, when the balance between 
the northern and central sections of the East Valley had been 
31,152 to 33,775 
(2), 
had seen both a rapid absolute growth 
and a considerably increased weight for the project area. 
The Six Day War cast, a long shadow over all`that 
had been achieved. Although the East Valley 'remained -under 
Jordanian rule and although little fighting spilled across 
the river the-whole area was now-a-frontier zone-on'a 
hostile border -, not a propitious'situation. Henceforth 
the East Valley became a hostage to events flowing from the 
Israeli occupation of the West Bank, the, first of these 
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being the new refugee movements. 
Between June 1967 and March-1968 those' refugees` 
from the West Bank who did not quickly integrate into the 
East Bank cities, perhaps 30% of the total, experienced a' 
complex series of local shifts, encompassing both the 
Plateau and the East Valley, before finallyYsettling,, in 
various Plateau localities. The shifts can be=simplified- 
into a four-stage process, though it should be emphasized 
that there were wide variations in the detail of individual 
participation. A central feature of the process-was the 
concentration within four months of at least. 60,000, 
1967 refugees in the East Valley, " a concentration which 
triggered the initial clashes of the War of Attrition., 
As indicated in the survey analysis the first 
stops of the 1967 refugees were widely scattered, people 
from the various West Bank regions tending to make for 
different destinations depending on their mobility, the 
location of their origin-districts, and the existence of 
family connections. The great majority, however, either 
moved directly to the Plateau or arrived there after a brief 
period, perhaps a couple of days, in the East Valley. It 
should be noted that June conditions in the Valley were not 
encouraging for the fugitives, particularly outside the canal 
area. The Summer heat, rising to 40°Cor more at*mid-day, 
is severe, especially for Highland people, ''-water is scarce, and 
the small scale of settlement, even after six years'of canal 
development, meant a strictly limited capacity'for absorbing 
outsiders. 
Hence the Plateau towns - Irbid , Salt, Madaba and 
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above all Amman - Zerqa, bore the brunt of the tide from the 
West Bank, taking in more than 200,000 people by the end of 
June. In Amman most public buildings were opened to the 
refugees, thousands crowding into schools, mosques, 
-churches 
and Ministry compounds in addition to the thousands more who 
descended on friends and relatives. The capital, a city of 
only 300,000, could not long endure such a burden and the 
Jordan authorities, in co-operation with UNRWA, soon went, 
into action to establish a more stable arrangement. 
This arrangement, the second phase of refugee 
movement within the East Bank, involved the setting up of a 
system of "emergency camps", both on the Plateau and in the 
Ghor, the chief immediate purpose being to relieve the, 
pressure on urban facilities and services. By July 1 
there were five such camps on the Plateau, located as shown 
in figure 24, into which 20,000 people occupying urban 
public buildings were persuaded to shift. 1948 refugee 
camps in Amman and elsewhere had already received an influx 
of more than 50,000. 
(3) 
Estimates of the numbers involved 
for the individual sites, old and new, are given in 
table 511. 
Furthermore, within two weeks of the end of the 
War UNRWA had set up four tent camps in the East Valley - 
Ma'adi, Shuna Janubiya, Ghor Kabid and Karameh new camp 
(figure-24). The Government was determined to'have-these 
filled and in late June it put severe restrictions on 
movement to the Plateau. Road checks and patrols were, 
instituted and people without specific destinations were 
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turned back westwards. Both these people and earlier refugees 
who had remained in the East Valley were directed to the Ghor 
emergency camps. 
In early. Julymatters moved a-step further. Negot- 
iations with Israel for displaced person repatriation, using 
the Red Cross as an intermediary, were getting. under way, 
and Jordan anticipated a successful outcome. In consequence 
the Government ceased encouraging 1967 refugees to re-locate 
within the Plateau and began compulsorarily trucking. people 
direct to the Valley, to the, -vicinity-of the cease-fire 
line. The Ghor camps, now conceived as mass transit points, 
steadily expanded. 
The repatriation scheme, however, turned out to be 
a charade, collapsing in mutual recrimination. It began"" 
on 18 July in a highly selective fashion when the Israelis 
allowed a mere 150 to return across the Allenby bridge. 
mostly women and children, a disproportionate number of them 
from wealthy families. 
(4) 
At this' stage only special " 
cases were considered - families split by the War or the 
old and sick. It was of course hoped that a more com- 
prehensive operation would follow after a short interval, 
but there were successive delays, principally caused by a 
dispute. over the appropriate heading for the application 
form to be distributed amongst, the family heads. The 
Jordanians strenuously objected to any reference to the 
"State of Israel". It was not until the second half of 
August. that the main scheme finally came into operation and, 
as with the preliminary, paper-work it proceeded with painful 
slowness. For example on 19 August only 361 people crossed 
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the river, 203 at the Allenby bridge and 158 at Umm Shurett. 
Israel, proclaiming itself ready to receive 3000 a day, 
blamed Jordanian "red-tape and defective administrative 
procedure. "(5) Jordan in turn accused Israel of refusing 
to accept people from the 1948 West Bank refugee rolls or 
from Jerusalem district. Then, after the ludicrously short 
period of two weeks, everything ground to a permanent halt. 
Israel had named 3, I August as the deadline for refugee 
return and on this point she adamantly refused to budge. 
The position is summed up by Buehrig in The U. N. and the 
Palestinian Refugees 
By resolution 237 of 14 June 1967 the Security Council 
unanimously called on the government of Israel to ' 
facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have 
fled --- return was begun in 1967, but the scheme soon 
aborted -- Amman reported submission of some 40,000 
applications, covering approximately 170,000 persons, 
while Israel acknowledged receiving some 32,000 
applications relating to about 100,000 persons. The 
number of returnees by 31 August -- was reported by 
Jordan at only 14,150 and by Israel at 14,056. Though 
in response to a request by the Secretary-General 
Israel extended the deadline for those not yet returned 
whose applications had been approved; only a few 
succeeded in crossing --- Response to the Security 
Council resoluj4pn of 14 June 1967 was little better' 
than a fiasco. 6I 
Thus the East Valley emergency camps remained and 
by the Autumn, still containing at least 30,000 refugees, 
they were taking on semi-permanent form. It was'at-this 
time that the third-phase of refugee, movement commenced, a' 
phase of critical significance in the development of'the 
military situation along the Jordan-Israel front, particularly 
when considered together with the failure of repatriation. 
The precipitating factor was the onset of the 1967 Plateau 
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Winter - early and severe. On 19-20 October heavy rainstorms 
swept the country from Irbid south to Kerak,:, turning the 
Plateau emergency camps into quagmires. A flash-flood 
forced the evacuation of Souf, this being quickly followed, by 
the emptying-of Wadi Dleil, Zizzia, '-Marka and Salah-ad-Din. 
Between mid-October and mid-December a further 25,000 people 
shifted down into the Ghor, where the dry and equable winter 
weather offered a , refuge from the mud', snow and freezing 
winds of the uplands, quite a different situation from that 
obtaining in June. Fortunately the capacity of the East 
Valley camps had somewhat increased, with the establishment 
of new tent sites at Ghor Nimrin and Damiya (figure 24). 
This third major shift inflated 'the East Valley 
population to at least 160,000, compared with only 95,000 
five months before. West Bank refugees, - concentrated south - 
of Deir Alla, made up almost half of the revised total, even 
leaving aside the indeterminate numbers squatting in local 
villages. 
Border hostilities on a substantial scale were now 
a near certainty. The new UNRWA camps, seething with dis- 
content against all established authority, provided the 
impetus, opportunity and physical cover for the setting up of 
a Palestine guerrilla infrastructure in the Jordan Valley -a 
base for the infiltration of occupied territory and for assaults 
on Israeli military and civilian positions. Co-operation from 
the deeply embittered new refugees, who had lost virtually all 
that they had, was assured, especially in recruitment drives. 
Assistance from the Jordan Army, both overt and covert, could 
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also be expected, first because the general state of Arab 
opinion left the authorities little choice and second because 
Jordan, with territory to recover, had a clear interest in 
maintaining great power interest in the area, if necessary 
by provoking fresh crises. By late 1967 these factors had 
paved the way for the emergence of a greatly expanded guerrilla 
force, using UNRWA camps, North Ghor villages and neighbouring 
hills as base areas and staging points. 
Guerrilla operations against Israel across the 
Jordan river began in earnest in October; 1967, as increasing 
difficulty was encountered with attempts to promote resistance 
within the West Bank. Although the UNRWA camps were 
principally located in the central Ghor, activity was from 
an early stage conducted along the full length of the Valley. 
In fact the first attacks occurred in the. far north, where the 
Kibbutzim and Moshavim of. the Beit Shean region came within 
reach. On 1 October, an Israeli was killed by raiders atý 
Kibbutz Hamadiya and on 14 October. ". about 200,000 lirot of 
damage was caused by Fatah sabotage at Kibbutz Ma'oz Haim. " 
ý7ý 
In early November Jordanian forces began to lay' 
down covering fire for guerrilla: forays, and on'19 November 
took independent action against an Israeli patrol north of 
Damiya. The Israeli response was to bombard the Ghor Nimrin 
refugee camp, which Israel regarded as a "terrorist" 
sanctuary. A Jordanian military spokesman reported 14 killed 
and 28 injured. After this incident conditions rapidly 
deteriorated. 4 
January and February 1968 saw a considerable 
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escalation of both Palestinian and Jordanian activities, 
culminating in heavy tank and artillery exchanges in the area 
of the bridges on 8 February, causing six Israeli deaths. 
Strong Israeli warnings immediately followed, from both the 
Prime Minister and the Defence Minister. Levi Eshkol talked 
of "a limit to our patience" and Moshe Dayan went on, in a 
Knesset review, 
(8) 
to threaten "Jordan will suffer serious 
consequences if it does not observe the cease-fire along the 
whole line. " The period of occasional skirmishing was clearly 
over - the East Valley now stood on the threshold of true 
border warfare.: 
In military terms the civilian structure existing 
in the Jordanian Ghor in early 1968 was-terrifyingly 
vulnerable. Its population 'swollen by' more than 70,000 
transients, it consisted of a series of agricultural settle- 
ments and refugee camps strung, along a one hundred and fifty 
kilometr. e. front, hemmed in by the barren eastern hills to 
within twenty kilometres of the Israeli guns. This narrow 
strip included the whole East Bank citrus crop and its best 
vegetable growing 
+eas. 
all dependent on elaborate irrigation 
works which could be easily disrupted or destroyed by 
bombardment., 
ti. The, West Bank Refugees e The final flight 
On February 15 - 16, using air-power and artillery, 
Israel struck. There was heavy shelling and. bombing. in: the 
canal project area, -in the vicinity of the ,. Allenby. 
bridge, and 
along the edge of the uplands, causing. at least- 200 Jordanian 
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casualties. The eruption proved the breaking-point for the 
residents of the Ghor emergency camps, as well as for many 
villagers. In five days (16-21 February) 70,000 people 
streamed out of the Valley 
(9) (table 5: 2 heading once 
more for Amman and other Plateau centres. The exodus 
included c. 20,000 from Karameh old camp and represented the 
fourth and final phase of the East Bank wanderings of the_ 
West Bank refugees. 
On the Plateau the Government faced a repetition 
of the situation of June-July 1967; once again Amman's public 
buildings were thrown open and once again there arose the 
problem of finding locations for new refugee camps. The 
difference was that while hostilities continued there could 
be no return to the Ghor - everything would have to be on the 
Plateau. 
r 
A quick decision in favour of'a system of six sºtes 
ensued, (fig. 24 ), several being at some distance from the 
capital, 'in part for security reasons. Amman, with a 
Palestinian majority and 'a substantial residual from the 
first 1967 influx, was volatile enough without further 
accretions to its discontented multitudes: High officials, 
fearing for the stability of the regime, favoured dispersal' 
as a means of limiting the strength Palestinian' Organizations 
could bring to bear at the centre of power. 
Three of the locations chosen - Marka, Zizzia and 
Souf - were simply resurrections of 1967 emergency camps. 
Zizzia, twenty kilometres south of the'capital, 'provides an 
interesting case-study in the mechanics of site selection, 
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owing its June 1967 origins to some astute political 
manoeuvring by the Beni Sakhr, a powerful bedu tribe. Shortly 
after the Six Day War the Iranian Red Lion had offered to 
sponsor an-emergency camp, financing all facilities. The Beni 
Sakhr, seeing a chance to acquize cheap agricultural labour at 
little cost to themselves, immediately donated land in the midst 
of their huge Madaba holdings. With a Minister in the Cabinet 
acceptance of their gesture was assured, Zizzia camp being 
the outcome. Precedent, and a continuation of the strong vested 
interest, similarly assured Zizzia's restoration in March 1968. 
Entirely new camps arose at Baga'a, Jerash and 
Husn. Considerations governing site selection,, apart from the 
internal security factor, included availability of land and 
water. Baqa'a, which became the largest concentration, - arose 
on a large block of Government land originally intended for 
a, prison compound. This was in the highly fertile 'Ain el 
Basha depression, within . commuting distance of Amman but 
easily insulated in case of trouble. Jerash'camp, designated 
in the main for Gaza refugees, resulted from land offers by 
Jerash district landlords. Motivation was probably mixed - an 
element of generosity, a desire for government rents, and an 
awareness of the prospect of revenue generation by suing the 
authorities whenever a camp resident walked across a crop. 
Finally, Husn's location near Irbid reflected first a policy 
to use camps as an economic stimulus to outer governorates 
and second the operation of the internal security factor. 
Not, surprisingly the actual setting up of-the six 
camps did, not work out quite, as intended. To begin with there 
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were severe problems at both Baqa'a and Husn. At B aga'a Spring 
mud caused much misery while the Husn camp had to be moved ten 
(kilometres 
because of dust-storms. 
lýý More important, the 
Government failed to effectively control the growth of the 
Amman area camps, for example Marka, and these became consid- 
erably larger than initially planned, thwarting to some extent 
the aim of dispersal. 
The early populations of the new sites (table '5: 3 
totalled approximately 60,000, about one-quarter of the overall 
number of 1967 refugees. The other three-quarters either 
resided in 1948 East Bank camps or had integrated into the 
Plateau towns, especially Amman. This latter fraction had been 
less involved in the shifts to and from the East Valley, the 
bulk remaining on the Plateau throughout. Moreover except in 
Zizzia, the best equipped site, emergency camp populations 
were disproportionately composed of second-time refugees, 
from 1948 West Bank camps, these people generally being poorer 
and more used to camp life than displaced native West Bankers. 
Growth of the new system up to 1976 is illustrated 
in the AppendixiV tables, which also indicate changes in the 
numbers of 1967 refugees living in older camps. Rations for 
native West Bankers are paid for by the Jordan Government, 
while those for second-time refugees, who were on UNRWA's 
West Bank rolls, continue to be financed by the Agency. The 
day-to-day administration of relief has been conducted by 
UNRWA. 
Figure 25 depicts the movements ofýtwo displaced 
person familities caught up in the East Valley experience, as 
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revealed in the Baga'a sample survey. One household head was 
a bedu farmer from Beit Ta'amar in Bethlehem district, the 
other a soldier from Toubas, near Nablus. It is an excellent 
summary of the four-stage process outlined above - the arrival 
on the Plateau, the shift to the first emergency camps, the 
flight to the Ghor with the coming of Winter, and finally, the 
return to the Plateau under pressure of Israeli bombardment. 
(plates 7-10 give a pictorial overview). 
III. The Desolation of the East Valley 
In the East Valley itself much of the settled popul- 
ation remained after the desertion of Karameh old camp 
c. 75,000 people - but not for long. For both the canal area 
and the villages of the central Ghor the fighting of 14-15 
February 1968 had a shattering effect. In the north, where 
the Israeli air-raids were popularly termed the "Eight-hour 
War", the Jordanians reported 56 dead and 82 seriously wounded. 
Further south many villagers, seeing the desertion of local 
UNRWA camps, joined the flight to Amman. 
Only one more push was needed to set the Ghor on the 
path to complete depopulation. This was provided by the 21 
March Israeli assault on Karameh, their largest ground incur- 
sion onto the East Bank. The Israelis had long regarded 
Karameh as the chief guerrilla centre and an upsurge in infil- 
tration and terrorism in early March, despite the February 
reprisals, led to a decision to take firm action. The oper- 
ation involved 1500 Israeli tropps, including armoured and par- 
achute units, and comprised thrusts across both the Damiya and 
Allenby bridges as well as a separate push south. of the Dead 
Sea. Fighting lasted twelve hours, the Israelis clashing with both 
PLATES 7- 10 
East Bank Movements of West Bank Refugees. 
Plate 7 The Arrival from the West Bank, 
Allenby Bridge June 1967. 
Plate 8 Concentration in the East Jordan 
Valley, July 1967 - February 1968. 
Plate 9 Flight from the Valley to the Plateau, 
February - March 1968. 
Plate 10 Final Location on the East Bank 
Plateau, Baga'a Camp February 1969. 
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the guerrillas and the Jordan Army and briefly occupying 
much of the East Valley between Damiya and the Dead Sea. 
Karameh town was reduced to rubble and on both sides casualties 
were relatively heavy - according to the Israelis 150 
"saboteurs" died for a loss of 21 of their own men. 
After Karameh there was complete destabilization s 
regular hostilities along the full length of the front, 
leading to the desolation and depopulation 6f the whole East 
Valley. The exodus of permanent residents, including canal 
project farmers, immediately accelerated, there being a .., 
steady stream up to the Plateau over following weeks. By 1969, 
which was to be the worst year in the Valley, no more than five 
per cent remained. The movement differed from the preceding 
camp exodus in being spread over a longer period, but. again 
it cannot have involved fewer than c. 70,000 people.. 
The geography of the War of Attrition - patterns 
of fighting, flight and economic disruption- will now be 
examined for each section of the East Jordan Valley : for-the 
North Ghor, the Central Ghor and Ghor-as-Safi. Figures 26,27, 
28 and 31 should be consulted with the written account. 
(i) The North Ghor 
After June 1967 the Ghor Canal Project was clearly 
living on borrowed time. First, with the Israeli capture 
of the Syrian north bank of the Yarmouk (figure 1) work 
on the Khalid Ibn al Walid 
(11) 
dam, designed to provide water 
for southward extensions of the canal, came to anabrupt halt. 
Second, although normal activity continued relatively 
undisturbed through the remainder of 1967, the growing concen- 
tration of Palestine guerrillas in project villages and in the 
rv 
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hills to the east left little doubt about the outlook for 
1968. 
The triple blow of the 15 February Israeli air 
attacks, the Karameh battle and the first disruption of the 
canal by artillery bombardment on 29 March inaugurated the 
period of desolation. For the next two and a half years the 
North Ghor was hit hard and often, though the details varied 
somewhat from place to place. 
Hostilities were most ferocious in that zone where 
Jordan faces metropolitan Israel, a zone containing almost 
40% of the East Valley's settled population. The main reason 
was the special popularity of the locality for guerrilla 
activities - -innumerable Israeli targets were immediately 
accessible and cover proved better than elsewhere. Conse- 
quently it was also the locality where the fiercest Israeli 
reprisals took place and where Jordanian forces were most 
frequently involved. In addition Israeli attacks could achieve 
most effect here - wrecking the canal at its source paralysed 
the entire Ghor. 
Nowhere were Jordanian settlements more concentrated 
or more vulnerable. In the far north the hills come to 
within two kilometres of the river and villages are very close 
to Israeli positions (in 1961 the average distance between 
local settlement sites and the river was 1.08 kn, compared 
with 2.20 km in the vicinity of Deir Alla, just to the 
south 
(12)). Rifle fire could reach farmers' homes and hence 
settlement desertion after February 1968 was rapid and total. 
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Below Ghor Fara, where the East'Valley borders 
the occupied West Bank, conditions proved slightly better. 
First, villages stood at some distance from the river, 
particularly near Deir Alla. Second, with less to attract 
guerrillas reprisal shelling tended to be less severe. Third 
Deir Alla, as government base, retained a substantial residual 
population - perhaps 1,500 through 1969. Even here however 
the residual amounted to no more than ten per cent of the 
original. The area was undeniably front-line and. for"most 
residents the risk ` was unacceptable. 
In all c. 58,000 people left the North Ghor in 
1968-69, the main refuge being the adjacent Irbid district. 
Those settlers who had originated from Irbid generally' stopped 
in Plateau edge villages where they had relatives and contacts 
or still possessed lands. Others, particularly the-1948 
Palestinians, became completely destitute and were forced to 
go onto government ration rolls. More than 1000 entered 
Husn emergency camp . 
(13) 
Of course although by early 1969 farmers on the 
canal project had ceased to live in the Ghor, they did not 
entirely abandon their crops. The distance from the Plateau 
to their holdings was generally less than twenty kilometres 
and many returned perhaps once a week to take whatever 
irrigation water might be available and to try to maintain a 
semblance of production. Some even made early morning, exped- 
itions to the Zor, the lower flood plain, perilously close 
to the front. 
Nonetheless few dared sleep in the Ghor and in general 
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the cause was hopeless. With the canal system under constant 
attack water supply was usually grossly inadequate and 
sometimes ceased altogether. On 23 June 1969 Israeli 
commandos crossed the Yarmouk and sabotaged the canal's main 
channel. A week later Prime Minister Golda Meir noted that 
Arab cease-fire violations were being deliberately repaid 
"seven-fold" and made non-interference in repair-work on 
irrigation installations dependent "on the Government and 
Army of Jordan preventing. saboteurs from attacking in this 
area. "(1ý On 31 December the Israelis again struck the main 
channel. The intake was blown up and the whole project area 
left without water for more than six weeks. 
Through all this the frantic efforts of the 600 
Jordan Government employees (largely National Resources 
Authority personnel stationed at Deir Alla) had little effect. 
No sooner would one irrigation feeder be put back into 
operation than another would be destroyed. For instance on 
29 April 1969 the Hasah flume was damaged for the second 
time in a week, and then on 1 May a storage basin in Wadi 
Zerqa was bombed. The latter took five days to repair. 
(15) 
Furthermore, local security conditions were every- 
where chaotic. With disagreement over strategy and increasing 
Palestinian questioning of Hashemite authority, friction 
quickly developed between the guerrillas and Jordan Army 
units along the front. Consequently the guerrillas took 
control of most of the Ghor and local police, fearing for 
their lives, hardly dared leave their posts. National 
Resources Authority staff were left to deal personally with 
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endless disputes, including numerous cases of water stealing. 
In water allocation priority went to citrus and 
bananas but even so 25% of the orange bushes and more than 
60% of the banana plants were lost - not surprising 
considering that neither can survive for more than a few 
weeks without water and that canal flow was on several 
occasions cut for at least this period. By 1970 production 
of both had descended to less than one-third of the 1967 
level. 
(16) 
. 
A, similar position prevailed with regard to veg- 
etables. Even if a farmer managed to obtain sufficient water 
to raise a tomato or eggplant crop he was lucky if it 
survived the artillery exchanges. 
(ii) The Central Ghor 
Below Deir Alla, beyond those areas served by the 
Ghor canal in 1967 is the region of the bridges, where agric- 
ulture still depended on wells and springs. As in the far 
north fighting here was relatively heavy. The emergency 
camps had drawn early Israeli attention and substantial 
guerrilla activity continued after their elimination. 
Again there was much to attract the guerrillas. 
Targets included the headquarters of the Jericho military 
district and Israeli installations at the river crossing 
points. In addition the region served as base for infil- 
tration of the Judean Wilderness, which offered access to 
Jerusalem. 
After the Karameh battle most permanent residents 
who had not fled either with or before the refugees packed up 
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and departed. In this case the main destinations were Amman 
and Salt. Only in the Kafrein-Rama sector, where village sites 
are set back from the river, did appreciable numbers remain. 
Hence one has a pattern superficially similar to that which 
emerged in the North Ghor -a relatively confined territory 
which was regularly pummeled and totally abandoned grading 
into a broader zone where bombardment was less intense and 
where a small population survived. 
Destruction in the Central Ghor was very great. 
In some parts highly saline layers in the sub-soil meant that 
a single bomb or shell could wreck much of a crop simply by 
spraying salts over the plants. Damage arising from such 
factors is reflected in the amount recently awarded to the 
region by the Ghor Damages Committee - 700,000 J. D. 
(c. £1,200,000). 
(17) 
For comparison the North Ghor farmers, 
in an area with a larger 1967 population and a broader 
economic base, are to be given approximately 1,000,000 J. D. -- 
(c. £1,700,000). 
(iii) The South Ghor 
Events in the South Ghor - Ghor as Safi and the 
Lisan peninsula - differed markedly from those experienced 
elsewhere. First, hostilities were more restricted both in 
space and in intensity. Second, in part because of this, the 
nature of the accompanying population shifts also differed. 
. Israeli activity took the form. of occasional ground 
incursions, the intervening periods being largely calm, apart 
from intermittent air assaults. Clashes were generally 
sparked either by guerrilla raids in the Arava (including ' 
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mine-laying), on the long desert border between the Dead Sea 
and Eilat, or by'mortar and rocket bombardment of the Sedom 
potash works. Israel regarded Ghor-as-Safi as a "saboteur 
base" and took steps accordingly. 
The first incursion occurred as an adjunct to the 
Karameh operation, including a brief occupation of Safi 
village and the destruction of police stations in Safi and 
Fifi. Israel reported killing 74 guerrillas and Jordanian 
soldiers at no loss to herself. After this there was a 
lull of more than a year, finally broken on 21 May 1969 when 
Safi was again attacked by a Tzahal motorized force. Amman 
reported five homes destroyed and an Israeli stay'of about 
42, hours. By far the worst fighting, however, came in 
January 1970. A chronology of the month's events is given 
in Appendix IVc . Attacks began with artillery bombardment 
in the first two weeks, climaxed with a twelve hour 
occupation of Safi village, on 20-21 January, and graded away 
with further air and artillery activity. 
Population movements caused by the hostilities were 
conditioned by three factors. First, the fighting only 
affected Ghor as Safi, the Lisan being practically untouched 
and hence available as a sanctuary. This spatial-limitation, 
which did not exist in the North and Centre, resulted in a 
migration within the Ghor itself, a unique event. For 
instance during the May 1969 battle approximately 4000 
Ghor-as-Safi residents treked to relatives at Mazra', 20 
kilometres to the north. 
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Second, flight to the adjacent plateau was in any 
case discouraged by suspicion that the reception by Kerak 
people would not be particularly favourable - Kerakites 
regarded the dark-skinned inhabitants of the Ghor as inferior, 
an attitude compounded by feudal tutelage, a lack of family 
ties and a strained history. Such socio-ethnic divisions 
between Plateau and Valley were much less pronounced further 
north. Hence with Mazra'pulling, Kerak repelling and distance 
restraining, only a few hundred Ghor-as-Safi people ventured 
up the mountain road. 
Third, -with hostilities sporadic rather than regular 
there was considerable coming and going between Ghor as Safi 
and the Lisan. hfter each incursion most people returned 
to their lands, fleeing again on the next attack. The 
resultant pattern of- ebb and flow was again somewhat dIfTerent 
from behaviour further north, where farmers tended only to 
commute to the Valley, continuing to live on the Plateau. 
Damage in the South Ghor was similar to that 
suffered in other areas. Safi village became a heap of rubble, 
irrigation installations were blown up, and much destruction 
occurred to trees and crops. The Ghor Damages. Committee 
eventually awarded Ghor-as-Safi c. 250,000 J. D. (c. £420,000) - 
10% of the Valley total for 8% of the 1967-population. 
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typ Israeli Strategy 
Israel's post-June 1967 struggle with the Palestine 
guerrillas began within a few weeks, when Fatah and Popular 
Front operatives attempted to organize a network for 
subversion and sabotage amongst the Arab population of the 
West Bank Highlands. In this phase the Israelis quickly 
gained the upper hand. The guerrillas were inexperienced, 
tenuous supply routes across the Jordan were swiftly throttled, 
an official policy of liberality combined with harsh 
punishments (e. g. house demolition) soon deprived them of 
an active popular base and, last but not least, the open 
sparsely vegetated terrain proved ill suited for guerrilla 
activity. In consequence'by early 1968 the Israeli General 
Security Service had been able to eliminate most West Bank 
cells, reducing internal resistance to the occupation to 
mere nuisance value. 
Having lost all prospect of a viable base within 
occupied territory the guerrillas were forced back on cross- 
border operations. These took two forms - attempts to 
infiltrate the West Bank and assaults on Israeli targets 
within the Jordan Rift. Together with supporting activity 
from Jordanian and Iraqi regular forces and the ever more 
vigorous Israeli reprisals such operations provided the 
dynamic of the War of Attrition. 
Seen from the western side of the river the geogra- 
phical pattern of incidents was a mirror-image of the pattern 
of devastation in the :, ast Valley. Table 5=4 gives numbers of 
incidents involving casualties for three sectors of the West 
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Valley during the period 1967-1970, as derived from daily 
Ha-aretz reports. As expected the occurrences were spatially 
concentrated, 45% being in the far north, in metropolitan 
Israel (Belt Shean and South Kinneret) and 45% being in the 
Jericho military district. The type of incident varied 
considerably, most casualties in the north resulting from, _ 
attacks on Israeli civilian settlements, ranging from mine- 
laying to artillery and rocket shelling, while in the vicinity 
of Jericho interception of attempts to infiltrate populated 
areas of the West Bank bulked larger. There was also a marked 
temporal concentration, 1969 being the worst year for., all 
three sectors. 
0 Israel responded to the Arab challenge with both 
defensive and offensive measures. The principal element in 
the defensive system is a complex anti-infiltration barrier 
running the full length of the Valley, from the Yarmouk to 
the Dead Sea. Constructed in 1968 and 1969 the barrier is 
located as depicted in figure 29 . It comprises a double 
fence, electronic listening devices, minefields and dust patrol 
roads on which footprints can be readily detected and by early 
1970 it had drastically reduced guerrilla penetration. In 
addtion the Israelis quickly organized an efficient system 
of daily patrols and pursuit tactics. On finding a suspect 
trace small units would be sent by foot, jeep and helicopter - 
"to search wadis and caves within a semi-circle drawn from- 
the crossing-point". 
(19)' 
The guerrillas were in any case 
disadvantaged by the breadth of wilderness they had to climb- 
through to reach the Highlands and thus, even after a 
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successful negotiation of the Valley floor, their tracks 
were often discovered long before they had been able to reach 
populated territory. In sum, on many occasions guerrilla 
infiltration ended in a bloody fire-fight somewhere in the 
barren eastern hills of Judea'and Samaria. 
In its offensive response to raids and bombardment 
from the East Bank Israel saw little use in occupying more 
Arab land. Government leaders were well aware that this would 
only mean facing the same problem all over again some distance 
to the east, 'at the cost of stretched logistics. When asked 
by Belt Shean farmers to let the army take the Irbid mountains 
from which Iraqi guns were shelling their settlements Levi 
Eshkol is reported to have laughed and offered the cynical 
comment 
"Comrades I know you well. If I let the army take the 
Gilead you would settle there and be shelled again. 
Before long the army would have taken all the land right 
to the edge of the desert" (20) 
Instead Israel relied on a retaliatory system aimed 
at damaging Jordan to such an extent that "the regime would 
develop an interest in calming activities. " 
(21) In more 
specific terms the strategy was to force Jordan to control the 
Palestine guerrilla presence for the sake of its political and 
economic survival, regardless of external Arab opinion. From 
the course of events and from the declarations of Israel's leaders 
one can detect two distinct intentions. The first was to drive 
the entire guerrilla apparatus eastward, into the population 
centres of the East Bank Plateau, from which access to occupied 
territory would be more difficult and where the guerrillas 
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could be expected to become increasingly embroiled in a. 
struggle for authority with the Hashemite structure. The 
second was to exert economic pressure on Jordan by means of 
strategic bombardment, chiefly of the vulnerable East Ghor 
Canal Project. 
Offensive activity took a number of forms. There 
were, for example, graduated reprisals for specific incidents. 
These ranged from the small arms level to air raids and cross- 
border incursions, depending on the degree of provocation - 
"when border villages were shelled, Israeli artillery shelled 
Jordanian army positions; when the town of Beit Shean was hit 
by rockets, the Israelis used long-range guns to shell 
(22) 
Irbid--". The main effort, however, went into an ongoing 
air offensive against the guerrilla bases, activity which often 
bore no direct relation to particular provocations. When, in 
the wake of Karameh, the guerrillas began to put more emphasis 
on fringe portions of the East Bank Plateau as supply points 
and back-up zones, Israel adjusted its"campaign to fit. On 
4 August 1968 Israeli planes struck Salt and its surrounds, 
bombing ammunition dumps, training camps and command posts. 
Taken in conjunction with the occasional bombardment of Irbid 
district this indicated Israel's readiness to pull Plateau 
areas into the battle-zone whenever deemed' necessary. 
Through 1968 and 1969 the application of Israeli 
power began to pay its intended geo-strategic dividends. First, 
the guerrillas were forced to move much of their infrastructure 
from the Valley to the flanking hills and then, after the Salt 
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bombing and subsequent raids, to Plateau urban areas and 
refugee camps. The process is shown in figure 30, indic- 
ating three stages of guerrilla retreat eastwards. Second, 
under the incessant Israeli pressure, the interests of the 
guerrillas and the Jordan government started to diverge strongly. 
The Jordanians, wearying of the destruction and worried about 
the development of a "state within a state" which the 
guerrillas shift to the Plateau presaged, wished to cut their 
losses and take up the June 1970 cease-fire plan of U. S. 
Secretary of State William Rogers. The Palestinian leadership 
had no interest in the Rogers proposal, viewing it as a 
Zionist-Hashemite plot aimed at their neutralization. Such 
differences of outlook, together with a steady erosion of 
Hashemite power as the guerrillas took effective control of 
refugee populations in Amman and elsewhere, led by mid 1970 
to frequent armed clashes between guerrilla bands and the 
Jordan Army. 
Finally, during the years of "attrition" Israel 
endeavoured to maintain the flow of commodity exports from the 
occupied West Bank to the Jordanian East Bank. One even had 
the extraordinary spectacle of undisturbed civilian movement 
across the Damiya and Allenby bridges in the midst of 
artillery barrages. This "open Bridges" policy was pursued 
for practical as much as for altruistic reasons if the 
West Bank agricultural surplus was not disposed of by continued 
transfer to the East Bank and the wider Arab world it would 
either have to be largely marketed in Israel, which some 
feared would ruin many Israeli farmers, or it would not be 
marketed at all, precipitating a catastrophic depression 
in 
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the occupied territories. with serious political and security 
implications. Furthermore there is the intriguing possibility 
that "open bridges" may have. provided an opportunity for 
Israel to infiltrate some of its own produce into the 
Arab world. 
V. Recovery in the East Valley 
In the devastated East Jordan Valley mid 1970 
marked the turning of the tide. For several months guerrilla 
activity had been slowly declining as the Palestinians 
became more embroiled with the Jordan Government and as 
Israeli counter-measures became more effective. Israeli 
shelling now slackened in sympathy and on 21 August the 
Rogers cease-fire ended hostilities between Israel and Jordan. 
In late 1970, after the September Civil War between 
Palestinian forces and the Jordan Army, the last guerrillas 
were withdrawn from the Valley. Military interest was 
diverted to the Plateau which, ironically, had become more 
dangerous than the Ghor. Because of the reversal of roles 
Ghor farmers commuting down from the uplands began to spend 
longer periods in their old homes - perhaps a week at a time. 
Then, as confidence concerning border security increased, 
many returned permanently. The demographic recovery acceler- 
ated in mid 1971. In May full-scale repair work commenced 
on the canal and in July government authority was restored 
to the country pLt large with the crushing of the guerrillas. 
Production rose steadily through 1971,1972 and 
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1973 (the East Ghor orange harvest climbed from 4,153 tonnes 
in 1971 to 8,556 tonnes in 
ingly brief period of four 
regained and thought could 
plans - the building of a 
of the occupied Golan, and 
toward the Dead Sea. 
1973 (23))" Within the surpris- 
years the pre-1968 position was 
again be turned to expansion 
Zew Yarmouk dam at Maqarin, east 
the extension of the canal 
The accompanying demographic recovery (fig. 31) has 
been substantial but even today is incomplete. A 1973 survey 
(24) 
counted 47,389 in the North Ghor, 15,000 less than 1967 
estimates. The shortfall was even greater in the Central Ghor 
(16,042 in 1973, against 35,000 in 1967), largely owing to the 
non-return of Karameh residents. This situation can be 
attributed partly to a persistent failure to provide elem- 
entary amenities such as electricity and domestic water 
supplies, and partly to the continuing shadow of war in a 
border region. 
Yet apart from the continued dereliction of Safi 
village 
(25) 
today's traveller in the Valley would be unable 
to find much visible trace of the War of Attrition. Settle- 
ment patterns can clearly display great resilience in the 
face of military devastation. 
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VI. Attrition : The Wider Phenomenon 
Paralleling the hostilities along the Jordan, devas- 
tation and depopulation also occurred on the Suez Canal front. 
A comparison between the two episodes helps place the Jordan 
Rift in a broader perspective. 
There are many superficial similarities between the 
Jordan and Suez cases. Both involved regular in situ fighting 
along a water-course leading to substantial economic and 
demographic dislocation on the Arab side, which for both Egypt 
and Jordan happened, unfortunately, to be a region of major 
economic significance. In addition the two Arab heartlands 
to the rear - the Irbid-Amman axis and the Nile delta, espec- 
ially Cairo - experienced similar strains , in terms both of 
absorbing refugees and of enduring deep penetration Israeli 
raids. 
On more detailed analysis, however, considerable 
differences in character, inception and scale emerge. First, 
the territories on the Israeli side of the front are entirely 
dissimilar. The Sinai desert is quite a different proposition 
from the populated West Bank and the fertile Beit Shean Valley, 
and this had several implications for Egypt - on the one hand 
there were few refugees from occupied territory to complicate 
the situation and no Palestine guerrillas to cause internal 
disruption and military inconvsnience, but against this there 
were no readily available Israeli towns and villages to harrass 
and strike back at. 
Second, in part because of the absence of guerrillas, 
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Nasser had much greater control over the course of events 
than did the Jordanians. Thus he could hold back for almost 
two years before launching his "attrition" (Istinzaf) 
campaign, to a time when the East Jordan Valley had already 
been virtually deserted for more than a year. Naturally some 
population loss had taken place from the canal cities as a 
response to sporadic but occasionally severe hostilities in 
lat-e 1967 and late 1968, but it was not until April 1969 that 
a general exodus, principally in the direction of Cairo, 
occurred. Furthermore, in direct contrast to the East Ghor 
evacuation the Suez exodus was officially orchestrated as a 
deliberate tactic, designed to "clear the decks" in the 
confrontation zone. 
Third, the scale of hostilities in the Suez theatre 
dwarfed anything happening in Jordan, essentially a side-show. 
The scale of the desolation was similarly greater, the impact 
of the fighting being intensified by the fact that the popul- 
ation at risk was an urban one - not a scattered rural comm- 
unity as in the East Ghor. Hence much larger numbers and a. - 
much more sophisticated economic apparatus were involved. 
600,000 people had to leave their homes as against less than 
100,000 in the East Ghor, and 'the damage figures amounted to 
an altogether higher order of magnitude, with major urban 
centres like Suez city and`Port Said substantially reduced to 
rubble. Losses here included oil refineries, factories and 
transport facilities, not to mention the crippling effect 
on Egypt's economy of the prolonged closure of the canal. 
Another scale difference involves the duration of 
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of the period of desolation. Whereas farmers began returning 
to the East Jordan Valley in late 1970, in part propelled by 
civil disorders on the Plateau, the Egyptian Government would 
not allow canal zone residents to re-settle while Israel held 
the opposite bank, as re-settlement in such conditions would 
merely cramp Egypt's freedom of military manoeuvre. Not until 
mid 1974, after Egypt had retaken the east bank of the canal 
in the October 1973 War and had acquired additional buffer 
territory in the January 1974 Disengagement Agreement, did an 
officially sponsored re-settlement programme get under way, 
with massive financial aid from Saudi Arabia. By this time 
Egypt's economy was in a desperate state, the burdens imposed 
by non-use of the canal zone assets and by the need to support 
600,000 refugees in the delta hinterland having become absolutely 
intolerable. 
Only when one comes to problems encountered in the 
recovery process do the Suez and East Ghor experiences demon- 
strate detailed convergence. In both cases the demographic 
revival has so far been incomplete, large numbers of old resid- 
ents continuing to live in hinterland refuge s, particularly 
Amman and Cairo. Along the canal as well as along the Valley 
there is an understandable reluctance to become hostages to 
fortune in what remains, even with the Israelis 50 kilometres 
distant, a potential battlefield. Yet, again in both cases, the 
numbers that have returned, substantial in absolute terms, have 
severely overtaxed the limited capacity of the authorities to 
make proper provision for them, whether in accommodation or in 
public facilities. Of course the scale of the difficulties is 
very much greater in the canal zone, reflecting the general 
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difference in scale. 
In sum the parallel Suez events reduce attrition 
and its effects in the East Jordan Valley to the proportions 
of a side-show. There are both similarities and differences, 
depending on the depth of analysis, but the overwhelming 
impression is that of a dwarfing of the East Valley. 
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(1) Jordan Valley Commission estimate. Source - Tuma Hazou, Director of Public Relations. 
(2) 1961 Jordan Census, 1961 East Valley Social and 
Economic Survey. 
(3) Includes Karameh Old Camp. 
(4) Ha-aretz 19-7-67. P. 1 and 2,20-7-67. P"9. 
(5) Ha-aretz 20-8-67 P. 1. 
(6) Buehrig P. 41-42. 
(7) Ha-aretz 16-10-67. P-1- 
(8) Ha-aretz 13-2-68. P. 1., 14-2-68 P. 1. 
(9) Also see interview of a Hebron notable returning from 
a visit to Amman Ha-aretz 26-3-68 P. 1. 
"the roads leading to the capital are packed 
(with people) and travelling from Amman to the 
Allenby bridge took long hours. " 
(10) The Government initially selected a locality known as 
Nueimah. Dust storms and lack of water and 
amenities quickly caused the people placed 
there to ask for a transfer. When this was 
refused the people moved themselves. 
(11) Construction had begun in 1965, using a joint Jordanian- 
Egyptian work force. It was intended that the 
dam should take water from a Syrian diversion 
of the Baniyas spring, one of the princip. al 
sources of the Jordan, as well as from the 
Yarmouk. This made it exceedingly unpopular 
with the Israelis, who launched a mortar attack 
on the site in April 1967. When abandoned the 
Project was about 20% complete. 
Source - Jordan Valley Commission, Amman. 
(12) Measurement of distances from 1961 East Valley survey, 
Map 2 P. 33 - 34. 
(13) There were still 556 in Husn in late 1971 (UNRWA 
Field Record, 31-9-71) 
(14) Ha-aretz 1-7-69, P. 1. 
(15) National Resources Authority correspondence Deir Alla to Amman - in Arabic. 
(16) Estimate by Khalil Khayyat, National Resources Authority 
co-ordinator in the Valley during the hostilities. 
No precise data exist. The Department of Statistics {Amman) notes in the preface 
I 
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to its 1971 "Agricultural Sample Survey in 
the Ghor" that "unfortunately the department 
was not able to undertake any kind of 
agricultural sample survey in the region during 
the year 1967 - 1970 for security reasons, 
due to the continuous aggression of the 
Zionist forces. " 
(17) 1 Jordanian Dinar = c. £1.70 (Aug. 1976) Compensation 
is partial, not total. There is a sliding scale - 
Complete destruction of 1 dunum of citrus 
of to It of bananas 
it to of of vegetables 
for 3 years 
of of of of cereals 
for 3 years 
(18) Discussion between author and Mazra' resident, 
Mazra' July 1976. 
(19) Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army p. 308. 
(20) Davar, 22-11-72 
(21) Comment to author by M. K. Meir Pa'il. 2-11-76. 
(22) Luttwak and Horowitz, p. 309. 
(23) The A ricultural Sam le Su 
Dept. of Statistics, 
1973 Survey, P. 24. 
(24) Social and Economic Surve 
Dept. of Statistics, 
in the Ghors 
- 70 J. D. 
- 50 J. D. 
- 10 J. D. 
- .3J. D. 
1,1971 Survey P. 26, 
the East Jordan Va 
an F, June 1973. 
(25) As observed by the author, July 1976. 
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GENERAL, 1967-1973 
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I Underlying Processes : An Analytical 
framework 
Through the eleven years after the June 1967 
War nearly 40,000 Israeli citizens settled in the newly 
conquered territory, generally under the official colon- 
ization policies of the various governing coalitions, 
whether dominated by Labour or Likud, but also as a result 
of occasional private initiatives. Up to June 1977, under 
Labour rule, official programmes were restricted, apart 
from East Jerusalem, to areas which had either been 
substantially depopulated in the June 1967 fighting or had 
always been largely desolate, areas which also happened 
to be those most desirable to Israel from a strategic point 
of view. After June 1977, in the first year of Likud 
government, religio-historic factors took a stronger hold, 
with official settlement being tentatively extended into 
the populated core of the West Bank, the biblical heartland 
of Judaism. (see Table 9: 2 for general demographic results). 
Discussion of the Israeli'in-movement'will 
concentrate on two aspectss 
a) landscape transformation resulting from the 
imposition and elaboration of the new settlement patterns. 
b) the political processes responsible for the 
landscape transformation. 
With regard to the impetus behind the colonization, the 
June 1967 War provided the territorial opportunity - inter- 
acting elements within the Israeli political-system and 
impinging on it from outside then determined how, where and 
when advantage was taken of the opportunity. Such elements 
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seem to have included: 
a) the psychological legacy of historic experience 
b) philosophies, attitudes and strategies of 
leading decision-makers. 
c) shifting balances between political factions. 
d) public pressures and the activities of interest 
groups. 
e) resource constraints. 
f) international factors, particularly moves by 
Israel's Arab neighbours and the relationship 
between Israel and the United States. 
g) the detailed physical and human environment 
within the occupied territories. 
To organize the elements and the interactions 
between them into a single analytical structure the author 
proposes a model based on General Systems Theory (GST) 
(figures 32 and 33). GST defines a system as "anything 
formed of parts placed together or adjusted into a regular 
and connected whole". 
(') Its chief advantage lies in 
bringing order and coherence to extremely complex phenomena, 
emphasizing the "inter-connectedness of all factors and 
events". 
(') 
GST has been found of considerable value as an 
analytical tool in political science, whether in examining 
domestic or international questions. Its potential was 
first recognized by Easton in his pioneer paper "An Approach 
to the Analysis of Political Systems" (World Politics, 
1957). The approach has been further developed in case- 
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studies, a notable example being Michael Brecher's 
monumental The Foreign Policy System of Israel :. Setting, 
Images and Process (1972). Introduction into political- 
geography has been comparatively recent, beginning with 
the Cohen and Rosenthal paper "A Geographical Model for 
Political Systems Analysis" (Geographical Review, 1971) 
Cohen and Rosenthal suggest that 
political geographers turn more directly to political 
processes and to the spatial consequences than has 
heretofore been the case, and that their efforts 
be cast within a political-geographical system 
framework. (2) 
This is one of the author's principal purposes in the 
following four chapters. 
Figure 32 presents a general outline of a political 
system and its externalities. The independent variables 
in any such framework appear to comprise* 
a) actors, along with their perceptions of realities. 
b) structures, being formal and informal associations 
between actors, for example political factions. 
c) the broader environmental realities within which 
the system operates, 
d) processes, being patterns of interaction between 
actors, structures and environment. 
Demands constitute pressures within the system for certain 
policies and actions, and support indicates the strength of 
these pressures in -terms of backing from actors and within 
structures. Images of environmental realities held by 
actors may either encourage or discourage attempts to 
implement certain policies, whereas the realities them- 
selves determine the physical results - the success or 
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otherwise of the attempts. In the author's study the dep- 
endent variable, the object of attention, is of course the 
origins and evolution of the Israeli settlement programmes 
in the occupied territories. 
Figure 33-gives the adaptation of the general 
outline used by the author, depicting core elements and 
the links between them. 
External realities (environmental factors) are 
envisaged as consisting of a number of distinct components. 
a) Historic context may be divided between the 
fundamental attachment of'the Jewish people'to biblical 
'Eretz Yisrael', covering much of the occupied territories 
as well as Israel itself, the perceived lessons of'the 
preceding century of Zionist land settlement in Palestine, 
and the legacy of Israel's general historic experience. 
The first two and their implications are given special 
attention in the following section 'Links with the Past'. 
The third, general historic experience, encompasses 
both the long centuries of exile, marked by intermittent 
persecution culminating in the 1938-45 Jewish Holocaust 
in Europe, and the more recent history of Arab hostility 
to the emergence of the Jewish state, owing to the dis- 
placement of Palestinian Arabs. For most Israelis, 
including°the political leadership, the psychological legacy 
has been one of deep insecurity and intense distrust of- 
outsiders, with the Arabs being viewed through 'holocaust 
spectacles'. Occupied territory colonization has directly 
expressed this siege mentality, being in part designed to 
fix 'defensible borders', the rationale for which has been 
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suspicion that the Arabs are irreconcilable, that allies 
are unreliable, and that Arab moderation is either 
dissembling to gain positional advantage or, even if sincere, 
a temporary phenomenon liable to be overthrown by the 
deeper feeling of antipathy. 
b) The occupied territory environment, physical and 
human, has heavily conditioned the location of colonization. 
Its integration, along with the historic context, into 
decision-maker images, is treated in detail in the sections 
on the Allon Plan and its rivals. As will be seen, terrain 
of strategic significance, particularly where devoid of 
population, tended to be given first priority under Labour 
Governments. In addition conflict within and between 
various colonization schemes, conflict stemming from the 
dichotomy between pragmatic appreciation of physical and 
demographic realities in the occupied territories and 
aspirations toward the biblical 'whole land of Israel', 
provides a significant and recurrent theme. 
c) International influences come under two headingss 
activities of Israel's neighbours and the super-power 
(American) factor. They receive particular attention in 
the Golan case study (Chapter 7) and in the analysis of 
colonization after the October 1973 War (Chapter 9), where 
there is very clear illustration of their alternate 
accelerating and delaying effects on settlement construction. 
d) Domestic forces include movements in public 
opinion and the activities of lobbies and interest groups 
originating outside the political system or possessing 
public followings independent of party structures. As 
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unauthorized colonization attempts by settler pressure 
groups have demonstrated, 'domestic forces' can produce 
action without involving the official policy system at 
all - indeed sometimes in opposition to official policy 
objectives. The potency of their demands is, however, 
greatly augmented if they can also generate support within 
the political system, perhaps using direct action as 
a supplement. The activities of the Golan Settlement 
Committee, particularly between 1973 and 1976, and the post 
1974 Gush Emuntm offensive on the West Bank, which encom- 
passed unofficial site foundations, subversion of the 
National Religious Party and efforts to influence govern- 
ment personalities, provide the most prominent examples. 
e) Available economic and demographic resources 
have been the most important constraints on the actual 
realization of Israel's settlement decisions. They serve 
to indicate that, whatever may be the demands within the 
political system or the images and will of decision- 
makers, the real-world results of attempts to implement 
settlement policies depend on whether or not the requisite 
means can be obtained. 
Images, held by decision-makers (the top level 
political actors, principally the Cabinet Ministers) are 
the filters through which external realities influence the 
formulation of policy, and hence action. For the indiv- 
idual decision-makers these images are built up from 
personal experience, personality traits, political ideology 
and sensitivity to the external realities, including the 
historic context. Contrasts such as those between Sapir's 
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sensitivity to Israel's limited capacities, Allon's 
combination of nationalism and pragmatism, Eban's inter- 
nationalism and Begin's biblical fundamentalism, together 
with the shifting weight of such outlooks in the political 
system, are crucial for understanding different phases 
in the colonization. Here it should be emphasized that 
party labels are not necessarily a good guide to images 
concerning the occupied territories. The Labour Party 
has always contained a broad spectrum of views and even 
Begin's Herut, though generally following a hard-line, 
has its more conciliatory elements. 
The political system provides the institutional 
arena within which demands for particular policies and 
action appear, whether from political actors or as input 
from domestic forces outside the system. It comprises 
Israel's formal political and bureaucratic apparatus, 
including the Cabinet, the government machinery, the 
Knesset, the parties and factions, the semi-autonomous 
Jewish Agency, and all actors involved in this apparatus. 
Demands, reflecting various images of external 
realities, compete for support within the political system, 
and those which generate the greatest support have the 
greatest influence on political decisions. As noted by 
Easton, support encompasses both acts in favour of a 
particular demand and "supportive states, of mind" 
(3) 
- i. e. 
where does the world-view underlying a-particular demand 
stand with regard to the whole range of images held by 
actors and decision-makers? For. example the great 
strength of the Allon Plan and the reason it became the 
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informal framework of Israel's settlement actions between 
1967 and 1977 lay in the fact that it stood near the centre 
of gravity. amongst decision-maker attitudes and outlooks 
during that decade. 
To summarize; the input in the author's model 
could be held to consist of demands and support, influenced 
by domestic forces and the images of external realities 
held by political actors. Output, being decisions and 
action, would appear to depend on the shifting balance 
of power between decision-makers and hence between different 
world views. However it is posited that the effectiveness 
of decisions and action in terms of realizing goals and 
in terms of actual impact on the landscape has nothing to 
do with the responsible'images, but is determined by the 
external realities and by the degree to which these have 
been correctly gauged by the decision-makers. 
Harold and Margaret Sprout (Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 1960) hold this view very strongly, though perhaps 
too dogmatically with regard to the explanation of decisions, 
about which outside academic observers can never be entirely 
certain - 
What matters (appears to matter) in the explanation 
of decisions and policies is how the actor imagined 
his environment to be, not how it actually was, 
whereas what matters in the explanation of. accomplish- 
ments is how the environment actually was, not how the 
actor imagined it to be. (4) 
Brecher (The Foreign Policy System of Israel 1972) is more 
cautious and in Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy (1974) 
supports his outlook with exhaustive exemplification - 
To the extent that decision-makers perceive the 
operational environment accurately their -- acts 
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may be said to be rooted in reality and are thus 
likely to be successful. To the extent that their 
images are inaccurate, policy choices will be 
unsuccessful, that is, there will be a gap between 
elite defined objectives and policy outcomes. (5) 
In Israeli settlement policy the chief instance 
of lack of congruity between images and reality has been 
the seemingly persistent over-optimism of decision-makers 
regarding Israel's demographic capacity to implement 
large-scale settlement projects. The consequence has been 
a regular failure to achieve planned settlement populations, 
often by very wide margins. Cases are given in chapters 7 
and 9. In addition settlement decisions have occasionally 
been unrealistic with regard to international factors, 
leading to delay and re-orientation. One example is the 
programme contained in the August 1973 Galili Document 
(p. 180), which had to be postponed or rethought in the wake 
of the Arab military offensive of October 1973 and the 
American political pressures of 1973-75. With these 
exceptions, however, Israel's leadership, one of the best 
informed in the world throughout the period under discussion, 
appears to have been generally well attuned to changing 
external realities and has adjusted tactics swiftly to 
take account of new contingencies. 
Finally, the author's model should be treated 
as dynamic. External realities, images, personalities and 
power balances all change through time, whether as a result 
of factors unconnected with the colonization or as a result 
of feed-back from previous decisions and actions in settle- 
ment policy. Such change produces shifts in action and its 
landscape implications, these in turn having further feed- 
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back effects on the system and on inputs. In consequence 
the settlement pattern at 'a particular moment is a mosaic 
of imprints of a whole series of permutations of the model. 
II Links with the Past 
Before all else Jewish settlement across the June 
1967 boundaries should be seen not as a radically new 
phenomenon but as a development arising out of trends and 
philosophies well-entrenched in Israel's past. Three 
historic themes are relevant here: a) the desire for the .. 
completion of the biblical 'Land of Israel' (Eretz Yisrael) 
b) the long-standing belief, derived from pre-state 
experience, that settlements have intrinsic military value 
as forward defence lines and c) the pre-1949 use of agric- 
ultural colonization as a political tool, both to expand 
the ekumene of the Yishuv and to secure frontier zones 
protecting areas already settled. 
In practical terms the 1949 armistice seemed to 
relegate to the realms of political fantasy widely held 
ambitions for an extension of Israeli sovereignty over the 
full historic domain of the twelve tribes, including the 
West Bank, the Golan and much of Trans-Jordan. Nonetheless 
as an ideal the 'whole land' continued to be firmly 
supported by many elements in the Israeli political spectrum. 
Menahem Begin's ; Herut movement, built around Vladimir 
Jabotinsky's revisionist Zionism, which had stridently 
opposed socialist tendencies as a diversion from the prime 
goal of securing territory, proved particularly vociferous 
in this respect, but the 'whole land' also remained a 
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guiding philosophical tenet for many in the Labour factions. 
The 1967 conquests of course re-opened the question as a 
practical matter, especially with regard to Gaza and the 
West Bank. Annexationist groups within the principal 
parties immediately pressed their opposition to withdrawal 
from territories to which the Jewish people had an 'historic 
right'. 
This outlook--- penetrated the ranks of Mapai, Rafi, 
Ihud ha Kevutzot ve ha Kibbutzim, Ha Kibbutz ha Meuhad, 
and possessed many sympathizers in the Moshav movement. 
The number not believing in the traditional split 
between the 'fanatical' right and the 'progressive'-- 
left grew. The attitude concerning extended boundaries 
for the State of Israel, that was mockingly considered 
up to then (1967) to be a 'concession' of the Herut 
movement and the revisionists, suddenly took hold of 
many staunch members of the Labour movement. (6) 
Demands for rapid and unrestrained Jewish settle- 
ment through large parts of the occupied territories quickly 
followed and although proponents of this course did not 
achieve control of the Government during the years of 
Labour domination their views gained expression in a 
number of unauthorized colonization attempts by private 
bodies, particularly after the October, 1973 War. 
On the pragmatic issues of settlements as defence 
lines and, more broadly, of settlement policy as a land 
anchor for strategic or other purposes, the whole history 
of the Yishuv serves as illustration. Faith in the former 
concept was considerably boosted by the resisting power 
of the kibbutzim in the Gaza area during the Egyptian 
attacks of May-June 1948, while the latter is well demon- 
strated by the 118 'tower and stockade' villages established 
between 1936 and 1947 to ensure de facto possession of 
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Jewish National Fund tracts in peripheral regions, for 
instance in Upper Galilee and the Beit Shean Valley. Despite 
shifts in military technology which, arguably, reduced the 
efficacy of colonization for such purposes these geo- ' 
strategic themes left a powerful mental legacy amongst 
decision-makers. After June 1967 they fed directly into 
the official settlement programme in the occupied territories, 
the Schief functions of which were to politically anchor 
to the State of Israel limited areas seen as critical for 
the State's security and, to a lesser extent, to form 
'defence lines' in these areas. 
III Aftermath of the War 
Decision-making after the June War was in the 
hands of a Government of National Unity, founded in the 
crisis atmosphere of late May and headed by Levi Eshkol. 
This Government, though dominated by the Labour core of 
Mapäi, Rafi, and Ahdut ha Avoda, incorporated almost the full 
political spectrum, ranging from Mapam on the left to Gahal 
(Herut - Liberals block) on the right (Appendix II), a 
situation which did not augur well for clear policy 
formulation concerning the future of the conquered territories. 
The range of images, world views and consequent opinions was 
too broad for there to be any possibility of an immediate 
consensus, or even a majority, in favour'of one line of 
action, especially as attitudes on these subjects differed 
within the major factions as much asýbetween them. 
Gahal, faithful to its vision of the 'whole land', 
and heedless of the demographic reality of large Arab 
populations in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, immediately took 
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a maximalist stand on the retention of territory, even in 
Sinai. Such thinking,. principally championed by Menahem 
Begin, was diametrically opposed by several leading person- 
alities in the Labour factions, for example Pinhas Sapir 
(Ministry of Finance, Mapai), Abba Eban (Foreign Minister, -, 
Mapai) and even Ben Gurion (Rafi - see p. 165 ). These 
people took a more pragmatic view of local and external 
realities, being worried about the implications for the 
Jewish State of incorporating large Arab populations and, 
especially Eban, being concerned about the possible effect 
on Israel's world image of., an excessive flaunting of 
expansionist ambitions. In territorial terms they did not 
envisage boundary revision going beyond the unification of 
Jerusalem, imperative on historical and emotional, grounds, 
and. the partial retention of the Golan Heights, imperative on 
geo-strategic grounds. Otherwise, possibly excepting minor 
frontier adjustments in the vicinity of Israel's narrow 
coastal waist, all the territories could be returned to the 
Arabs with the conclusion of a peace treaty, security problems 
being settled by mutually acceptable demilitarization 
arrangements. 
(7) 
Other Ministers and leading figures in the governing 
factions were either still uncommitted or evolved positions 
between the Begin and Eben/Sapir extremes, perceiving that 
Israel's long-term defence required the absorption of land 
additional to Jerusalem and the western Golan, but realizing 
that 'not an inch' stands on territory would mean permanent 
warfare and probable international isolation. In the Labour 
factions the intermediate spectrum ranged from Dayan, who 
advocated permanent Israeli security control over the West 
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Bank 
(8), 
to Allon and Eshkol, who envisaged some more 
limited territorial adjustment. The existence of such a 
multiplicity of divergent images almost inevitably implied 
a willingness to delay; to freeze the 10 June status-quo 
for a period and to wait for an initiative from the defeated 
Arabs, Moshe Dayan's 'telephone call'. 
There was only one major exception to the looming 
paralysis in decision-making - the unification of Jerusalem. 
Here even the National Unity Government could agree and 
take immediate action. On 28 June 1967, only two weeks 
after the war, East Jerusalem and a wide swathe of surr- 
ourxing land was formally annexed to Israel (figure 37), the 
new municipal boundary being set to include heights 
commanding the Arab suburbs but to exclude several large 
Arab villages, minimizing the accretion of Arab population. 
Unification and the creation of new Israel landscapes had not 
been in doubt from the first days of the conquest; immed- 
iately after the cease-fire barriers separating the Arab 
and Jewish sections were removed and on 11 June the Moghrabi 
Quarter of the old City was demolished to provide open- 
space in front of the Western (Wailing) Wall. 
(9) 
In retrospect the annexation of East Jerusalem, 
accompanied by calls for substantial Jewish colonization 
in the vicinity, marked an important point of departure. 
It established an exclusive claim to which the Arabs 
could never be expected to agree and thus helped pave the 
way toward further years of mutually reinforcing belligerence. 
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IV. The July 1967 Allon Plan - 
i Through late'1967 Eban/Sapir minimalism represented 
the strongest single outlook in the, Government, -and its 
influence could be-clearly detected°in enunciations of 
policy. Eban himself statedltheýofficial line on territory 
in September: "Israel sees the'old city'of Jerusalem as'a 
'part of Israel' but if talks take place every other area - 
the West Bank, Sinai and the Golan'-Heights - is open to' 
negotiation" . 
(10) He later asserted that this in fact 
meant the Arabs could have obtained a 98% restitution of 
territory in 1967 if, they had been prepared to fully- , 
recognize the Jewish state, 
(ll),., 
a comment confirmed from 
the other side by General Saad. el Shazli, Egyptian. Chief 
of Staff in the October 1973 War. 
(12) 
After their military humiliation, however, the 
Arabs were in no mood to accept Israel and instead adopted 
an extremely militant standpoint, looking forward to a 
forcible 'liquidation of the consequences of aggression'. 
Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem only strengthened 
the Arab attitude, deepening the feeling of frustration 
and bitterness. 
In this context, faced-with. -what seemed to be 
complete Arab intransigence, Israel's minimalists exper- 
ienced a steady erosion of'their position. . At the 
20-August 
Cabinet meeting Eban submitted a gloomy assessment of the 
outlook of Israel's neighbourss "no movement has occurred 
in the position of the Arab states'-- they continue in their 
hostile and belligerent policies against Israel, as in all 
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previous years"., 
(13) Such perceptions made the Government 
increasingly vulnerable. to various demands, both from r 
within the Labour factions and from the wider public, for more 
hard-line policies. on occupied territory - demands encom- 
passing the-absorption of.: considerable areas into-Israel, - 
for strategic and/or religio-historical reasons, combined 
with extensive Jewish colonization across the old boundaries. 
Figure 34 depicts the impact of the demands and the support 
they generated on the political system, the influence of 
external factors, and the eventual results on the ground. 
The earliest and most notable demand was the 
July 1967 Allon Plan. The Allon Plan is of great signif- 
icance because,, without ever being formally accepted, it 
gradually became the territorial. and ideological base for 
large-scale official settlement programmes in the occupied 
territories, continuing in this role for almost a decade. 
Its potency was twofold: 
a) It represented a position mid-way between 
minimalism and inaximalism, and so could command considerable 
support as the least evil for both camps. 
b) It took, as its fundamental premise a combination 
of assumptions which drew their strength from contemporary, 
Arab militancy and, at a, deeper level, from the historic 
insecurity of the Jewish people, so closely reflecting the 
prevailing state of Israeli public opinion - the assump- 
tions that Arab regimes could not be trusted even after. a 
peace treaty, that the 1949 boundaries were indefensible, 
and that demilitarized zones and other devices not entirely 
under Israel's control were unreliable. On these assumptions 
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it built 'a' simple logical structure"of'"considerable power : 
Israel must retain direct rule over parts of the occupied 
territories which conferred clear strategic advantages and, 
to buttress her bargaining position with regard to such 
regions, she must; go-beyond. setting up military sites and 
immediately implement a comprehensive policy of Jewish 
colonization. 
ii Yigal Allon, Minister of Labour and a senior 
spokesman for the _Ahdut ha Avödä faction, presented the 
first version of his scheme to the Cabinet on 26 July 
1967 (text 'in-'App end ix VI ), only six weeks after" the war. 
The aim was to break 'the paralysis in decision-making 
which afflicted the National Unity Government, due to'a 
feär that internal drift would'invite external intervention, 
particularly 'from the United States. 
Allon's outlook was characterized both by the 
militant self-reliant nationalism of Ahdut ha Avoda and 
by a tendency toward intellectual pragmatism. 
(14) His 
ideas derived directly from his 1948-4.9 experience when, 
as Commander of the southern front, he had a) pressed 
Ben Gurion to allow an offensive to capture the Sinai 
approaches to the Gaza Strip, trapping Egyptian forces and 
establishing a block across the southern route into 
Palestine and b) urged measures to prevent Judea-Samaria 
being retained by the Hashemites. 
If we recognize"the'fa6t'6f the Hashemite invasion 
of Eretz Yisrael this -- will lead to the political. 
annexation of these areas to the Hashemite Kingdom 
not possible to draw a border more sound that the 
line of the Jordan 2r the full length of the land. 
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The advantages of the Jordan line rest not. just in 
its waters, which are not a decisive obstacle against 
a modern army, but in the Jordan Rift for its full 
length, including the steep and continuous mountain 
slopes. (15) 
Central to Allon's plan was the'', oncept' of a 
territorial compromise to maximize Israel's security while 
minimizing additions to'Israel's Arab minority - "the 
unity of the land from the geostrategic point. of. view and 
a Jewish, state from the demographic point of view". 
(16) 
On the West Bank, the major territory, involved 
(figure 36), the strategic and demographic objectives 
dovetailed neatly, with the Jordan Rift being both the 
logical defence line and the least populated zone. "In'' 
the Rift Allon proposed the incorporation into Israel of 
a strip 12 - 15 kilometres wide running south to'the Dead 
Sea which, with the inclusion of the mountains to the 
west, would form a defence wall against any assault from 
the east. Hence the whole centre of Israel, especially' 
Tel Aviv and the narrow coastal plain, would be given a 
hitherto undreamt-of strategic depth. Furthermore,,. the 
strip would militarily neutralize densely peopled Arab 
Samaria, by cutting it from the wider Arab. wo: ^ld. -Israel 
could then safely give this area political autonomy, - 
perhaps with confederal links to Jordan and/or-Israel, 
so avoiding annexation and an uncomfortable accretion to 
(l7) Israel's Arab numbers.. 
For the Hebron region A11on proposed"two altern- 
atives. In one Hebron would be annexed to Israel' in full, 
incorporating an area of great historic significance to 
the Jewish people at a high though possibly acceptable cost 
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in addition of Arab population. In the other Hebron would 
be split between the populated core, which would join'the 
autonomous entity, and the Judean Wilderness, which would 
act as an extension of the Jordan Rift defence barrier. 
The latter'would compromise the historic'interest but 
avoid the demographic cost. 
Apart from the Rift Strip and the undetermined 
Hebron question, lesser territorial adjustments were also 
suggested in the vicinity of Jerusalem and the Jerusalem 
corridor. First a connection would be. established between 
Jerusalem and the Rift, easing access from central Israel 
and cutting the Palestinian entity in two (if it consisted 
of both Samaria and Hebron). Second, the Jerusalem 
corridor would be fattened in the Gush Etzion and Latrun/ 
Beit Horon sectors (figure 36), so providing security 
insurance for Jerusalem if part of the Rift strip, for 
example between Damiya and Jericho, had to be sacrificed 
in peace negotiations. 
Away from the West Bank the July 1967 submissions 
only mentioned Gaza. Guide-lines for Sinai and the Golan 
were not yet fully formulated, though it was understood. 
that the same principles of strategic buffers would apply 
to future borders with Egypt and Syria. In Gaza a gradual 
removal of the 1949 refugee population was posited,. 
refugees to be resettled either in the autonomous West 
Bank entity or in North Sinai, towards El Arish. 
(18) 
With the local population thus reduced to manageable 
proportions Gaza would be annexed to Israel, eliminating 
a base for invasion. 
I 
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As a necessary accompaniment to these territorial 
aspects Allon also pressed for the immediate implementation 
of a comprehensive programme'of Jewish colonization in` 
the occupied territories. 
In the areas that. I have discussed-- there is a 
need for the early erection of rural and urban 
settlement points and permanent military bases 
according to security necessities --- is need to establish Jewish urban estates in East 
Jerusalem in addition to the rapid restoration 
and re-population of the Jewish quarter in-the 
Old City. (19) 
As a beginning he proposed "the establishment of a line 
of settlement nodes by means of Nahal along the Jordan 
Rift, in the surrounds of Jerusalem and on Mount Hebron". 
(20) 
He saw colonization as the only sure means of anchoring the 
security zones to Israel and as the best instrument for 
resisting external political pressures for concession 
within the zones. The argument was succinctly summarized 
in a later speech to the Labour Party Congress. 
A security border that is not a state border is not 
a security border --- a state border that is not 
settled along its length by Jews is not a state 
border. (21) 
iii The different standpoints regarding the West 
Bank indicate the Allon Plan's position in the minimalist - 
maximalist spectrum. Allon proposed the absorption of 
c. 40% of the area (figure 36) whereas minimalists stood 
for near-total withdrawal (except East Jerusalem) and 
maximalists for outright annexation. Allan opposed 
the minimalists as risking Israel's security, holding 
that mere demilitarization of a West Bank returned to the 
Hashemites could-easily be flouted. For example surface 
to air missiles might be placed in the eastern mountainsi 
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ostensibly defensive but in fact threatening Israel's air- 
space. Similarly, though himself a firm believer in. Jewish 
rights to the 'whole land', he viewed the maximalists_as 
ignoring demographic realities. 
In their turn both minimalists and maximalists 
questioned the viability of Allon'sýideas. Eban and Begin 
were at one in suspecting that the Allon security belts, 
covering land that all Arabs considered absolutely 
inalienable, would never be accepted by Israel's neighbours, 
though the lessons each drew from this were diametrically 
opposed. Particularly scathing comment came from former 
Defence Minister Pinhas Lavon, an extreme minimalist. 
The Allon Plan is truly brilliant if you are playing 
chess with yourself. If there is a chess board 
before you and you are moving his and your pieces 
according to your will and your best needs and the bare minimum of the second side's needs, it's a 
marvellous concept. If Allon and the Foreign 
Minister and the government will secure the agreement 
of any Arab government to. this plan it will be a 
revolution. It will be the days of the Messiah. (22) 
Because of such conflicts of images and person- 
alities the Cabinet response to Allon's July 1967 proposals 
was, in effect, to decide 'not to decide'. Up to the 1969 
Unwritten Agreement no formal policy. existed concerning the 
issue of whether or not to extend Jewish settlement across 
the green line. (the pre-June. 1967 boundaries). 
The lack of a formal policy, however, 'did not' 
mean lack of activity. The-Allon Plan was only one, 
expression of a powerful series of expansionist demands' and 
pressures and, in this setting, government division merely 
rendered it liable to being pulled out, not unwillingly,. - 
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into an increasing number of de-facto decisions to set up 
individual settlement points in the occupied territories. 
Allon's ideas, representing a central, position between 
divergent Ministerial viewpoints, provided a, convenient 
informal framework for the early 'fact creation', -a role 
which strengthened as 'fact creation' intensified. 
V Towards Colonization 
After the June 1967 War border-area activities 
by the Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, 
responsible for the physical implementation of settlement 
policy, proceeded with some caution. Preparations were 
made for the establishment of paramilitary outposts along 
the West Bank boundary and in the former Israel-Syria 
demilitarized zones but, reflecting the Government's 
indecision, it was stressed that all were to be inside 
metropolitan Israel. 
In reality only one such outpost came into 
existence - Nahal Snir at the north-east end of the Hula 
Valley (26 September 1967 - figure 40). 
(23) This was 
not because the Settlement Department lacked-vigour but 
because by the time of Snir's founding plans based on 
respectingthe pre-war lines had already become redundant. 
Within weeks of the war it was clear that powerful under-- 
currents in Israeli society were pulling towards the 
absorption by colonization of extensive tracts of occupied 
territory. 
Apart from the Allon Plan and the maximalism of 
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Gahal and others three indications of such pressure can be 
detected during the Summer of 1967. First, before the end 
of July the Northern office of the Settlement Department, 
possibly with approval from higher levels, produced a 
document proposing "the settlement of 1800 families in the 
Petzael region" (Lower Jordan Valley). 
(24) That this 
suggestion could appear so soon after the West Bank's 
capture, while the public emphasis was still bn the old 
boundaries, implies urgent pressure within the bureaucracy 
to colonize occupied territory. 
Second, in July and August children of former 
settlers in the Etzion block, which had been taken by the 
Arab Legion in 1948 and become part of the West Bank, 
petitioned senior officials to allow them to re-establish 
a Jewish presence in the vicinity. As the area was legally 
Jewish property and as the 1948 capture had been accompanied 
by a massacre of settlers the petitioners aroused consid- 
erable public and official sympathy - another potent factor 
in eroding the decision 'not to decide'. 
Third, and perhaps most important, the same period 
saw a well-organized campaign aimed at forcing the 
Government to settle the Golan Heights. Here an extremely 
determined group exerted influence at a point where 
official resistance was particularly weak, as most elements 
in the National Unity Government viewed the absorption of 
portions of the Golan as a strategic necessity, a degree 
of consensus which did not exist regarding the West Bank, 
Gaza or Sinai. Success in precipitating de facto Govern- 
ment activity on the Golan plateau would naturally set a 
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precedent for other regions, whether or not the agitators 
had wider ambitions. 
Figure 34 indicates the role played by the Golan 
group and its supporters in the context of the general 
political environment. 
The agitation was set in motion by members of 
farming communities in the Hula Valley and adjacent parts 
of Upper Galilee, communities which had been sporadically 
bombarded through the previous eighteen years by Syrian 
batteries on the Golan scarp. Only 48 hours after the 
10 June cease-fire representatives of local kibbutzim and 
moshavim met in the ruined dining-hall of Kibbutz Gadot, a 
settlement which had been heavily shelled by the Syrians 
in the first four days of the war. They discussed "what 
to do to prevent the return to Syria of the twenty 
kilometre wide strip which Tzahal has conquered on the 
Golan" 
(25) 
and resolved that the most effective step would 
be to take unilateral action to colonize the Heights. 
Implementation of the Gadot resolution came on 
15 July when eight young people from Hula localities 
shifted into the deserted Syrian camp of Alaikah, east of 
the Bnot Ya'agov bridge on the main road to Quneitra 
(figure 49). They obtained tacit approval from the Agricul- 
ture Department and the military authorities, ostensibly to 
round-up stray cattle. Encouraged by the semi-official 
protection they then engaged in investigating lands for 
possible agricultural exploitation and in using the proceeds 
from the sale of the cattle to provide for increases in 
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membership. 
(26) By late August numbers were up from eight 
to thirty-five. As the nucleus was not yet under the aegis 
of any single settlement movement the newcomers came from 
a variety of backgrounds, including some new immigrants. 
Simultaneously with reinforcing the settlers the 
Upper Galilee elements backing the colonization attempt 
extended their support within the political system. : Apart 
from contacts with-sympathetic elements in the bureaucracy 
and in Tzahal's. Northern Command, for instance the-- 
commanding officer David Elazar, the main thrust was 
directed through the Kibbutz movements and associated. 
political factions. 
Ha Kibbutz ha Meuhad, to which a majority of the 
settlers belonged, recognized the Alaikah outpost in 
September and Ahdut ha Avoda Ministers were openlysympath- 
etic. Particularly useful encouragement came from Yigal 
Allon, who prompted the Prime Minister to approve the idea 
of Jewish Agency support for the settlers "until a-final 
decision will be taken by the Cabinet". (27) In addition, 
in his capacity as Ministry of Labour Allon assisted the 
settlers with wages out of the unemployment: fund. 
Private pressure was also exerted within Ha 
Kibbutz ha Artzi, the largest Kibbutz organization and a 
source of concern because it forbade its members to colonize 
across the green line-in advance of clear Government - 
authorization. Several of the-Hula kibbutzim involved 
in the Golan venture were Artzi affiliates and 'Kibbutz 
Golan' members actively proselytized among young people on 
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Artzi Kibbutzim elsewhere, sometimes-without-consulting 
Kibbutz secretaries. Subsequent pressure on the Artzi 
general secretariat-from its own 'young guard' even led 
in late 1967, to a. visit by secretariat officials to 
'Kibbutz Golan'. 
-(28) 
Here the settlers succeeded in 
extracting an assurance that no obstacle would be put in 
the way of Artzi people wishing to live on, the Heights, in 
return for a commitment that information work would in 
future be conducted only in co-ordination with Kibbutz 
secretaries.. 
Nonetheless the position at Alaikah-, remained 
insecure through the first two-months. Despite moral and 
financial backing from within Israel the settlers were few 
and their formal raison d'etre was purely. temporary. As 
noted by the Jewish Agency official wholater took charge 
of co-ordination in the region, much of the 
,... 
public. was n 
"still thinking in terms of the Sinai campaign when we 
pulled back after a few months"t 
(29) though this attitude 
did not last long. 
The real breakthrough to,. a long-term, settlement 
presence came in September, when lobbying via the Tzahal 
Northern Command achieved final Government approval for a 
transfer from Alaikah to Quneitra and for the exploitation 
of 6,000 dunams in the rich Quneitra basin. 
-'(30) Over- 
crowding at Alaikah was one of the main reasons for the 
request and the shift to Quneitra's villa quarter took 
place on 12 October, the settlement then being renamed 
Merom Golan. Late Summer was also decisive in a wider 
A 
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sense, for on 26 September the Gush Etzion petitioners 
finally extracted Government authorization for their bid 
to settle across the old border south of Bethlehem. 
Hopes that private pressures could drag a vacil- 
lating administration into de-facto decision taking had 
thus proved well placed, for both the-'Golan and the West 
Bank. After all most Ministers were to some degree sympath- 
etic - it was not disagreement over whether or not Israel 
should expand at all that prevented-the formulation of 
general policy concerning territories and settlement but 
disagreement, albeit very wide-ranging, over the extent of 
the expansion. Opposing attitudes were not entirely 
irreconcilable, especially with regard'to limited areas 
which had a high perceived strategic value. 
Furthermore the broader political environment 
inside and outside Israel gradually propelled the Government 
toward harder-line positions. 
a) In the wake of victory domestic opinion became 
self-confident and more intensely nationalist, the private 
moves for settlement being merely the visible expression 
of a deeper expansionist urge. 
(31) 
b) Heightened support from world Jewry and tempor- 
arily favourable world opinion, both legacies of the war, 
meant a lack of any pressure on Israel to maintain a 
minimalist stance. ' 
c) The neighbouring Arab states refused to alter 
their position vis-a-vis the existence of the Jewish State 
and in August 1967 the Arab summit at Khartoum united 
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around the rejectionist formula of "no peace, no recognition 
and no negotiations". Naturally such'Arab absolutism"in 
turn increased the domestic weight of Israelis favouring 
large-scale territorial expansion. 
X32), 
Because of these external realities it seems 
reasonable to assume that the political system would-sooner 
or later have produced decisions in favour of some colon- 
ization of occupied territory beyond East Jerusalem,. - 
regardless of specific private pressures.. However, Merom-., r 
Golan and Kfar Etzion accelerated, -the process, determining 
both the timing and the detailed beginnings. Also, whether 
or not special cases, they set a crucial precedent, 
. opening the way for systematic colonization. Certainly 
recognition for 'Kibbutz Golan' was swiftly followed by_ 
intensive surveys and planning for a settlement pattern 
covering the whole Golan up to the new cease-fire line 
with Syria. 
(33) 
Caution persisted for a few months in 
other more controversial areas, but with restraints minimal 
and with the Etzion activity on the West Bankt. the momentum 
could not help but spread. 
In early November the vocal expansionist element 
in public opinion received formal expression with the 
emergence of the Whole Land of Israel Movement. The move- 
ment's inaugural proclamation stated 
The Western Land. of Israel is now - 
in , the 
hands of 
the Jewish people and just as we have no authority 
to make concessions with regard to the State of 
Israel, so we must hold what we have received from 
its hands - the Land of Israel.. We are obliged to be faithful to the completion of our Land - 
for the sake of both the past and the future of 
the people - and no government of Israel has the 
right to compromise on this completion. The. 
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borders of our land today are also a surety for 
" security and peace. The signatories see the 
mobilization of the-public for this purpose and 
the sketching out of routes and means for its 
achievement as a central duty in this hour. (34) 
Supporters derived from the Labour factions as much as from 
Gahal - indeed the new organization owed its beginnings to 
a reaction by senior Rafi adherents against Ben Gurion's 
call for all the territories except East Jerusalem to be 
returned to the Arabs. 
(35) 
With a wide range of well- 
known personalities behind it, 
(36) 
the Whole Land of Israel 
Movement quickly became an influential interest group, 
adept at string-pulling within major political factions, 
which' vigorously championed unlimited settlement across 
the green line. 
Between November 1967 and February 1968 the first 
officially sponsored settlement outposts appeared in various 
parts of the occupied territories : four on the Golan, two 
in the Jordan Rift, and one in North Sinai. These comprised 
small paramilitary plantings established on temporary 
sites, their members drawn from the army's pioneer youth 
corps (Nahal). The process of implementing the geographical 
concepts contained in the Allon Plan had begun. 
VI Decision-Taking in Settlement Policy 
W Under the Labour dominated Governments decisions 
concerning acts of settlement in the occupied areas lay in 
the hands of various Ministerial bodies, the most important 
being the Ministerial Committee for the Territories up to 
1970, which dealt with political aspects of Israel's 
relationship with local Arab populations as well as with 
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Jewish colonization, and the more specialist Inter- 
Ministerial Settlement Committee'from 1970'onwards, The 
early transfer of responsibility to'the latter reflected 
the increasing significance of the settlement process, with 
Prime Minister Levi Eshkol feeling that the matter was 
placing too great a burden on the Committee for the 
Territories. In addition to these primary institutions 
the Government also established two regional settlement: 
bodies - the Supreme Ministerial Committee, for Jerusalem 
and, for a few months, an ad-hoc Committee for Hebron. 
Throughout the ten years colonization sites 
received individual consideration by the different 
committees, which in theory meant ` the' Government remained 
uncommitted to any specific map, so avoiding open conflict 
within or between coalition factions. In practice there 
were of course overall guidelines - various versions of the 
Allon Plan, shifts between them reflecting the evolving 
balance between the Cabinet's maximalists and minimalists. 
Planning of non-urban settlement projects and the 
execution of Ministerial decisions on the subject have been 
the responsibility of the Settlement Department of the` 
Jewish Agency. As regards the occupied territories the 
Settlement Department has been involved in investigating 
the detailed practicalities of colonization fromýthe begin- 
nings of the settlement process. It has co-ordinated' 
surveys, received ideas from Settlement Movements'and interest 
groups, formulated spatial concepts and submitted recommen- 
dations on all these subjects to the Government. Once a 
Government decision has been made the Department has then 
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seen the relevant project through to physical completion, 
thereafter lending support as long as deemed necessary. 
Paradoxically, as an arm of the Jewish Agency the Settle- 
ment Department has always been institutionally separate 
from the Government structure -a situation which has 
encouraged a degree of independence and even occasionally 
led to friction. 
Mobilization of groups for Jewish Agency coloniz- 
ation programmes has largely taken place within the frame of 
the' established Kibbutz and Moshav federations. This is 
primarily because the bulk of settlement sites across the 
pre-1967 borders have been agricultural, continuing the 
land anchor tradition, but also reflects the fact that non- 
agricultural villages have themselves been organized 
along co-operative lines. Indeed up to the end of Labour 
rule the only settlements outside the Kibbutz-Moshav system 40 
were four urban projects, three area centres, three 
unauthorized Gush Emuntm encampments and, of course, the 
East Jerusalem developments. 
In Aharon Bier's 1976 register of Footholds and 
Settlements in the occupied territories 50 of the 67 sites 
are identified as stemming from one or other of the instit- 
utional settlement movements. The movements most involved 
included : Tenu'at ha Moshavim (Moshav Movement, Labour, 9), 
Ha Po'el ha Mizrahi (Eastern Labour, Religious Moshavim, 8) 
Ha Kibbutz ha Meuhad (United Kibbutz Movement, Labour, 6), 
Tenu'at Herut-Beitar (Herut Moshav Movement, Likud, 6), Ihud 
ha Kevutzot ve ha Kibbutzim (Union of Kibbutzim, Labour, 5) 
and Ha 'Oved ha Tzioni (Zionist Labour Moshavim, Independent 
168 
Liberals, 5). As regards political affiliation of the 
50 villages, the Labour Alignment led with 23, followed 
by the religious parties (12) and the Likud (6). 
To attract candidates for new sites the settle- 
ment movements operate in urban areas and overseas as 
well as in their own rural communities, principally through 
their youth organizations. The process frequently begins 
with the formation of a nucleus (gar'in) of young people, 
either by spontaneous initiative or by encouragement 
from above. Thereafter, with the foundation laid, the 
movement makes an application to the Settlement Depart- 
ment, proposing the nucleus as a base for colonization. 
The Golan Meuhad Kibbutz of El Rom (figure 40) 
is a useful example. In this case the nucleus came 
together while those concerned were in their last year at 
school, the original group numbering c'. 45. Members then 
did army service in the pioneer youth corps (Nahal), 
the instrument generally employed by the Jewish Agency 
to establish a settlement presence in new territory. As 
a Nahal unit the group at first considered going to Gilgal 
in the Jordan Rift but, with a majority opposed, it was 
instead assigned to the Golan -s, ite, to which it moved 
in July 1971, evolving into Kibbutz El Rom when members' 
completed their military service. 
ii Figure 35 is a diagrammatic representation of 
the decision-taking system for colonization, whether 
involving rural schemes, channeled through the Settlement 
Department, or urban projects, channeled through the 
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Ministry of Housing. The operation of the system, little 
changed since 1967, may be illustrated by describing the 
path followed by an agricultural settlement proposal. 
Such a proposal may originate within the Settle- 
ment Department, probably from one of the regional offices, 
or may come in the form of pressures from a Settlement 
Movement or a private body. The Settlement Department 
investigates the relevant practicalities - costs and benefits, 
compatability'with general planning and, if the proposal 
comes from an external factor, whether the applicant 
can muster the necessary man power. If the Department 
reaches a positive decision a recommendation goes to the 
Government. For instance on 26 February 1968, in reply to 
a question as to whether factors were being refused 
permission to settle in the 'liberated areas' Prime Minister 
Levi Eshkol stated in the Knesset that "twenty-four bodies 
have up to now applied to the Settlement Department -- 
seventeen answered in the affirmative --'seven remaining 
are not big enough to ensure settlement stability. 
(37) 
The Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee has 
served as the primary Cabinet institution for dealing 
with colonization proposals since its inception in 1970. 
It has consisted both of Ministers and of representatives 
from the Jewish Agency and has usually been the final 
decision-taking body, though particularly controversial 
questions may be debated by the full Cabinet. It has 
always been chaired by a senior Government figure - between 
1970 and the Labour collapse in 1977 by the two Ahdut ha 
Avod4 leaders, Yigal Allon and Yisrael Galili. 
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Regarding procedure, the rural settlement 
proposal appears as an item on the Committee agenda some 
days before the relevant session, giving members a chance 
to acquaint themselves with the issue. The session 
itself is addressed by the relevant specialists (land 
settlement, Arab affairs, security affairs etc. ) and 
may even adjourn "to the very area, to see for ourselves 
and not only to trust experts. " 
(38) 
Under the Labour Government a proposal would 
become operational only if approved by a large majority. 
If one member or Minister expressed strong opposition 
provision existed for referral to the full Cabinet, though 
as a Cabinet offshoot the Committee was normally considered 
to act on behalf of its parent body. The Committee also 
had to report its deliberations to the Foreign Affairs and 
Security Committee of the Knesset, where the Parliamentary 
Opposition would have a chance to examine decisions. 
After approval by the Government and the Knesset 
the rural settlement proposal proceeds to the Agricultural 
Planning Board, which contains representatives from the 
Settlement Department and the Ministry of Agriculture and 
which determines the settlement form (kibbutz, omoshav 
etc. ) 
and the mix of economic activities. The issue. of perm- 
anent site is then dealt with by the Location Committee, 
which includes members from several institutions. 
(39) 
Possibilities within the area concerned are carefully 
examined, each member guarding his organization's interests. 
For instance the Ministry of Defence may object to a hill 
as being too close to the cease-fire line, while the 
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Antiquities Department may have reservations about proximity 
to a potential excavation. The final choice is-often a 
compromise between conflicting viewpoints. 
Finally the proposal returns to the Settlement 
Department for detailed site planning. This includes such 
matters as field distribution (decided in conjunction with 
the Lands Authority), architecture, and internal drainage 
and water supply. Finance for implementation comes out 
of the Jewish Agency budget, stemming in part from Govern- 
ment grants and in part from Agency (World Zionist Organ- 
ization) sources, both local and international. 
On the wider infrastructural setting for colon- 
ization schemes the Settlement Department is in constant 
communication with Government Departments and Public 
Corporations. There is a host of working and bridging 
committees for everything from electricity reticulation 
to regional water supply. Constant detailed changes in 
regional plans result, quite apart from larger scale 
shifts that may be occasioned by the adoption of a new' 
settlement proposal. 
VII The First Six Years : An Overview 
Shortly after the'emergence of the Allon Plan, 
by mid 1968, Defence Minister Moshe Dayan formulated''his own 
ideas regarding borders and occupied territories settlement. 
The chief difference between the two concepts involved 
the West Bank, where Daya-n favoured large scale Jewish 
settlement on the populated Highlands. This settlement 
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would be undertaken within the framework of several 
territorial blocks, principally to establish a Jewish 
urban presence alongside the main Arab towns. 
(40) 
For Dayan, any compromise with the Arabs would 
be functional rather than territorial - the local popul- 
ation could have self-administration, perhaps under 
Jordanian auspices, but Israel would retain a free hand 
in security matters and there would be no constraints on 
Jewish settlement or access. Sovereignty could remain 
undetermined. The aim was to maintain the unity of West- 
ern Eretz Yisrael, 
(31) 
de facto, while simultaneously 
resolving the demographic problem by avoiding 
annexation. 
Most Labour Ministers, however, were sceptical. 
Sapir, Eban, Eshkol, Allon and even Galili and Golda Meir 
were united in viewing the activities Dayan proposed for 
the Highlands as incorporating an Arab minority of 35% 
into Israel. This minority, because of its high natural 
increase rate, might become a majority within forty years, 
converting Israel into a Lebanon style bi-national entity 
and destroying the democratic Jewish state. Sapir, in 
particular, also feared that the 'natural' Jewish employment 
structure would be almost immediately subverted by low 
paid Arab wage labour. In consequence the Cabinet tended 
to prefer the Allon concept, based on the geographic fact 
that Arab population concentrations on the West Bank 
Highlands and in the Gaza Strip can, in military terms, 
be effectively neutralized and 'defensible boundaries' 
against external forces achieved without any need for 
absorption into Israel. 
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Support for Allon was divided between those who 
saw independent merit in his 'territorial compromise" 
and minimalists who moved toward the Allon Plan to hold 
off Dayan's ideas rather than out of positive' enthusiasm. 
Regarding the latter a large portion of'the Cabinet, in` 
1968 including Eban', Sapir, the Mapam Ministers and perhaps 
even Levi Eshkol, preferred to'see implementation of the 
settlement aspect of the Allon Plan not as a'means of 
permanently anchoring territory but as creating a bargain- 
ing position to be liquidated in exchange for concessions 
from the Arabs on demilitarization, Jerusalem and minor 
border rectifications. For example in the Jordan Rift 
the'minimalist camp would probably have been content if' 
the 'colonization card' enabled Israel to secure Arab 
agreement to a series of military outposts along the moun- 
tain crest-line, providing a strategic border on the Jordan 
without any need for the sort of territorial adjustment - 
suggested by Allon. 
(41) Unfortunately for the minimalists, 
far from inducing Israel's neighbours to negotiate the 
beginnings of occupied territory colonization only infuriated 
the Arabs and strengthened their perception that Israel was 
ä fundamentally expansionist entity with which compromise 
was impossible and negotiation pointless. 
(41) 
In 1969, as part of its platform for the Knesset 
elections, the Labour Party attempted to synthesize the 
views of its minimalists, maximalists and centrists in an 
extremely vague formula termed the Unwritten Agreement 
(otherwise known as the Oral Law, Torah she Ba'al Peh). 
The only territorial adjustments clearly discernable in the 
Unwritten Agreement concerned limited areas on which no 
I 
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strong disagreement existed: Israeli control over East 
Jerusalem, the Golan, Latrun, the Gaza Strip and Sharm 
ash Sheikh, linked to Eilat by an Israeli supervised 
corridor. There would also be a "security frontier" on 
the Jordan River, though its precise character remained 
undefined. With regard to all other areas (i. e. the bulk 
of Sinai and the West Bank) the platform made no final 
commitment. Dayan supporters, Allon supporters and mini- 
malists could thus each interpret the Unwritten Agreement 
and its implications for colonization whichever way they 
liked. 
In practice settlement activities from 1968 
onwards proceeded within the framework of the middle-way 
interpretation - the Allon Plan. The full Allon Plan 
for the occupied territories, in its 1972 form, is depicted 
in figure 38, with sites of settlements established between 
1967 and October 1973. A very close correspondence between 
the Allon security belts and the geographical spread of 
official colonization is immediately apparent, though the 
security belts never received formal endorsement. On the 
eastern front Galilee and the coastal plain would be 
protected by a natural defence buffer using the Hermon 
Massif, the crest of the Golan plateau and the mountain 
wall flanking the Jordan Rift; second line insurance would 
be provided around Jerusalem= and in the south a second 
buffer would cut the invasion route from Egypt, broaden 
the Negev, and assure navigation through the Straits of 
Tiran. Concerning the latter, a presence at Sharm ash 
Sheikh would give Israel a position from which she could 
exert counter-blackmail on both Egypt and Jordan if the 
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Arab side closed the Red gea-entrance (Bab el Mandeb). 
Once these various strategic goals were achieved 
Arab population clusters-in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, . 
separated from one-another and. from Arab states. by Israelis 
'defensible borders', could be awarded self-rule, subject 
to demilitarization. -, 
Colonization established a political anchor and' 
a domestic political commitment to the security belts. 
By October 1973 forty-four settlement sites had been 'founded, 
involving a total investment of 500 million lirot. 
(42) 
These sites contained c. '4000 people (c. 13000 if the East 
Jerusalem housing-estates are, -included). It was. the 
greatest settlement surge since the--mass immigrant flow,. 
of the 1950's and stood in marked-contrast-to the stagnation 
of the preceding five-years, especially as the development 
merely laid foundations for more rapid expansion after the 
October 1973 war. 
In the first two years work almost entirely'con- 
centrated on the Golan and East Jerusalem, where'the"early 
political consensus was firmest. Late 1969 represented 
an important turning point, seeing a , simultaneous broad- 
ening of the programme in three directions a plan appeared 
for settlement in the Rafiah approaches to the Gaza Strip, 
implementation commencing'-immediately; the slackening of 
the War of Attrition allowed an intensification'-of work in 
the Jordan Rift; and colonization and tourist development 
began in the Sharm ash Sheikh region, with`the founding of 
the new town of Ophira. Minimalist geographical limits 
were clearly loosening, a process which was to continue 
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alongside accelerations in the growth of the overall 
settlement structure. 
Early developments even included some projects 
which could be interpreted as executing aspects of the Dayan 
conception, though without violating Allon's guidelines. 
On the West Bank these comprised the Upper Hebron urban 
settlement, officially approved in 1970, end the Etzion group 
of villages, seen by some 
(42) 
as the first of Dayan's 
highland settlement blocks. Beginning with Kfar Etzion in 
September 1967 Gush Etzion had expanded to three sites with 
c. 200 inhabitants by October 1973" 
Events in East Jerusalem itself had several distinct 
dimensions, each with a somewhat different purpose (figure 37). 
First, in 1968 work commenced on repopulating the Jewish 
Quarter of the Old City, a project whose connotations were 
chiefly historical and religious. Second, a suburban ring 
of Jewish housing estates gradually took shape through the 
period, designed to enclose the main Arab built-up area. 
The ring consisted of two giant pincers sa northern arm 
arcing round from Ramot (1973) through Ramat Eshkol (1968) 
and French Hill (1969) to Mount Scopus, and a southern 
counterpart incorporating Gilo (1973) and East Talpiot 
(1973). (43) Each pincer was set on ridge-tops dominating 
the metropolitan region, part of the purpose evidently 
being to buffer and protect West Jerusalem from any future 
harassment. Thus in a sense the pincers formed an 'outer 
wall', with their massive fortress style construction. 
Third, after 1972 ground preparation began for industrial 
estates beyond the housing estate ring, even beyond the 
" 
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annexed area. These included Atarot and Anatot in the 
north and Ma'ale Adumin to the east, the latter two implying 
a geographical link with Allon's Jordan Rift strip. Overall, 
according to the 1972 Israel census the Jewish population 
involved in the various East Jerusalem projects amounted 
after 5 years to 8704, approximately two-third of the' 
Israeli movement across the old borders. 
Although apart from East Jerusalem all the security 
belts were regions of limited Arab population, the early 
colonization faced intermittent difficulties with regard 
to Arab occupance and land ownership. In the Jordan Rift 
there were a number of clashes over land and water rights 
after 1970 (see Chapter 8), while in the Rafiah approaches 
bedu encampments were cleared and water-holes stopped up 
in a controversial 1970-71 army operation conducted, " appar- 
ently without Government approval, by Ariel Sharon's Gaza 
command. East Jerusalem of course experienced exprop- 
riations and under-cover land deals on an extensive scale, 
(44) 
some of the proceeds from accompanying property speculation 
disappearing into the web of corruption which was eventually 
to help bring down the Labour Government. Only on the Golan, 
because of the near totality of the refugee exodus, did 
Israel have a virtually clean slate, as-long as the 
relatively small zone of Druze proprietorship (figure 50) 
was not encroached upon. 
ii In late 1972 Dayan began a further major effort 
to influence the direction of settlement policy. 
(45) First, 
on 24 August Ha-aretz reported that he was preparing a 
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private plan for the building of a"large city in the Rafiah 
approaches to the Gaza Strip (figure 38) following this on 
24 October with a detailed description of the plan. The 
city would be named 'Yamit' and would have 18000 inhabitants 
by 1977, eventually growing to a population of 230,000. 
The chief economic base would be a 'deep-water-ports equiv- 
alent in capacity to Haifa and Ashdod. - Second, at the 
opening of the 1973 election campaign, the Defence Minister 
demanded that Jews be given unrestricted rights to"buy lands 
anywhere in Eretz Yisräel, particularly on the West Bank 
Highlands. He even spoke of it in terms'df 'Zionist 
obligation'. 
Some in the Labour Party suspected that Dayan's 
aim was to overturn the limited settlement map (figure 38) 
or, at the least, to have a harsh version of the Unwritten 
Agreement formally built into the 1973 election platform. 
Although the proposed Yamit site came within the accepted 
settlement area (figure 70) a city of 230,000 would oblige 
an extension of the limits deeper into Sinai, to ensure 
a reasonable distance from any future frontier, while free 
land purchase would quickly make any 'territorial compromise' 
on the West Bank impossible. Dayan was supported by most 
of his Rafi faction, which tended toward territorial 
maximalism, including his'Cabinet colleague Shimon Peres. 
Outside Rafi, however, inthe larger Mapai and 
Ahdut ha Avoda factions of the Labour Party, Dayan's 
ideas and tactics met a frosty reception. He quickly 
discovered that a large majority of the Cabinet were hostile 
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and so decided not to make a formal presentation of his 
original demands. Particularly strong opposition came 
from Finance Minister Pinhas Sapir, who argued that money-, 
go to development towns inside Israel - not to new cities 
in occupied territory. 
Instead, in July 1973, the Defence Minister put 
forward a very much scaled-down version of his ideas as 
part of a ten point paper. ' This`Däyan Document (Mismakh 
Dayan) is'given in full in Appendix VI. As may be seen, ' 
the Yamit of 230,000 was reduced-to a "regional and urban 
centre for the-Rafiah approaches" and-free private purchase 
of lands had-become "the. acquisition of lands and, owner- 
ship by companies and individuals., will, be to some extent 
allowed and will be done for constructive needs and within 
the political and security conception". The other eight- 
points were already part of the Government consensus, 
some being in the process, of implementation. Indeed on 
24 December 1972 the Government had even authorized a 
regional services centre near Dayan's Yamit site-as part of 
a long-standing intention to. establish such centres on the 
Golan, in the Jordan Rift and in the Rafiah approaches. 
Why then did the Däyan Document arouse consid- 
erable public controversy? First, even in their reduced 
form the demands for a Yamit port and for private land 
purchase retained some potential for expanding the terr- 
itorial coverage of the Allon Plan. , Second, although 
the 
bulk of Dayan's points concerned matters within the- 
Government consensus, it was the first time such matters 
had been brought together in a single paper. With-regard 
180 
to occupied territory settlement this gave the illusion 
that acceptance of the document would mean a harsher 
settlement policy. In reality, of course, the gap between 
Dayan and Sapir was now greatly reduced and a compromise 
formula for the election platform, ensuring Rafi's 
continued participation in government, would not be 
difficult to draw up. If such a formula maintained the 
illusion of harshness it would considerably augment the 
Defence Minister's prestige, possibly a major consideration 
when Dayan launched his ten points. 
Prime Minister Golda Meir asked Yisrael Galili, 
head of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee and 
senior Ahdut ha Avoda Minister, to draft a bridging 
statement. Approved by the Labour Party leadership on 
17 August 1973, the GaliliDocument (Mismakh Galili) com- 
prised thirteen points as set out in Appendix VI. A 
preamble assured all factions, especially the Mapäm minim- 
alists, that the document as yet only represented a recomm- 
endation to be presented to the formal policy making bodies 
of the Labour - Mapam Alignment. In detail the "outposts 
and settlements" component followed the four year 
Settlement Department proposal (2 August 1973) for 36 new 
sites, their distribution as portrayed inýfigure 38. 
The Galili Document further eroded Dayan's 
demands concerning land purchase and a deep-water port at 
Yamit. A decision on the port was postponed until a 
thorough investigation had been undertaken, while private 
land acquisition on the West Bank would be approved "only 
in those cases where the Lands Authority is unable or not 
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. 
interestedin such purchases", and when they came "within the 
framework of Government policy. " Nothing could now be 
construed as over-throwing the settlement and territorial 
dimensions of the Allon Plan (figure 38), and to this extent 
the Galili Document was undoubtedly a successful upholding 
of existing Government policy as represented by the Allon 
Plan, the Unwritten Agreement and individual Cabinet 
decisions. 
Yet, at the same time, none of the principles 
of the Dayan Document had been rejected outright and, 
because the Galili Document was a clear, harsh and written 
interpretation of the existing concept, Dayan had also 
made his point with some success. Furthermore in some 
significant locations, particularly' in the Tulkarm-Qalgilia 
region (figure 10), the Galili Document could be seen as 
slightly expanding the territorial bounds of the Allon 
Plan. Certainly much of the press and public viewed 
Galili's compromise as toughening occupied territory settle- 
ment . policy and as involving movement by Sapir rather than 
by Dayan 
(46) 
-a remarkable result considering the fate, 
of Dayan's original standpoints of late 1972/early 1973" 
In the view of the author the main reason for 
such an outlook was probably that Sapir and other minim- 
alists, by accepting the colonization aspect of the Allon 
Plan to resist Dayan's 1968 maximalism, had already moved 
a considerable distance away from their initial willingness 
to return everything to the Arabs except East Jerusalem 
and part of the Golan. The shift had not, however, been 
immediately apparent to the public, as Government policy 
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had never been clearly defined on paper before 1973" 
Consequently perhaps the chief. significance of the Galili 
Document lay in the fact that it gave the first comprehensive 
written confirmation to six years of gradual minimalist 
retreat, especially within Mapai. 
Such was the position when the Yom Kippur War, _ 
intervened. 
iii One problem for the Allon/Galili outlook, a 
problem hidden before 1973 but more apparent in following 
years, was that it involved more than the 'defensible 
boundaries' which were its principal public justification. 
Most Labour leaders, including Allon and Galili, believed 
in the fundamental rights of the Jewish people to the 
undivided 'Land of Israel', the only difference with Dayan 
and Begin being that they held, some more firmly than others, 
that demographic conditions imposed a need for pragmatic 
territorial compromise. This situation had significant 
implications: 
a) because the security belts, especially. on the West 
Bank, were themselves bound up with the 'ideal' of the 
Jewish people redeeming their historic land, they and the 
settlements planted on them were even less amenable to 
negotiation than if they had been based on military strategy 
alone. 
b) because the historic heartland of Judaism is 
largely congruent with those populated areas on the West 
Bank which the Allon/Galili outlook sought to exclude from 
absorption into Israel, a conflict existed between the 
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concept and the-feelings of those formulating it. Allon's 
vacillations concerning the Hebron district, detailed in 
Chapter 8, provide good exemplification. 
The lack of geographic congruity between the 
security belts and the bible belts meant that after 1973 
the Labour Government found it increasingly difficult to 
prevent Jewish settlement spilling over into regions of 
dense Arab population. Furthermore, as the political 
balance in Israel slowly shifted toward the right - toward 
the new Likud coalition - the viability of the whole 
Allon/Galili package came into question. 
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I. Israel and the Golan, 1967 
For Israelis Syria is the most disliked and 
distrusted of the neighbouring Arab states. This attitude 
has its origins in deep historic fears. of a northern enemy 
sweeping down through Galilee to Haifa and the'coastal 
plain, fears derived from biblical experience and rein- 
forced by post 1949 perceptions of Syria as the most- 
militant, enemy of the Jewish state. 
In consequence before 1967 Israel was extremely 
sensitive regarding both the inferior topographic position 
of the Hula and Tiberias settlements, all within fifteen 
kilometres of Syrian gun emplacements on the Golan scarp, 
and the vulnerability'of the Jordan water sources toýSyrian 
interference. Syria's exploitation of her geographic'--: 
advantages to'shell Israeli villages, whether in response 
to Israeli moves in the demilitarized zone or on her own 
initiative, and to ý make -plans for diverting the outflow 
of the Baniyas spring, the largest Jordan source, =greatly 
intensified such sensitivities. 
Israel's capture of the Golan on 9-10'June 1967 
immediately relieved the various security problems. At 
a local level the Upper Galilee population was freed from 
the threat of bombardment while in the national context 
Israel's most important water sources were secured and a 
defensive buffer provided for the whole of Galilee. The 
perceived strategic gains were immense and'it'is thus 
hardly surprising that the majority of Israel's leaders, 
heavily conditioned by military logic and fundamentally 
suspicious of Syria, soon determined on the permanent 
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retention of the new region. 
In line with the Allon concept such retention 
would be assured by extensive Jewish colonization prog-'1 
rammes. Allon submitted his Golan proposal"to the Govern- 
ment within a few weeks of the presentation of his main' 
plan (July 1967), following discussions with the Prime 
Minister who "was convinced that'our-control-öf. the Golan 
Heights was vitally important strategically. "(')-Kibbutz 
Golan pressures undoubtedly forced the'pace, but the' 
direction was clear. 
The Golan Heights were so important, so indispens- 
able -- therefore I not only recommended establishing 
settlements from immediately after the Six Day War 
but in fact I helped to establish them. (1) 
The rationale behind'the Golan colonization was 
primarily, but not entirely, strategic. Many "whole Land 
of Israel" supporters viewed the region as-part of the 
historic domain of Eretz Yisrael, "because it had inter- 
mittently come under Jewish control in biblical and 
Hashmonean times, while historic precedent for Jewish 
settlement could be uncovered fairly readily. Traces of 
a Jewish presence up to the, Byzantine period, together 
with attempted renewals in the, early twentieth century, 
have-thus figured prominently in most recent Israeli. 
writings on the Golan. 
II. Regional Planning 1967 - 1968 
i Through: late 1967, intensive survey work was, 
conducted-on the lands, soils, climate and-water resources 
of the Golan, in preparation for. colonization. Agencies 
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involved included the Settlement Department, the Ministry 
of Agriculture, the Volcani Institute, Tahal and the Jewish 
National Fund, the research-being in part original and in 
part an inspection of Syrianrecords, captured'in Quneitra 
during the June fighting. The first general settlement 
plan to result appeared in-November - The-Golan Heights : 
An Early Planning Proposal for Agricultural-. Development, 
put together by the Galilee office of the'Settlement Depart- 
ment. This document combined caution and optimism in a 
highly pragmatic appraisal of Golan opportunities. 
Agriculture, the traditional instrument'of pioneer 
colonization and the exclusive initial pre-occupation of the 
planners, was clearly to be the main economic base for the 
early stages of-. settlement. It was seen both as estab- 
lishing the firmest-hold on-territory'- the land anchor - 
and as offering the best prospects for rapid revenue 
generation. 
Caution, however, surfaced incomments that survey 
data remained inadequate'for firm conclusions and in 
warnings that, with many branches of Israel's agricultural 
sector close to market saturation, the integration of yet 
another agricultural region into the national economy 
would have to be handled with great care. The range of 
choice regarding a Golan agricultural base was seen as 
severely limited; many mainstays of kibbutz and moshav farm 
production, -for example chicken rearing; -dairying, 'decid- 
uous fruits and a 'range of vegetables, ` being excluded'from 
consideration by the-market factor. 
Despite this the planners believed that an 
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economically viable structure could be. devised. The,, Golan 
seemed to offer physical conditions ideal for a number of 
products Israel unquestionably needed more of, whether 
for export-earnings or import substitution. Table 7: 1 
details these products. and. indicates their suggested 
geographical assignment, in line with environmental consid- 
erations. The planners note "all the mentioned branches 
suit different parts of our region, more than that, s we 
specifically aimed for adjustment to the particular conditions 
of our region (which are not found in other parts ofythe 
State)"., 
(2) 
The Golan even had advantages when viewed 
as a whole - for instance the broad temperate, well-watered 
plateau opened up excellent opportunities for sheep, and 
cattle pasturage. 
In any case it was seen as imperative. that colon- 
ization should begin without delay. Perceived strategic 
necessities dictated both speed and the over-riding of 
economic arguments, if these stood in the way of the fund- 
amental objective of anchoring the Golan to Israel. "The 
political-security factor is likely to justify activities 
which are not necessarily economic but liable to contribute 
to expansion of population. "(3) Implementation should even 
get under-way before survey work was completed - practical 
trial and error would itself provide valuable additional 
data and help enable verification of planning concepts. 
The "planning proposal" called for the establish- 
ment within c. 15 years of 20 agricultural villages 
populated-by 1400 family units (c. 7000 people). As regards 
geographical distribution, a concentration on three sub- 
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regions was suggested, each with a-somewhat different 
economic base (table 7: 1, figure 
. 
45 ). The Central Golan, 
where thin stone-strewn soils rendered agricultural, devel- 
opment prohibitively expensive, would be left empty, 
presumably to await industrial settlement projects. A 
major quandary arose on the question of balance of emphasis 
between the northern and southern sections of the plateau s 
the north possessed the major water sources but had only 
limited areas which could be worked without prior land 
preparation, whereas in the south extensive lands were 
immediately available but local water sources were inadequate. 
Colonization could either be based on intensive high-water 
demand farming in the north, with a major investment in 
supporting infrastructure, balanced by extensive low-water 
demand farming in the south, or it could involve only 
limited northern development with water transfer allowing 
more intensive southern settlement. 
As an ultimate objective the decision went in 
favour of the former division, but for the first five year 
phase the south was to be absolutely dominant (figure 45 ). 
In this sub-region the most could be done for the least 
cost, as it contained 60,000 dunams out of a Golan total 
of 70,000 able to be worked without land preparation. It 
thus suited the planners ideally, in their dual purpose 
of colonizing immediately yet avoiding heavy investment 
before all requisite data had been collected. The South 
Golan would enable experimentation and an early creation of 
facts without implying a parallel commitment to a particular 
line of regional development. Large scale expenditure on 
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water projects and land preparation, especially in the 
north and in the Batiha Valley, could wait several years. 
Agriculture, though of fundamental initial, 
significance, was not of course to be the only major factor 
in long-term colonization. Even the November 1967 plan 
hinted briefly at a role for Quneitra as a resurrected 
urban centre - "it has to be thought about -- from the 
point of view of its future function in the organic structure 
of the region"(4) - and held out particularly high hopes 
for tourism. Because of the Golan's special attractions, 
ranging from the Hermon snows to the El Hamma hot springs, 
providing for tourists and holiday makers might become 
"a branch of great weight contributing much to the opening 
and populating of the region". 
(4) 
ii Non-agricultural aspects were explored further in 
the January 1968 Golan Master Plan, which subsumed the 
earlier agricultural proposal in a comprehensive regional 
development scheme. This ranked as an altogether more 
grandiose and ambitious document than that discussed above, 
aiming at a Jewish population of 45-50,000 within ten 
years - 15-20,000 in "villages" and 30,000 in a regional 
urban centre. In all between seventeen and twenty-two 
settlements were to be built based on the, "exploitation of 
natural resources"(5) supplemented by industry and tourism, 
and these were to cover the whole region, including the 
Central Golan. 
The spatial distribution suggested in the plan spread 
along the principal axis of the-Golan, in a north- 
south direction, with the distances between settlements 
-planned to be 5-10 kilometres -- the physical 
alignment of the settlement system and its infrastructure 
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was planned to be set back 5-10 kilometres from the 
border (5) 
The concept of an unbroken line of kibbutzim and moshavim, 
running from the Yarmouk to the flanks of Hermon, pervaded 
the Master Plan. 
Such targets', however, clearly exceeded Israel's 
limited financial and demographic capacities and the first 
years saw a return to the more pragmatic ideas put forward 
in the November 1967 Early Planning Proposal for Agricul- 
tural Development. In terms of numbers of settlement' - 
poinis the Master Plan held firm, but behind the facade the 
real scale of activity and its geographical spread were 
of comparatively modest dimensions, albeit considerably 
in advance of work elsewhere, in the occupied territories. 
III. Chronology of Developments, 1968-1977 
Up to 1973 thoughts of settling throughout the 
Golan receded in favour of a more economically rational 
concentration on two sub-regions - the South Golan and the 
vicinity of the Quneitra basin. Agriculture dominated 
during this phase and with their friable fertile soils 
the two areas required only small initial investments. 
(6) 
There were no settlements "purely of a security char- 
acter"(7) - and-the idea of a regional urban centre quietly 
faded.. 
Overall the pragmatic approach sought to reconcile 
the perceived strategic imperative fettering the Golan 
to Israel - with the reality of scarce resources and 
the 
intention that the settlement system be an asset rather 
11 j 
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than a liability to the national economy.. Avoidance of 
the Central Golan, where strategy and agricultural 
economics clashed fundamentally, was the price of such 
an approach. Central Golan land reclamation costs were 
prohibitive yet this was the core of the, territory Israel 
wished to bind to herself. Up to 1973 agricultural 
economics carried the day - in a situation of minimal 
external pressure the strategic inconsistency could be 
ignored. 
Between late 1967 and early 1969 eleven settle- 
ments were founded, only two of which were outside the 
South Golan - Quneitra basin frame (figures 3,46). Five 
began as Nahal camps and six were purely civilian. Most 
of the c. 300 settlers came from Kibbutz and Moshav 
movements favouring the anchoring of large tracts of 
occupied territory. At this stage the settlement structure 
had a very tentative air - population-turnover was rapid, 
sites were temporary and accommodation` largely consisted 
of Syrian huts and bunkers. 
Primitive, conditions naturally encouraged 
grumblings and impatience among the colonists. After a 
second Winter in huts and prefabs (plate 13'), with 
successive delays in promised housing, the feeling grew 
that the Government was still not seriously committed to 
the Golan, especially as the 1969 Knesset elections 
approached 
The settlers say : at the start every public figure 
wanted to prove that it was in his power to create 
settlements. Now no-one is really interested in us --- the secretary of the Moshav movements, who aspires 
to become Minister of Agriculture, fears engaging 
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in unpopular activities concerning settlement 
establishment lest leaders of his party (Labour) 
consider him "undisciplined" -- As for the Kibbutz 
movements Mr. Ya'cov Hazan (Ha Kibbutz ha Artzi) 
calls for thinking before creating facts. The 
heads of Ha Kibbutz ha Meuhad have their eyes 
on the Jordan Rift and Ihud lacks manpower -- 
representatives of these movements stand at the 
head of the Settlement institutions and block the 
way to other factors wishing to settle, Beitar 
(Revisionist Youth Organization - Herut) asked 
permission to set up a settlement in the South 
Golan. They were advised to wait a few months. 
It was hinted that Beitar's going up to the 
Golan at present would be used as propoganda 
for Gahal's election. (8) 
Such comment offers a tantalizing insight into the byzantine 
complexities of Israel's political process. Caution, 
vacillation and minimalist influence clearly survived', in 
some quarters even flourished, despite the increasingly 
evident dominance of those favouring large scale territorial 
expansion. 
In fact, however, the settlers need not have 
worried - as time passed and Israel's attachment to the new 
territories slowly strengthened the pull towards "creation 
of facts" grew. On the Golan the period 1969-1973 witnessed 
a substantial consolidation of the existing system, although 
there were fewer new foundations (figure 47 -) Population 
grew to 1727 
(9) 
and became more cosmopolitan, many newcomers 
being city dwellers or foreign immigrants (principally 
American, British and Russian Jews). In addition the system 
took on a more sedentary character - Nahal plantings became 
civilian, several groups shifted into expensive and spacious 
permanent quarters (platesl4,15 ) and the proportion of 
families, though still modest, was steadily rising. Of 
course, in qualification, it should be observed that such 
PLATES 12 - 15 
Golan heights - four stages in Settlement 
foundation (also see figure 40) 
Plate 12 Nahal Geahur - temporary site, 
1968 
Plate 13 Naial Golan (Afiq) - temporary 
site, 1968 
Plate 14 Biorom Golan - construction of 
permanent site, 1971 
Plate 15 Nave Ativ - construction of 
permanent site, 1974 
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stabilization sometimes only came after successive upheavals, 
including multiple location shifts, the complete replacement 
of original groups and even, in three cases, temporary dis- 
bandment. Examples of location shift, a phenomenon which 
has continued throughout the colonization process, are, 
depicted in figure 
. 
4.9 
Paralleling the demographic consolidation the 
settlement structure also began to acquire both a more 
diversified economy and a more sophisticated spatial organ- 
isation. By 1973 it was becoming clear that with Israel's 
high living standards and capital intensive farming 
practices the Golan environment could not readily support, 
more than c. 2500 agricultural colonists. 
(10) As a Jewish 
population of 45,000 remained the goal thought turned to 
the alternatives of tourism and light industry. In October 
1971 a Nahal group commenced work on the Hermon ski village 
of Neve Ativ and in August 1972 a community centred on an 
Israel Aircraft Industries factory was inaugurated in the 
South Golan (Bene Yehuda-. plate 17). 
As regards spatial organization a group of settle- 
ment "blocks" slowly emerged. A block would consist of 
several villages of similar social and political affil- 
iations oriented toward an area centre, designed to%provide 
common services. By 1973 there were three such blocks 
in the South Golan, encompassing 70% of the Jewish popul- 
ation, and one on the western fringes of-the. Quneitra 
basin (figure 47 ). 
The Yom Kippur War of October 6-24 1973 interr- 
upted this process of steady expansion. In the face of the 
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great Syrian tank surge of 6-8 October the whole structure 
immediately collapsed. All the sites had to be evacuated 
on the first day of the War, diverting, a significant 
proportion of Israel's available military capacity, and 
although a rapid return to normality followed the success- 
ful counter-offensive significant aspects of, Labour's Golan 
strategy had been brought into question, including 
the neglect of the Central Golan and the long-standing notion 
that civilian settlements were of military value. I 
Even so the basic policy of holding occupied 
territory for strategic reasons did not become a matter 
of serious controversy. Whereas many on the outside saw 
the war as the predictable Arab reaction to Israel's 
pursuit of creeping annexation, the Israeli leadership 
tended to view it as flowing from a continuing Arab 
rejection of Israel's very existence, particularly as far 
as Syria was concerned -a war which would 'hive occurred 
regardless of the occupation. Hence the perceived need- 
for the buffers afforded by areas like the Golan was rein- 
forced rather than shaken. On the Syrianfront the lesson 
the Labour Alignment took from October 1973 was that-the 
anchoring of the Golan was more necessary than ever - 
precisely the opposite of the conclusion drawn-in much of 
the rest of the world. 
Controversy largely concentrated"on the implem- 
entation of the fettering process and on`the*efficäcy of 
existing settlement policy in this context. " 
One important tenet of planning which came under 
assault was the idea that the kibbutzim and moshavim had 
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an intrinsic defensive value. Opponents asserted that 
though this might continue to hold true for the cutting 
of guerrilla infiltration routes, the October experience 
had graphically demonstrated the idea's bankruptcy in the 
face of massed tank formations. Some even argued that 
as the Golan settlements had proved an embarrassment to 
the army it would be better if their budget was reduced 
and more reliance put on purely military lines for holding 
the region. However the Government remained unshaken in 
its belief that civilian plantings were the best means of 
securing "defensible borders" and as a result it deter- 
mined on the retention and expansion of the settlement 
programme. This was rationalized by the assertion that 
the system had collapsed because the sites had not been 
properly fortified (the villages had no heavy weapons) - 
not because they were inherently indefensible. Work to 
rectify the deficiency was immediately put in hand. 
A second major effect of the war and its after- 
math was enormously increased sensitivity regarding the 
Central Golan gap. The gap now emerged as a crucial 
political-military weakpoint - it was the zone of the 
Syrian breakthrough and in 1974 it appeared possible that 
the Americans would use its emptiness as: an opportunity 
for pressing Israel into returning it as part of a 
second disengagement agreement. Inroads here would 
severely damage Israel's Golan policy, for the tenability 
of the settled northern and southernflanks would quickly 
become problematic. 
In consequence the spatial orientation of 
settlement policy shifted markedly in the period between 
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the October War and June 1977, when the Likud took over 
the Government. The central hinge became the focus of 
both planning and construction, the first concern being 
to close the 27 kilometre stretch between Ramat 
Magshamim and Ain Zivan. (figs. 40,47). Admittedly there 
was little progress through 1974 and 1975, partly because 
of resistance from left-wing Cabinet members (chiefly the 
Minister of Housing), who saw such activity as an undes- 
irable constraint on Israel's negotiating position, and 
partly because of a novel American interest in the 
Israel-Syria border. However with the diversion of 
American attention in the run-up to the November 1976 
Presidential election and with Palestinian inroads at the 
United Nations through late 1975 and 1976, reaction to 
which sapped domestic dissent, the eighteen months after 
November 1975 saw considerable movement (figs. 43,44). 
The central Golan programme had three inter- 
connected dimensions -a forward line of semi-agricul- 
tural settlements covering an industrial village block 
oriented toward the now resurrected urban-centre scheme 
(Qatzrin). In 1976-77 four sites were established in the 
forward line, one industrial village was inaugurated to 
the rear and the first 500 housing units were built at 
the urban-centre. Simultaneously two additions were made 
to the South Golan cluster and one outpost was established 
in the far north, part of a strategy to close the smaller 
gap between the Quneitra basin and Mt. Hermon (figs. 
47,48). 
In consequence the Golan's overall Jewish 
population had expanded to 3,850 by December 1977 (table 712) - 
I 
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much less. than the ten year target of 45,000 aimed for in 
January 1968, but a figure which made the settlement 
system the largest project in occupied territory after 
the East Jerusalem schemes. 
IV. Agricultural Patterns 
Agriculture, as the initial base of Golan Jewish 
colonization, and the most important component of the 
regional economy throughout the first decade, deserves 
special consideration. This section will review develop- 
ments up to the October War, conduct a detailed analysis 
of the Golan agricultural structure in 1974, and make some 
brief comments concerning more recent trends. 
In the first three years the main goal was to 
extend the Jewish agricultural presence over as much 
readily cultivable land as possible. Such a strategy 
exactly followed the November 1967 recommendations and 
by 1971 the bulk of the 70,000 dunams not needing special 
preparation had been allocated to settlements, being used 
overwhelmingly for unirrigated field crops, especially 
cereals. After 1971 strategy shifted toward intensifying 
cultivation within the existing agricultural zone, 
extending irrigation as the major water projects came 
into operation and diversifying crops in line with the 
natural advantages of the various sub-regions. The new 
period saw heavier investment, capitalizing on experience 
gained during the pioneer rush, though much of the 
planting remained experimental. Remarkably even at this 
stage progress deviated from the November 1967 plan in 
. 
ti 
PLATES 16,17 
Plate 16 
South Golan - Ramat Magshamim 
(loc. figure 40). Oct. 1976 
Plate 17 
South Golan - View east across 
Giv'at Yoav to Bene Yehuda, 
Oct. 1976. 
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only two significant respects - one geographical and one " 
structural. First, early development proposed for one 
of the three promising sub-regions - the Batiha Valley- 
(figure 45 )- did not eventuate to the extent anticipated, 
though whether the neglect stemmed from drainage and soil 
problems or from,, priority being given to tracts nearer 
the cease-fire line is unclear. Second, to establish 
a viable economic base for colonization branches were intro- 
duced which had originally been disregarded, due to fears 
concerning marketing - for example apple orchards in the 
Quneitra basin (instead of nuts) and poultry farming 
more generally., Here strategic imperatives took control. 
1974 marks a good point at which to take-stock 
of Golan. Jewish agriculture -a point when agriculture had 
become well-established in the initial South Golan/Quneitra 
basin limits but immediately before the shift in emphasis 
to the Central Golan and to non-agricultural activities., 
Figure ". 50 and tables 7i3,714 and 715 provide the requisite 
data. 52,880 cultivable dunams had been allocated to . 
the 
thirteen settlements in the two principal settlement groups, 
labelled 'South Golan' and 'North Golan', 73% to the 
former and 27% to the latter with the, detailed distrib- 
utions as shown in figure 50 . The territorial balance 
between the major sectors was, 62% unirrigated field crops, 
32% irrigated intensive cropping and 6% fruit plantations. 
Irrigation water came from two large-scale supply systems,, 
both of which had reached an advanced state of construction. 
Pastoralism, second only to field cropping as an'income 
source on most settlements, used c. 300,000 dunams of 
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unimproved natural pasture throughout the Golan, with beef 
production predominating and sheep rearing in a supporting 
role. The grazing blocks, allocated to outside factors 
as well as to the Golan villages, shifted annually, 
rotating with military reserves. 
Substantial differentiation existed between the 
farm economies of the two settlement groups (table 7: 5). 
The North Golan showed a relatively strong concentration 
on intensive agriculture, especially irrigated cultivation 
and deciduous fruit orchards, while in the South Golan 
somewhat more emphasis went to field crops and pastor- 
alism, with sub-tropical fruit (citrus) on the warmer 
slopes towards Lake Tiberias. Higher water consumption 
per settler in the North Golan reflected this difference 
in balance between intensive and extensive branches. 
Ecological factors, all recognized in November 
1967, were primarily responsible for the differentiation. 
First continuous expanses of soils not needing special 
preparation were largely confined to the southern plateau. 
In consequence this area, which had an ancient reputation 
as a granary, became the natural focus for extensive 
field cropping. Second, on the North Golan higher 
precipitation and the relative scarcity of good working 
land both pointed toward the development of intensive 
cultivation. In particular, with the added advantage of 
a cooler year-round temperature regime than any other part 
of Israel or the occupied territories, the North Golan 
offered an excellent opportunity for growing certain types 
of seed vegetables and flower bulbs, whether for export 
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or for import substitution. Seed potatoes and tulips had 
become noted specialities by 1974, for which export openings 
were almost unlimited. 
In contrast South Golan irrigated agriculture was 
more conventional, largely an extension of farm economies 
normal to various parts of the Galilee. These involved 
cotton, sugar-beet, dairy fodder and industrial vegetables 
(e. g. tomatoes) on the plateau and the beginnings of mango 
and avocado plantations in the Batiha Valley. 
With regard to the geographical relationship 
between settlement sites and their lands the 1974 
situation varied considerably, both within and between the 
two settlement groups. 
Moshavim, with individual families operating 
their own plots, require most working areas to be within 
comparatively short distances of the living quarters, because 
if farm branches are widely scattered the family units 
become unmanageable. Hence up to 1974 all Golan moshavim 
were placed in one block in the far south, where the extent 
of cultivable land enabled the above condition to be 
fulfilled. 
Kibbutzim and moshavim shittufim on the other 
hand are not constrained by this division into semi- 
independent units - their communal organization allows 
greater spatial flexibility, a valuable characteristic in 
environments where it is not possible to conduct a major 
part of the farm economy in the immediate vicinity of the 
settlement site. The North Golan, with usable tracts 
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smaller and more scattered than in the south, is a case in 
point. Here three kibbutzim and one moshav shittufi were 
established by 1974. Kibbutz El Rom, for example, was two 
kilometres from its seed potatoes, eight kilometres from 
its apple orchard and thirty kilometres from its fish pond 
and beef cattle '= all in different'directiions, from the 
settlement site. 
Since 1974, with extension of the 'cultivated' zone 
running-up against massive land preparation expenses and' " 
with irrigation aided intensification similarly limited by 
ever higher water project costs, agriculture's relative 
significance in the expanding regional economy has begun to 
decline. The decline has, ' however, been'slower than might 
have been expected for two reasons. 
First, settler pressures discussed in depth` 
on p. 231 have forced Settlement Department proposals for 
the Central Golan to be more agriculture oriented'than 
initially intended, despite the Department's total lack 
of enthusiasm. It was grudgingly admitted that up to 
70,000 Central Golan'dunams might be cultivable, but only"" 
after great investment. 
Detailed surveys revealed that these lands are 
difficult to exploit by conventional means. Soils 
are stony and shallow, in parts hydromorphic --- the 
designated lands are blobs of 100-150 dunams each 
and are scattered in various places --- the area 
has 
no climatic advantages. (11) 
Second, the agricultural sector has-received 
further stimulation from the Settlement Department's own 
renewed keenness regarding sub-tropical plantation on the. 
eastern slopes of the Batiha Valley. Expanding opport- 
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unities for avocado marketing have been chiefly responsible 
for the re-assessment of colonization possibilities in 
this sub-region, although the capacity for population 
absorption is limited. 
V. The Impact of the October War 1973-1975 
Two examples are used here to illustrate, the 
implications of the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 for the 
process of colonization on the Golan. - the case of changes 
in Settlement Department planning between 1972 and 19759 
which both reflected and influenced changing realities, 
and the case of the effect of the October War on the 
military logic underpinning the settlement structure. 
The period 1973-1975 marked a watershed in 
Israel's Golan planning, with a definite shift in emphasis 
from an almost exclusive concentration on agrxultural 
settlement in the South Golan and the Quneitra basin to a 
more varied programme incorporating a strong orientation 
toward industrially based settlement in the Central Golan. 
A major role in the thematic and geographic re-orientation 
must be ascribed to the war, but this influence was a 
complex one of decisively sharpening trends already in 
existence rather than of simple cause and effect. 
By 1973, with 54% of the land suitable for 
agriculture under some sort of cultivation to support a 
mere 1727 colonists it had become evident that any large 
scale population increases would have to involve-a more 
diversified economic base. 
(12) Although tourism could play 
a significant local role, especially on Hermon and the shore 
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of Lake Tiberias, in4ustrialization offered the only 
realistic supplement on the scale required,. and once this 
was accepted inhibitions about colonizing the Central 
Golan because of agricultural costs soon disappeared. 
Indeed in 1973-1974 the turnover from the 12 existing 
industrial enterprises already amounted to 29% of the 
total economic turnover of the Golan villages (table 7s 6 )' 
despite problems involved in a peripheral location, away 
from national foci of transport, -services and labour 
supply, problems which generally affect industry more than 
agriculture. 
Clear indication of a new direction in settle- 
ment policy emerged in the Golan Heights General Develop- 
ment Plan 1973-1977, completed in July 1973. The document 
was unequivocal about the course ahead - "the first signs 
of industry exist in a number of settlements and the 
purpose is to extend industrialization after the exploit- 
ation of productive possibilities in agriculture". 
(13) 
Although agricultural expansion in areas already colonized 
also received much attention the planners pursued the 
spatial opportunities opened up by their consideration of 
industrial development and, in their principal innovation, 
proposed a completely new type of settlement - the 
industrial village. 
Golan settlement is concentrated in two blocks -- 
between these remains an expanse covering 400 
square kilometres that is not suggested for any 
agricultural colonization. To populate the expanse 
it is proposed to establish two settlement 
structures ia regional centre and a block of 
industrial villages. The latter is a new form 
of village settlement that will conserve the 
conventional values of existing colonization, though 
employment will not be agriculture but industry, 
tourism and services. This settlement form will be 
able to act as an instrument for the colonization 
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of regions lacking agricultural resources and so sets 
a challenge to groups of settlers, locals or immigrants, 
who aspire to a village life-style and are faithful 
to existing settlement principles but who are chiefly 
interested in non-agricultural employment. The 
suggested principles for industrial villages are 
(initial concept requiring additional clarification).: 
1) The industrial village is a closed community -- and 
able to control membership. 
2) The management is elected by the members. 
3) The profits will be divided between investment in 
production and transfer to community services. 
4) The means of production in the village are owned 
by the workers or the workers participate in 
determining ownership. 
5) As a closed society it will maintain a balance between paying incentives for skill and keeping socio- 
economic gaps small relative to the situation outside - to be achieved mainly by using profits and service development to give a better balanced living standard than that given by Government social policy. 
6) Industrial Democracy - village to have a range of medium size industries (30-100 workers), to facilitate 
worker mobility between plants and to-maximize 
managerial job prospects. (14) 
Hence Central Golan colonization and anew settle- 
ment idea to meet the geostrategic challenge in the area, 
both prompted by awareness of agriculture's inability to 
provide the scale of Golan colonization Israel required, 
had in fact reached the drawing board several months before 
the October War highlighted the area's emptiness. As'may 
be seen in figure 52 the Settlement Department had in 
mind a compact alignment of three industrial villages, 
one kibbutz and a "regional centre", eventually to contain 
c. 3000 people, in the core of the empty zone. 
In the author's view, however, the Central Golan 
section of the July 1973 plan amounted to a vague 
statement of intent rather than to a detailed blue-print 
for immediate implementation. In particular, no urgency was 
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evident about the new structure, no dates being proposed 
for starting work or for the completion of different 
stages. Consequently, if external circumstances had not 
intervened, the entire planning period (1973-1977) might 
well have passed without much actual activity. 
Furthermore, the suggested developments were 
in any case to be of only modest scale. The regional 
centre concept, for instance, posited a mere 1500 inhab-' 
itants, far removed from the city of 30,000 referred to- 
in the January 1968 Master Plan. 
The War transformed the fate of the Central 
Golan from a matter of no pressing urgency into a matter 
of vital national significance, so producing planning 
which was both more pragmatic and set on a much larger 
scale. The April 1975 Planning Proposal for Settlement 
on the Central Golan powerfully represented these two 
facets. Here the settlement structure was to cover a 
considerably greater territory than envisaged in the 1973 
document (figure 53 comprising a border defence 
screen of. four mixed agriculture-industry settlements, an 
inner group of four industrial villages and a Golan City 
to the rear, and it was to involve, similarly greater popul- 
ations. For example the non-urban structure would alone 
contain upwards of 4,500 people, three times the equiv- 
alent 1973 figure. 
More important, concentrating onthe border 
settlements, the 1975 Plandiscussed practical detail in 
depth, sketching out water supply lines and suitable 
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agricultural tracts, and treated everything as ä°matter of 
urgency - in contrastto'the pre-war outlook. ` All four 
border settlements, one industrial` village and one`moshav 
on the western slopes were to be'fully populated by 1978" 
(table '7: 7 ). Admittedly *in much of this the impact 'of 
the war, was indirect rather than direct, being channeled 
through intensified settler pressures. 
ii In the afternoon and evening of October 6,1973, 
as soon as the scale of the Syrian, armoured assault (fig. 51) 
became apparent, all the Golan settlements were evacuated 1 
with no heavy weapons and little fortification any attempt 
at resistance would merely have led to pointless settler 
casualties. The evacuation operation cost Israeli units 
time and, as immediately available defence, capability was 
comparatively limited, it diverted significant resources 
from the front. On the face of it the collapse of the 
settlement structure provided classic exemplification of 
the validity of comments made by Erwin Rommel thirty 
years before, in his essay Rules of Desert Warfare -' 
Non-motorized infantry positions are only of value, _, against a motorized and mechanized enemy when 
occupying prepared positions. If these positions 
are pierced or outflanked, a withdrawal will leave 
them helpless victims of the motorized enemy, --- they 
cause terrible difficulties in a general retreat - for 
one has to commit one's motorized formations merely 
to gain time for them. (15) 
Certainly the idea of ranks of kibbutzim and 
moshavim as defensive positions, 
_an 
historic concept which 
had on occasion served Israel well, provided part of the 
under-pinning for Golan colonization. In consequence, 
during the inevitable post-war controversy the concept and 
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the settlement structure stood, in a sense, on trial 
together. The year after the war saw frequent press 
attacks, 
(16) 
real unease in the army and some erosion of 
public support for Golan settlement, all described by one 
settler leader as "the feeling of weakness and failure 
which revealed itself in the State in the period after the 
war" 
(17) A major strand of criticism proceeded from the 
hypothesis that in modern warfare colonization creates 
rather than solves security problems, because civilian 
settlements cannot stand against "masses of soldiers with 
murderous weapons and are turned into a burden and a 
nuisance --". 
(18) 
Proponents of the security value of colonization 
did not let the criticism go unchallenged. They maintained 
that the need to evacuate the settlements had arisen not 
because the notion of defence lines was untenable but 
because the Golan kibbutzim and moshavim had never been 
properly organized to fulfil their military function. 
In Rommel's terms the colonists had not been occupying 
"prepared positions" and the remedy for this was simple - 
they should in future be equipped with anti-tank weapons, 
light artillery and mines for rapid sowing around settle- 
ment perimeters. In was argued that relatively cheap 
year-round defence would result, capable of rapid mobil- 
ization; that a pattern of fortified sites would greatly 
hinder any armoured assault, giving Tzahal time to con- 
centrate for counter-attack; and that once a counter- 
attack had begun the sites could act as rear security, 
guarding supply lines. 
(19) 
Interestingly, much the same 
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logic had permeated Crusader strategy. 
When Latin Syria was invaded- the border castles 
enabled the Franks to meet the enemy before he had 
penetrated too deeply into Christian territory. The 
field army was normally mustered at a point behind 
the frontier, where it was joined by contingents 
from the strong places --- once they knew his direction 
of attack the Frankish commanders attempted to make 
contact with the enemy without delay and on such 
occasions a border stronghold could be of the first 
importance. It offered shelter, water and -- 
supplies. (20) - 
In the end the defence line advocates carried the 
day, though less because of merit in their argument than 
because, in the Government's view, the settlement system 
had to remain and be strengthened for the rather different 
purpose of establishing political under-pinning for the 
military presence in a vital buffer zone. According to the 
Government the fact that the Syrians had been contained 
before making any penetration of northern Israel had 
proved the defensive worth of the Golan. The argument' 
that the very existence of a buffer zone established on 
someone else's land itself invited war was rejected by 
those who saw Syrian enmity as an inescapable-fact of' 
life. 
Hence with the continued dominance-of the buffer 
concept there was no real threat to the colonization 
process, as long as it was perceived essential to the 
buffer's political viability. Furthermore, once the 
initial post-war crisis had passed public opinion again 
consolidated behind the Government outlook. -: Nationwidel- 
sample polls in May 1974 and May 1975 indicated, a rise- 
from 45.6% to 63.1%-in the proportion opposed. to, any 
territorial concession on the Syrian front. 
(21) It was 
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in this context that defence-liners survived and flourished 
and their opponents lost ground. The practical effect can 
be seen both in-the post-war efforts to 'convert the settle- 
ment points into strongholds 
(22) 
and in the border screen 
of villages proposed and progressively , implemented in the 
Central Golan - the defence line answer to the Syrian break- 
through from Rafid. In addition it maybe noted that the 
Golan City of-1975 was some-distance to the-rear of the 
proposed regional. centre site of 1973, (figures 52,53) " 
Defence-liners viewed kibbutzim and moshavim as the most 
appropriate, _settlement 
types for. integration into the 
. 
Tzahal alignments, owing to their social, cohesion and the 
relatively small numbers of non-combatants; whereas urban 
colonization near the front invited severe refugee problems. 
In Golan circumstances the writer feels that it 
is hard to consider the defence-line arguments without 
a measure of scepticism. Whatever the validity of defence- 
line logic in more rugged terrain, on'the westward sloping 
Golan plateau the settlement structure would seem easy, 
prey, many sites having little local terrain-advantage, 
if the Syrians ever again manage to'cross the low water- 
shed ridge. Also, if large numbers of-civilians remain 
in the battle zone they may act-as a"severe constraint 
on the Israeli Army's freedom of manoeuvre, reducing the. 
Golan's advantage for Israel as a free-fire-zone covering 
the Galilee frontier. - 
iii In sum, taking the examples discussed above, the 
effects of the October shock seem rather puzzling. First, 
far from causing doubts about the settlement process on the 
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Golan the war pointed the way to an eventual acceleration, 
foreshadowed by shifts in planning and intense settler, 
pressure. Second, with regard to the military logic 
buttressing settlement, where a shift in direction might 
have been expected, the only impact was a strengthening 
in historic defence line logic. "The lesson we learned 
was - and still is - that every single settlement should 
be fortified as if it were a military, fortress".. 
(22) 
The mystery abruptly disappears, however, 
when one turns to the fundamental geo-political base for 
colonization, the idea of absorbing territory to provide 
defensible boundaries, to find that it survived the 
hostilities not merely intact but reinforced. From this 
reinforcement all else followed. 
VI. Qeshet, Qatzrin'and the Central Golan 
Settlement and Politics 
In the two years after the October War a long, 
complex and occasionally heated political-struggle took 
place over the issue of intensified Golan settlement, a 
struggle which had both international and domestic ramif- 
ications and which, although it was eventually' resolved 
in favour of accelerated colonization, -caused significant 
delays in the implementation of planned new development. 
Between October 1973 and November 1975 the Golan Jewish 
population only grew from 1800 to 2100, despite ambitious 
rhetoric from certain quarters, and only three new sites 
were added to the sixteen in existence before the war. 
Figures 54 and 55 give a diagrammatic, representation 
tii 
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of the political struggle at two stages, first when - 
delaying forces were most prominent (late 1974) and second 
when accelerating forces finally triumphed (Nov. 1975). 
Externalities, images; competition within the political 
e .. Ax 
system and the geographic consequences are all depicted 
in the context of the general scheme outlined in 
figure 33" 
On the one side were the political forces pushing 
toward a long term peace arrangement between Israel and 
Syria and hence toward Israeli withdrawals and at least 
partial abandonment of the Golan settlement structure. 
These forces included (a) a major external component and 
(b) a lesser component internal to the Israeli political 
system. Both opposed new colonization ventures. From the 
outside came a powerful and extremely active American 
interest, organized by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
and prompted by America's urgent need to build up her 
position in the Arab world following the newly'revealed 
potency of Arab oil wealth. Simultaneously within'Israel's 
ruling Labour Alignment the *key post of Minister of Housing 
passed after May 1974 into the hands of a leading territ- 
orial minimalist, Avraham Ofer, who combined with the 
leftist Mapam faction to exert an intermittent blocking 
influence. Domestic dissent had of course been evident 
before the October War, but the unprecedented American 
pressures greatly heightened its impact in 1974-1975. 
On the other side stood the forces pressing 
for continued and accelerated settlement. These remained 
dominant in domestic politics and, like the retarding 
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forces, were considerably stiffened by the events of 
late 1973. 
Amongst the Labour Party leadership war-weariness 
was offset by deepened distrust, suspicion and pessimism 
regarding Syria : Yigal Allon viewed the war as confirming 
Israel's need for defence buffers politically secured by 
colonization, 
(23) 
while for Golda Meir the war apparently 
ate away her last bit of trust. 
24) 
There is no doubt that she was repenting for the 
sin of complacency in the days before -- and-the 
memory of the first days -- when the Syrian Army 
was at the foot of the Golan Heights, haunted her 
like a nightmare. (25) 
Similar images were held by Rabin and Peres,, as well as 
in the ranks of the Herut, the largest opposition party, 
where absolutist "not an inch" resolve remained'as 
uncompromising as ever. 
In addition, as Labour. power slowly decayed, 
discredited by failures in the early days of the war and 
weakened by seemingly ineffectual government under Rabin, 
new occupied territory settler organizations, became 
highly activist, reacting both against American pressures 
and perceived Government vacillation. ' The settler organ- 
izations, principally the Golan Settlement Committee and 
the religio-nationalist Gush Emunim, rapidly gained 
strength and experience in influencing party machines and 
in disseminating propaganda, especially as Israeli public 
opinion drifted towards more hard-line positions, prov- 
iding more propitious national settings. 
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-i) The Golan Settlement Committee (henceforth 
termed GSC), a private interest group established to 
articulate the views of Golan. colonists and to press the 
centres of power for continuous expansion of, the settlement 
structure, comprises representatives from most settlement 
points in the region. It existed before the October War 
but only became visibly effective in the critical 1974-75 
period. The Committee's leadarship has tended to come from 
Merom Golan, the senior kibbutz (secular) and Ramat 
Magshamim, the senior moshav shittufi (religious). 
GSC pressures strengthened'even before the end 
of the October War (ref. 'Appendix VIIý. 
(26) 
Represent- 
atives headed by Yehuda Harel°(Merom Golan) met Yehial, 
Admoni, a senior Settlement Department official"; -while the- 
Israeli Army was still engaged in its counterattack'against 
Syria, and agreed on four post-war targets -r doubling"the' 
Jewish population within a year, erection of a Golan City, 
colonization of the Central Golan and the building-of a 
regional defence system. 
Contacts with members of the Inter-Ministerial 
Settlement Committee followed and then, when the Minister 
of. Finance Pinhas Sapir'visited the Heights in late October, 
the GSC also converted him to its plan. 
(27Y 
These activities 
led, on 13 November, to Government approval for an extension 
of village settlement and for the establishment of an urban 
centre (the GSC "Golan City"). At this stage the Golan 
settlers assumed that they would not merely be, able to retain 
the pre-war territory, but to absorb parts of the newly! 
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conquered salient as well. Permission was obtained from 
the front commander, Rafael Eitan, to cultivate lands across 
the old cease-fire line and there were hopes that the 
valuable Beit Jinn springs might be kept as a water source. 
It was soon apparent, however, that external 
forces were such that Israel would be lucky to preserve the 
old lines on the Golan. Considerable pressure for territorial 
concession emanated from both America and Europe, then being 
strongly influenced by OPEC, and on the front itself Syria 
launched a war of attrition. Israel's economy desperately 
needed substantial demobilization and a respite from the 
fighting, a point fully realized by interested external 
parties. The first disengagement agreement with Egypt, 
negotiated by Kissinger in January 1974 and involving Israeli 
withdrawals from some areas held before the war, thus seemed 
to indicate the character of negotiations for the Golan as 
much as for Sinai. 
The struggle to achieve a cease-fire on the Syrian 
front, yet to avoid withdrawals detrimentally affecting the 
settlement structure and the Golan's ability to act as a 
strategic buffer, went ahead on two inter-connected levels. 
On the higher diplomatic plane the Israeli Government 
conducted a campaign of dogged political resistance against 
Kissinger and the Syrians. Israel had a very clear idea of 
the final border she could accept - the pre-war cease-fire 
line with minor concessions in the Quneitra sector - and 
here she used the settlement structure as a political weapon. 
The message to Kissinger was that any uprooting of settlements 
might cause a domestic upheaval capable of bringing down the 
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Government, and this stood as a political rock blocking 
any significant erosion of Israel's position on the'Heights. 
Hence settler demonstrations outside the Prime Minister's 
office during the negotiations and other signs of internal 
rebelliousness, though a- nuisance,, directly served to r 
strengthen the Government's hand, lending credibility to the 
upheaval argument. 
Of course, with Israel internationally isolated, 
the primary factor which allowed such manoeuvering to carry 
any weight at all was Syria's fundamentally weak military 
situation. Damascus lay within artillery range of the front 
and, less obviously, Assad heeded some early territorial 
dividends to shore-up his own internal standing. Syria 
lacked either the diplomatic or the military strength to 
overcome the settlement block, and in this context, although 
Israel also needed stabilization, the eastern margins of 
Jewish colonization marked the effective limit of withdrawal. 
On the purely domestic level Israel's leaders 
stood in apparent confrontation with the settlers and their 
sympathizers, a source of friction which, as noted, the 
Government found of utility as a diplomatic card. It is the 
author's view, however, that despite such utility the 
pressures from below were a truly independent phenomenon, 
not in any way stage-managed. They had existed before the 
disengagement talks began and were intensified by real fears 
that the Government and the wider public lacked backbone in 
standing up against external factors (see Appendix VIII ). In 
addition the expansionist mentality of the GSC and its 
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insistence on the full maintenance of the pre-war, line as 
an absolute last resort were, by early May, out-of-tune 
with Government thinking, the Government having to-take 
account of realities which the GSC could safely'ignore. 
Hence settler protest, whether orchestrated ' on' the streets 
or inside party machines, proved a real embarrassment as 
well as a convenience. 
From the outset the GSC sought support from rising 
religio-nationalist elements. , 
Shortly, after -the war 
Harel and 
another member, met a group of twenty, at the, home , of 
Rabbi 
Haimga Druqman, a meeting which apparently laid the found- 
ations for the Gush Emunim. Here identity of views was 
reached and a strong link established between the Golan, -. 
activists and Gush Etzion, on the West Bank. Then during 
the Winter months the GSC worked hard throughout the political 
system, seeking to limit any withdrawal entirely to the-, 
October salient. Activities included meetings with all 
Government Ministers, two sittings with the Foreign Affairs 
and Security Committee of the Knesset, the achievement 
of sympathetic decisions from Ha Kibbutz ha Meuhad and, the 
Regional Councils, publicity in the newspapers and the youth 
movements, and two assemblies of all occupied territory 
settlements (in Kfar Etzion and Neot Golan). Merom Golan 
people were particularly involved, and it was'later claimed 
that "we knew for certain that our work prevented 
a deep 
withdrawal on the Golan and damage to"the settlements 
(28) 
In April 1974 the GSC received hints that Quneitra 
might be subject to concessions and so, with the "requisite 
approval" 
(29) 
settlers began clearing buildings in the 
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deserted city and implementing "land preparation", pres- 
umably for an extension of Merom Golan's agricultural area. 
Whether or not "requisite approval" (ha ishurim ha darushim) 
meant that some-one at a high level in either the Army or 
the bureaucracy felt that fact-creation might help Israel 
to hold Quneitra, and whether or not demolition work by 
settlers accounted for a major part of the destruction 
evident after disengagement, are both unknown. 
In the event the Government decided early in the 
May negotiations that all Quneitra would be given up. It 
had little strategic value, it was of considerable prestige 
significance to the Syrians, and a street-by-street 
bartering process would probably enable Israel's positions 
in the volcanic hills to the rear to be preserved. Without 
the volcanic hills, dominating the Golan watershed 
(plate 4 ), there would be no "defensible boundary", and 
their retention was thus adjudged vital. The kibbutzim 
of Merom Golan and Ain Zivan, whose sites and fields surr- 
ounded the cones, were also pressed into service as a 
diplomatic blocking mechanism - the cause celebre of Golan 
settlements used as a political instrument. 
(30) 
Merom Golan settlers, however, were determined 
that even Quneitra should not be given up. At 1.00 a. m. 
on 11 May, two days after a Ha-aretz article noting "it 
looked as if Israel and Syria would agree 1) the whole of 
Quneitra handed over to Syria, with the U. N. occupying 
the suburbs facing the heights" 
(31) 
-- had clarified 
Government thought, a GSC assembly in the Kibbutz's 
PLATE 18 
Plate 18 
Kibbutz Merom Golan - view north to 
liar Odem (mid-distance) and Harmon, 
Jan. 1978. 
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restaurant shelter resolved to impede any retreat by immed- 
iately setting-up an unauthorized settlement nucleus in 
Quneitra. At dawn the same day a small group, largely 
from Merom Golan, implemented-this decision-by moving into 
the city's hospital bunker. A sympathizer. in, the Jewish 
Agency's. Tzefat office supplied a-generator for electricity 
and the group occupied itself making footwear (Kibbutz Dafne 
support) and continuing "land preparation. ", The ease of, 
establishment makes it difficult to believe that there was 
not substantial collusion from, at the. least, the local 
army command and bureaucracy. 
A critical problem facing the new settlement,..,., 
named Qeshet, was that of raising group size to credible 
numbers. Initially the GSC hoped Qeshet could be joined 
to the neighbouring Ha Kibbutz ha Meuhad block (El Rom, -. 
Merom Golan, Ain Zivan) but the Meuhad secretariat refused 
to back a Quneitra settlement and attempts t6-Mobilize 
recruits in Galilee kibbutzim failed, completely. Instead 
salvation came from the religio-nationalists, particularly 
from Hanan Porat, later to be a major personality in Gush 
Emunim, and the demonstrators besieging the Prime Minister's 
office in Jerusalem. 
The demonstrations'against withdrawal, in part 
organized by occupied territory settlers and-in part spont- 
aneous, took place regularly during the Israel-Syria 
disengagement talks. They primarily comprised young "whole 
land of Israel" enthusiasts who made themselves partic- 
ularly prominent and noisy whenever Henry Kissinger appeared. 
They eventually created such a disturbance that some were 
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arrested and temporarily jailed, an action which prompted 
attacks on the Government from both the Likud and the 
National Religious Party. 
(32) 
As soon as news arrived in Jerusalem about the 
establishment of Qeshet, spread amongst the demonstrators 
by pamphlet, numbers began leaving for the Golan, appearing 
in Qeshet in ones and twos over the following fortnight. 
This ensured the settlement's viability, pushing its pop- 
ulation up to c. 30 by late May, and simultaneously trans- 
formed it into a largely religious community, for which 
Hanan Porat took responsibility. 
On 31 May the Disengagement Agreement was signed. 
The new lines (figure 56 ) transferred the bulk of 
Quneitra to Syrian civil administration, but left the 
western outskirts and all the surroundings of the volcanic 
hills under Israel. Qeshet's bunker stood exactly on the 
margins of Israeli jurisdiction, though its role in 
detailed boundary determination is uncertain and it clearly 
could not remain on its initial site. Haggling with the 
Army enabled a shift to alternative accommodation in a 
tree nursery just outside Quneitra in early June. This was 
after settler honour had been satisfied by some illicit 
adjustment of the barrels marking the new border, so 
bringing the hospital bunker inside the Israeli area. 
At this stage, of course, Qeshet's very existence 
remained officially unacknowledged and full analysis of 
its significance, as a manifestation of domestic discontent, 
in aiding the Government to resist Kissinger can only be 
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made if and when the relevant documents are released. 
With their Quneitra adventure over the Qeshet 
group urgently needed a new raison d'etre to keep itself 
together. After-several months in which the settlement 
experienced considerable population turnover members fixed 
on the Central Golan gap as their replacement cause - 
strengthening the settlement structure at its most vulner- 
able point in anticipation of further American pressure. 
Assured of GSC backing they campaigned vigorously through 
the late Summer for transfer to a permanent site in the 
Central Golan. Here they faced the opposition of some 
senior Army officers, who did not favour settlement in an 
area reserved for exercises and who possibly shared some 
of the thoughts then current about colonization being a 
liability rather than an asset in military terms. To 
overcome the opposition the Qeshet members applied heavy 
pressure on Government Ministers, including Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin, and spent long hours arguing with northern 
commander Rafael Eitan, eventually achieving their objective. 
On 17 October 1974 Qeshet was permitted to make its second 
move - to the Hushniye military camp in the forward sector 
of the Central Golan. 
ii Although the 13 November 1973 decision in. favour 
of an urban-industrial centre theoretically committedthe 
Government to accelerated colonization, especially in. the 
Central Golan, the close American interest and the delaying 
tactics of the Minister of Housing, Mapai's Avraham Ofer, 
held back effective implementation until late 1975, when 
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the majority finally triumphed. The history. of the Golan 
urban-industrial project well illustrates the impact and 
ultimate impotence of minimalist resistance within the 
Government. 
Ofer, as a protege'of Pinhas Sapir, a close 
confidant of Yitzhak Rabin and a skilled party'operative, 
(33) 
had considerable power within the Cabinet. Both Ofer and the 
Mapam Ministers, jointly opposed to major territorial adjust- 
ment outside the Jerusalem area, viewed the creation of an 
urban community on the Golan as a dangerous'departure in 
the colonization process. Mapam's supporting settlement 
movement, Ha Kibbutz ha Artzi, had only recently managed 
to persuade itself that agricultural colonization across 
the green line could be justified as a bargaining, counter, -(34) 
presumably on the dubious premise that the process could be 
reversed if a peace treaty seemed in prospect. However, ' 
what could be argued concerning kibbutzim could hardly be 
sustained with regard to a city which, on some projections, 
would eventually contain 20,000 people. The latter, once 
it had progressed past the first stages of development, 
would amount to an almost irreversable commitment to 
absorption of substantial parts of the Golan, transforming 
the diplomatically convenient notion that Israell'was "a 
prisoner of its own facts" into a potentially inconvenient 
reality, seriously limiting manoeuvre in-negotiations with 
Syria. This characteristic of course made the proposed 
urban centre a highly popular scheme amongst the settler' 
lobbies. 
Ofer, whose Ministry bore full responsibility 
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for all urban building development, was ideally, placed. 
to obstruct the Golan city (named, Qatzrin after the site 
chosen in, July 1974). Settler suspicion, that he, was using 
his position for this purpose first became apparent in-early 
November when a GSC meeting noted, in very critical terms, 
that "the Minister of Housing has not yet begun actual 
activity to create, the urban centre on the Golan although 
in the current budget year more than 80 million lirot have 
been allocated to infrastructure works". 
(35) When the issue 
arose in the Knesset in December Ofer. brushed it aside, 
citing technical excuses 
Because of the importance of the region from many points 
of view - in chief security,, climatic -- it was, a 
difficult task to achieve a siting common to all 
institutions -- on 17 July 1974 the Committee for Urban 
Building finally confirmed the agreed area and detailed 
planning immediately began, but for the needs of planning 
surveys the area had to be cleared of thorn bushes -- 
this needed a number of weeks -- the actual works began in December and soon road construction and the building 
of a large shelter will be started. Building of housing 
structures will begin at the opening of Spring because -- 
there is no sense in large scale works in Winter -- (35) 
Similar inquiries early in the New Year, one noting a slow- 
down in the infrastructual development, were treated in the 
same manner. 
(36) 
Not until several months later did Ofer's oppos- 
ition to the city idea become more open, when on 27 May 
1975 he flatly informed a hostile GSC delegation that no 
city would be built -a small urban estate of 200 resid: 
ential units would be the maximum. 
(37) The latter comment 
reduced even his own December 1974 estimate, in which he. had 
spoken of 300-400 units within two years as a first stage. 
(35) 
Reaction came swifly. On 6 June Ma'ariv began a series-, of 
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articles on the controversy, the opening piece entitled 
"Minister of Housing, - Against the Golan Heights", and on 
17 June Zevulun Hamer of the National Religious Party, now 
returned to the governing coalition, raised "delay in the 
erection of the urban-industrial centre on the Golan" as 
a matter for debate by the full Knesset. Hamer poured 
scorn on excuses involving surveys, thorn-bushes and the 
lack of a suitable director for the project, ' claiming that 
when one man had volunteered to head the team Ofer had had 
refused, indicating that he should volunteer to help 
populate Tzefat, and that when an architect had presented 
a Qatzrin plan the Minister had commented that the plan .. 
would not be executed on the Golan, but inside the green - 
line. 
If from the standpoint of politics, conscience or 
some other factor the Minister of Housing cannot 
establish the city - and it is perhaps possible to 
understand that it is difficult for ,a man 
to perform 
a task he does not identify with - and if the 
quotation that 'he does not plan to, build a city on 
the Golan' is correct will he please transfer the job 
to others. (38) 
0fer retorted that the original Government decision had not 
mentioned the word "city" and then postponed further 
discussion by having the issue diverted into the Knesset 
Works Committee. 
Such tactics remained-effective for-, some time' 
with Ofer receiving tacit backing from various quarters. 
Amongst these were elements in the Jewish Agency and in 
Galilee local authorities. who viewed Qatzrin as an unwarranted 
diversion of resources from the existing urban structure 
in the Hula Valley and the Tiberias basin. In particular. 
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the Mayor of Qiryat Shemona asserted that Qatzrin would 
hurt North Galilee development projects. 
(39) 
More significantly, the Government remained. 
sensitive about American attitudes. For example Hamer's 
proposal for a Knesset debate was at first delayed a week 
because of Government fears that it might have a detrimental 
effect on a concurrent Rabin visit to Washington. Here 
Yigal Allon stressed "the difficulties Rabin would have 
with the United States if the media headlined stories from 
Israel about intentions to build a city on the Golan". 
ýý0) 
Finally, however, 'Ofer was over-ridden. Two external 
events decisively tipped the balance against minimalism in 
settlement policy : on 20 November 1975 a guerrilla incursion 
in the South Golan led to the murder of three yeshiva 
students at Ramat Magshamim and on 30 November, as her price 
for extending the UNDOF mandate, Syria extracted. American 
acquiescence in a PLO attended U. N. Security Council debate 
on the Middle East conflict. Israel's leadership was 
infuriated and the reaction massively buttressed the position 
of 'hard-liners', both in the Government and amongst the 
wider public. Furthermore by early 1976 fear of Ford/ 
Kissinger hostility to new colonization projects was 
lessening, as American attention became distracted by the 
approach of the Presidential election campaign. Ofer could 
hold out no longer - the urban-industrial centre was 
officially upgraded to a "city" and the Government took 
determined steps to ensure rapid implementation. In 
January 1976 a co-ordinating team was set up for Qatzrin 
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and this quickly adopted plans positing 5000 residential 
units, a commercial complex and an industrial estate, the 
whole entity covering 2,500 dunams and accommodating a popul- 
ation of at least 20,000. The settler lobbies had triumphed. 
(iii) Qatzrin comprised only one aspect of the wider 
Central Golan issue. There was also the matter of agricul- 
tural and industrial village colonization, designed both 
to secure the eastern border by bridging the Ramat 
Magshamim gap and to fill empty space behind the 'bridge'. 
Here the Qeshet episode led into a trial of strength between 
moderates and settlement enthusiasts which paralleled and 
complemented the Qatzrin debate, drawing in the same 
protagonists. 
In July 1974, only one month after disengagement, 
the GSC demanded the erection of five new settlements in 
the frontier sector of the Central Golan, a demand which 
formed the basis for negotiations with the Settlement Depart- 
ment of the Jewish Agency. The Settlement Department, 
itself closely interested in Central Golan village colon- 
ization, proved sympathetic and by the end of. the, year 
planning had reached the stage of site details.. 
Here two problems arose whose resolution graph- 
ically demonstrated GSC influence. One concerned the 
permanent site for the Qeshet group, counted among the 
GSC five. Qeshet representatives, in co-ordination with 
the Regional Planner, 
(41) 
decided on a hillock two 
kilometres south of Hushniye, at a point which offered a 
superb view of the Tiberias basin and which was deemed 
sufficiently close (five kilometres) to the cease-fire 
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line to hinder further Kissinger style withdrawals. The 
Army, worried that the village would be too exposed to 
allow easy evacuation in the event of renewed hostilities, 
objected strongly. Qeshet, backed by the GSC,, immediately 
responded by appealing to Defence Minister Shimon Peres. 
Peres, fulfilling expectations, over-ruled the military 
and the settlers kept their original choice. 
The second problem involved disagreement between 
the GSC and the Settlement Department over the economic 
base of the proposed villages. The authorities, with-an' 
eye to costs, wanted to avoid expensive land reclamation 
and so suggested a largely industrial orientation. Golan 
settlers, on the other hand, wanted a significant agricul- 
tural component. Two reasons underlay their insistence - 
a) the historic view of agriculture as a "land anchor", in 
Golan circumstances the best insurance against political 
manoeuverings for village removal, and b) the fact that 
the available settlement nuclei, being of predominantly 
religious persuasion, had a strong ideological attachment 
to the concept of redeeming the land by working the soil. 
After an adamant stand the settlers again got their own 
way. 
A detailed Settlement Department scheme for the 
GSC sponsored Ain Zivan-Ramat Magshamim bridge appeared 
in the April 1975 Planning Proposal for Settlement in the 
Central Golan, already discussed on P. 210 . The four 
mixed agriculture/industry villages proposed for the 
frontier axis (figure 53 ) would each contain c. 100 
families. Village siting would be at least in part 
i 
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determined by the desire to minimize distances to suitable 
lands (i. e. those requiring leaststone-clearing). 
Intensive studies for the individual villages 
quickly followed, a Programme for Moshav Qeshet being 
completed as early as July 31. The Qeshet plan'presented 
suggestions for area dnd'type of building structure, 
monthly work schedules and monthly water requirements. 
Agricultural lands amounting to 1500'dunams woüld`be 
assigned to the settlement, divided into eight parts and 
scattered over an area of 20,000 dunäms. It was observed 
that "the lands in the allocated zone'are stone-strewn' 
and require special preparation chiefly with regard to 
scouring and annual stone clearing. " 
(42) In the industrial 
sector initial activities would comprise such specialities 
as carpentry and sewing, with provision for'an electronics 
plant. Agriculture and industry were each intended to 
provide 50% of Qeshet's final income, though, "owingýto 
Central Golan environmental difficulties, the agricultural 
investment would be much greater (agriculture/industry 
investment ratio = 2: 1 in one option, 3: 1 in another). 
Details concerning the two branches, are depicted in 
table 7: 8, indicating the depth of analysis. In accord 
with the wishes of_nucleus members, numbering c. 60 by 
mid 1975, Qeshet would be organized as a moshav shittufi, 
on similar lines to Ramat Magshamim. 
However, as soon as the GSC Settlement 
Department ideas passed from the bureaucratic to the 
political level they ran into trouble - opposition from 
Avraham Ofer and caution on the part of several other 
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Cabinet figures. The Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee 
deferred discussion on. the proposals, perceiving possible 
American disapproval, and this caused impatience and. 
irritation in settler circles. 
By late August the GSC had come to the conclusion 
that action had to be taken to force the pace. For some 
time it had maintained a second settlement nucleus in 
"training" at Merom Golan, a small religious group linked 
to Gush Emunim, and on the night of 27 August, after 
checking with sympathetic elements in Tzahal Northern 
Command, it inserted the group into empty, bunkers on Tel 
Fares, without the approval or even the knowledge of the 
Government or the Settlement Department. In, this way 
Yonatan appeared; a unilateral planting only two,. kilometres 
from the Central Golan border "In the middle, of an empty 
area rumoured as negotiable for return to Syria. " 
The GSC organizers were buttressed in their defiance of 
the state by the success of similar Gush Emunim tactics 
on the West Bank, and in turn the Gush ranked among the 
most enthusiastic supporters of the Yonatan operation. 
The Government, deeply divided and not wishing 
a public confrontation with the settlers, took no steps 
to reverse the fait accompli, but neither did it make 
any move to approve the Tel Fares occupation or to activate 
the broader scheme. Only in September did the Inter- 
Ministerial Settlement, Committee examine the April Settle- 
ment Department plan for the first time, and at Ofer's 
request it deferred the matter for debate by the full 
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Cabinet. Here he and Rabin were at one in favouring delay, 
though for Rabin this was largely a matter of sensitivity 
over timing with relation to international. factors. In a 
significant comment to kibbutz secretaries the Prime Minister 
held that there had been "no change in Government policy 
about (retaining) the Golan, but -- inadvisable to start 
new settlements before the expiry date of the U. N. mandate 
(November 30). " 
(44) 
Through October the Yonatan settlers consolidated 
their Tel Fares position, bringing in bulldozers to level 
ground for housing and securing electricity and water 
supplies from the military - all evidence of under-cover 
support from senior officials in the Defence Department 
and perhaps from Defence Minister Shimon Peres himself. 
The Mapam young guard, in a memorandum to Mapam Ministers 
observed 
All this is proof that there are security or settle- 
ment factors lending a hand to deviations which have 
not been approved by the Government in order to force 
on the Government things and acts which it has never 
decided upon. (45) 
As with Qatzrin the deadlock was broken and the 
inhibitions swept aside by the two external irruptions of 
November 1975. After the Ramat Magshamim raid hard-line 
Ministers immediately demanded a decision on the four 
settlement plan. 
The circles who re-raised the issue said such an act 
would express the Government's resolve to hold 
on to 
parts of the Golan needed for security purposes. The 
four settlements would help ti hten the security belt 
in the Ramat Magshamim area. ( 6) 
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A full Cabinet discussion followed on 23 November, and the 
scheme was made operational, though lingering hesitation 
led to actual implementation being temporarily deferred. 
Final doubts, however, did not survive Syria's price for 
the renewal of the UNDOF mandate and the prospect of the 
PLO addressing the Security Council. On 2 December the 
Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee ordered an immed- 
iate start to official construction on the four settlements, 
as a "practical reaction to Syrian success in the Security 
Council". 
(47) 
The chief impetus came from Committee 
Chairman Yisrael Galili - Ofer abstained and the two 
Mapam Ministers voted against the decision. 
Events now moved ahead rapidly. Qeshet and 
Yonatan were immediately legitimized and in January 1976, 
two other settlement groups, the nuclei for Moshav Gamle 
and the Moshav Shittufi Sha'al, also established themselves 
on the Central Golan. Qeshet, Yonatan and Sh'al joined 
the Ramat Magshamim block (figures 10, L8), following the 
frontier axis concept, while Gamle, established on the Batiha 
slopes, formed part of the strategy to occupy the central 
hinterland. 
(iv) In sum, by early 1976 the post-October-War 
interlude was over and a new phase in the'settlement process 
was beginning -a transition depicted diagrammatically 
in 
figure -55 . First, with the defeat of the domestic 
minimalists, the Arab provocations, and the diversion of 
the United States in the beginnings of the Presidential 
election campaign, the internal and external constraints 
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on colonization were slackening decisively. Second, after 
two years of effort, the settler lobbies had entrenched 
themselves as never before in public consciousness and in 
the political system. These two changes in political real- 
ities, domestic and international, led directly to an accel- 
eration in Golan settlement, which had been in prospect 
since the majority of the Government had drawn their hard- 
line conclusions from the October War, but had been postponed 
by unfavourable post-war circumstances. 
VII. Infrastructural Foundations 
As an essential element in the creation of a new 
cultural landscape on the Golan Heights the Labour period 
saw the expanding settlement structure buttressed by a 
considerable infrastructural investment - in roads, water 
supply, electricity reticulation and sewage systems. The 
investment amounted to 21% of the total Golan investment 
up to 1977 
(48) 
and probably bulked larger in some earlier 
years, as progress beyond the initial rudimentary level 
depended on the parallel creation of a substantial infra- 
structure. Two critical dimensions are examined in this, 
section - the road network and the water supply. 
(i) Roads. Israel inherited a skeletal system of paved 
highways from the Syrians, consisting of a north-south 
spine running from Baniyas through Quneitra to Rafid, Fiq 
and El Hamma, with one major east-west link between Quneitra 
and the Bnot Ya'acov bridge (figure 57). Initially 
little was done to extend this net but after 1969, when 
several major schemes were set in motion, work proceeded 
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continuously and in some cases vigorously. - 
Objectives included the building of further east- 
west connections to improve access from Israel and the 
establishment of a new north-south axis at a safe distance 
from the cease-fire line. Motivation was transparently 
strategic, though military strategy operated in association 
with such lesser. concerns as the opening, up of new agric- 
ultural lands and the requirements of tourism. 
Good exem ification is provided by the most 
expensive and spectacular of the early projects - the 
blasting of twin highways to the Hermon shoulder. This was 
prompted by the growth of Palestinian bases across the 
border in Lebanon (Fatahland) and subsequent guerrilla 
infiltration of the Hermon slopes, craggy and difficult to 
patrol. Fears arose that Israel might lose effective control 
of the vicinity and Northern Commander David Elazar repeat- 
edly stressed the need, on security grounds, for a border 
highway. Implementation began in 1969 with the opening 
of an eastern link from Majdal ash Shams to the Israeli 
held summit (2050 metres), the intention being to reduce 
the vulnerability of the military outpost on the shoulder, 
hitherto entirely dependent on helicopter transport. The 
fact that the road also gave access to the new. Hermon ski- 
field was a welcome 'bonus'. Then, after, guerrilla attacks 
on Metulla, Qiryat Shemona and Ghajjar, a Lebanon border 
highway was pushed through to Har Dov and beyond in Spring- 
Summer 1970. Guerrilla opposition created arduous cond- 
itions for the Jewish National Fund work parties, with 
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mine-layings and attempted ambushes, but Israel's power and 
determination'made the result a foregone'-conclusion - 
F atahland was overshadowed and the accomplishment followed 
by the expression of wider ambitions : "Hermon will be ours 
not only as a military fact but also as a civilian reality, 
with access for civilian traffic, tourists, sports fans. , 
(49) 
On the plateau itself four new east-west roads had 
appeared by 1973 (figure 5.7 ). These bound the Golan 
and'its new settlements more closely to Israel and served 
as alternative military approach routes. Two (Gonen-Wasit, 
Hushniye-Batiha) upgraded existing tracks and two (Mazra'at 
Quneitra-Kursi, Bene Yehuda-Kursi) were entirely new 
creations. The Bene Yehuda-Kursi link gave the southern 
settlements their first secure direct access to Israel s 
prior to 1970 the only local access had been the El Hamma 
road, adjacent to the Jordanian border and under constant 
threat of attack during the War of Attrition. 
In contrast work on a safer north-south axis 
running up the centre of the plateau, called for as early 
as January 1968, did not begin in earnest until after the 
October War. Action was in part prompted by the Disen-11, 
gagement Agreement, which increased the political and military 
vulnerability of the existing Quneitra-Rafid axis, and in 
part stemmed from the infrastructural needs of Central 
Golan colonization. 
Concerning overall development figure-58 indicates 
improvements in the connectivity of the Golan all-weather 
road network between 1970 and 1975. Connectivity is 
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defined as the degree of inter-connection between all 
the vertices (nodes) in the network when the network is 
abstracted as a graph. It is measured here by the a index, 
(50) 
a ratio measure of the number of'actual circuits in the 
network to the maximum number possible. ' 
a_ actual circuits _e-v+1 maximum circuits 2v -1 
where :e= edge (link), v= vertex (node) 
The index ranges from 0 for a , minimally connected network 
to 1 for maximum connection. 
For the Golan road system the results are as 
follows - 
t 
1970 :a==o. o64 
1972 a==0.134 
1975 =a==0.134 
A major increase in sophistication is evident in. the first 
two years, especially in the far north, with the Hermon 
effort, and in the far south, with the Kursi"link and an 
intensification of the agricultural service system. Fail- 
ure to sustain the rate of improvement in the-second period 
(1972-1975) may in the main be attributed to linkage. - 
reduction in the Quneitra and Rafid sectors caused by dis- 
engagement. Such losses were balanced by new routes in the 
Central Golan, which enabled the 1972 connectivity level 
to be preserved but not increased. As a cautionary 
comment it should be noted that the 11 100,000 Maps 
(51) 
used as a data base are not entirely accurate, either for 
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road standards or for the exact extent of the network. This 
emerged from detailed inspection of the recently released 
(52) 1; 50,000 series and from field investigation. 
(ii) Water Supply Projections of the water. requirements 
of the Golan settlement structure, overwhelmingly bound up 
with irrigation assisted cropping,, have traditionally been 
as ambitious as population projections. - The agricultural 
plan of November, 1967 proposed consumption of 15.9 million 
cubic metres per annum (mill. cm. p. a. ) with ten years, equiv- 
alent to c. 1% of Israel's total 1968 consumption, while the 
1973 general plan looked ahead to a 1978 supply of 26.7 mill. 
cm. p. a. In fact known sources on the Golan can only produce 
c. 7 mill. cm. p. a. and, although this can and has been supp- 
lemented by bores and by reservoirs to store Winter precip- 
itation, at least 50% of the production necessary to fulfil 
the above planning must come from metropolitan Israel - in 
other words, from Lake Tiberias. 
The actual situation existing on the Golan after 
six years of water project construction is depicted in 
figure 59 and table 7: 9 . Two major systems had 
been 
built up, one for the south and one for the north, each 
consisting of a grid of pipes, pumping stations, springs, 
bores, reservoirs and ponds. Excluding the Druze villages, 
total Golan supply in 1973-74 amounted to 4.4 mill-cm. 
In the South Golan the principal source was Lake 
Tiberias. Although this meant pumping the water up a 
500 metre scarp(53) imposed pipe distances of up to 
40 
kilometres and caused competition with the National Water 
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Carrier, there was no real choice if a settlement structure 
of any size was tobe established on the southern plateau. 
Despite intensive utilisation of springs and the establish- 
ment, of reservoirs and storage ponds to preserve Winter 
run-off local sources could not possibly carry the main 
burden. By 1974 the South Golan system had reached the 
dimensions shown in figure 59 , 
and was supplying 
2.7 mill. cm. p. a. to eleven agricultural villages, 37% from 
Lake Tiberias. Extension plans predicated an ever 
increasing dependence on the lake. 
The North Golan system on the other hand, oper- 
ating in more propitious terrain, relied entirely on the 
local sources. Construction work was initially tardy, 
partly because the Syrians did not out the flow across the 
cease-fire line from Beit Jinn until May 1968, but from 
1969 onwards it proceeded with vigour. The pivot was the 
natural reservoir of Brekhot Ram, from which pipes went 
north to Neve Ativ and the three Druze villages, drawing 
in the output of two'large Druze owned springs, and south 
to the three Quneitra basin kibbutzim. In 1974 production 
ran at 3.7 mill. cm. p. a., from the origins depicted in 
table 7: 9 , making the enterprise somewhat 
larger than 
its southern counterpart, albeit with Jewish settlements 
consuming only 47% of the supply. Considerable potential 
still existed for growth, by sinking more bores and by 
further ponding of the heavy Winter rainfall, but not at 
the rate envisaged for the South Golan scheme with its 
Lake Tiberias base. 
Both systems are to be, 
_extendedinto 
the Central 
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Golan as part of the support for the area's colonization 
programmes, the main load being borne from the south. 
Within the Central Golan there are also possibilities, 
at great expense, for rainfall collection and for bores, 
particularly at Tel Bazaq, although the local springs are 
so deficient in Summer that they are of little general 
value except as drinking water sources. 
VIII. New Directions 1976-1977 
"The political situation and the relative quiet from 
the security and political aspects demand and facilitate 
the use of the time at our disposal for developing, 
deploying and filling out land settlement in the Golan 
at the fastest possible pace. The regions where 
settlement efforts should be concentrated are in the 
Central and Northern Golan ---". 
Tour of the Zionist Congress Delegates, Settlement 
Dept. 23 February 1978. P. 17. 
Between early 1976 and December 1977 the Golan 
Jewish population increased from c. 2200 to c. 3900, while 
the number of officially recognized settlement sites 
expanded from 20 to 27, increases of 75% and 35% compared 
with 25% and 18% for the preceding two years. 
In the village sector the path ahead was set by 
the July 1976 Plan for the Development of Additional 
Settlements on the Golan Heights. This concentrated on the 
Central Golan, visualizing an alignment of five industrial 
villages and four mixed industry/agriculture settlements 
for c. 1980. 
(54) 
Elsewhere it called for two new industrial 
villages in the North Golan and one new kibbutz on the 
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southern plateau. 
Implementation of the new programmes, comprising 
both the village plan and the Qatzrin city development, 
had two dimensions. On the one hand significant progress 
had undoubtedly been made by early 1978. At Qatzrin, 
which dominates this phase in Golan colonization, building 
proceeded at great speed, the first of eight housing 
estates reaching an advanced stage of construction by July 
1977, when settlers began moving in. Thereafter the city's 
population grew from zero to more than 500 within six 
months, making it the largest Golan settlement and the most 
formidable new Israeli project in the occupied territories. 
The initial employment base consisted of light industry, 
with an industrial estate being built on a separate site, 
and service activity, primarily for Golan villages and 
military camps. It remains to be seen whether Qatzrin can 
attract enough people beyong the relatively small pool of 
fervent nationalists to sustain its current rate of expan- 
sion. However, if it can - and the 1978-80 programme calls 
for an urban infrastructure investment of 455 million 
(55) 
lirot to ensure that it can (plate 18,19) - it will, for the 
first time, make long-standing Golan population targets of 
40-50,000 realistic and so severely reduce the short-term 
likelihood of a negotiated peace with Syria. 
Regarding village settlement late 1977 also saw 
several of the main proposals well on the way toward 
fulfilment (figures, 4.0,48) . On the Central Golan frontier 
Qeshet, Yonatan and Sha'al had been joined by Nahal P crag, 
PLATES 19,20 
Plate 19 
Qatzrin - Urban construction, 
Jan. 1978. 
Plate 20 
Qatzrin - Urban construction, 
Jan. 1978. 
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near Rafid, and kibbutz Ortal,, near Ain Zivan. None of 
the five were yet on permanent sites but spacious new 
quarters for Qeshet, which had expanded from 80 people to 
120, including 50 children,, were almost complete.. In add- 
ition the new kibbutz proposed for. the far south - Avni 
Eitan - had been inaugurated,.. while in the far north a 
secondary ten kilometer gap between El Rom and Neve Ativ, 
was being attended to by an incipient cluster of industrial 
villages, beginning with the Har Odem nucleus. 
On `the other hand, to set against the progress, °- 
the very pace of development only made the underlying 
financial and demographic resource constraints more obvious. 
In particular the intense concentration on Qatzrin implied a 
certain debilitation' in the execution of new construction 
throughout the rest of the Golan. ' One casualty seems to 
have been the industrial village block suggested for the 
Central Golan interior. Up to 1978 the sole"evidence of 
activity'was the erection of Ani'am, a permanent village 
for a group of Russian immigrants stationed at Ramot. The 
neglect presumably stemmed from the priority given to 
closing-gaps"on the eastern frontier, which received more, 
settler attention, as: well as from that given to Qatzrin,. 
to which the industrial villages were. subsidiary. Even, 
ön'i 
the frontier,. however,. one_notes significant. delays, in 
(s6) 
providing new settlements with permanent housing. 
More broadly the resource constraints were also 
evident in the fact that a decade of fluctuating effort 
had established only 3,500 Israelis on the Golan, less than 
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50% of the population of the residual Arab villages. This 
was all the more striking in view of the determination of 
Israel's leadership concerning Golan colonization. The 
constraints thus provide good exemplification for 
Brecher's point that although external realities only 
affect decisions via the images of decision-makers, the 
same realities directly determine the fate of efforts to 
put the decisions into practice. 
(57) 
Nonetheless the strength of the political will 
and the potency of political pressures should not be under- 
estimated, as may be seen in the over-riding of both envir- 
onmental and diplomatic obstacles in the drive to settle 
the Central Golan. Local agricultural projects, water 
scheme extensions and the new industrial village concept 
can only be interpreted in a political and strategic 
context. Seen from an economic or an environmental stand- 
point the author feels that the emerging Central Golan 
structure makes little sense : the area has only a very 
limited agricultural potential (see P. 206), it has no 
resources for industry and it is distant from existing 
industrial concentrations. 
Indeed it is instructive to note that the whole 
effect of the October War was to accelerate the shift away 
from an economically rational Golan settlement pattern, 
limited in both scale and spatial coverage, to a pattern 
which sought to be spatially comprehensive and to break- 
through to large scale colonization by either overcoming 
environmental difficulties (Central Golan agriculture) 
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or by finding ways round. them - (industrial villages). 
As observed, such moves to strengthen the settlement 
anchor followed an erosion in Israel's diplomatic 
position. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CASE STUDY : THE JORDAN. RIFT, -1967-1978 
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I. The Rift-Strip i` Refining-the Allon P1än 
. Of all 
the colonization programmes in the occupied 
territories the settlement system in the West Bank section 
of the Jordan Rift is the most visible expression of the 
Allon Plan. It realizes the plan's central concept that 
the defence of Israel's heartland should rest not on minor 
border adjustments between the West Bank and the coastal 
plain but on the absorption into Israel of a security zone 
running the length of the Jordan Rift, so giving true geo- 
graphic depth at the same time as containing areas of dense 
Arab population.. Figure 36, - which depicts both _the'original' 
version of the zone and the September 1967 West Bank' 'ý"t 
population distribution, illustrates just how convenient 
for Israel was the disproportionately large Arab exodus from 
the West Jordan Valley. 
Allon's ideas regarding a Rift strip were his 
chief original contribution to the Israeli debate on 
retention of territory for strategic purposes, and they did 
not reach their final form until early 1968. Before going 
on to the settlement process itself it is useful to examine 
the detailed ramifications of these ideas, which gave the 
settlement process its spatial and ideological base. 
In the expanse between the Beit Shean Valley, 
and the Dead Sea (figure 60) the Rift strip would form 
a formidable topographical barrier against any assault 
from the east. The Jordan River, with its entrenched 
meanders, would serve as the initial anti-tank ditch, 
although Allon recognized that it could not be decisive 
against a modern army. The main defence line would thus 
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be positioned between 500 and 1000 metres above the Valley, 
in the Samarian mountains. The mountains are an extremely 
impressive topographical feature (plate 1) and Allon 
calculated that relatively small forces, . armed 
with sophist- 
icated and appropriate weaponry, could hold the "wall" even 
against an Arab army assisted by outside powers. 
(') Any 
passes through the mountains, the principal example being Wadi 
Fari'a, leading up to Nablus, are long and narrow and could 
be turned into death-traps for advancing' armour. 
After July 1967 Allon's proposals for, the Belt 
Shear/Dead Sea expanse were refined 
sin ; 
two important respects. 
First, as the original, idea for a strip 10, -, 15 kilometres 
in breadth did not take the defence line far enough back ., 
into the, Samarian Wilderness to give the maximum possible. 
height and terrain advantage the breadth was, adjusted, to 
15 - 20 kilometres. 
(2) 
The final., line, as indicated in the 
August 1975 Jordan Rift Development Plan (figure 60 took 
the western border of the strip to the very margins of Arab 
cultivation on the West Bank Highlands. Its detailed align- 
ment "was, determined by political/demographic considerations 
above all else" and "was fixed on the limit of worked lands 
in the vicinity of the (Arab) villages, at an average distance 
of 2-3 kilometres from the site of the villages them- 
. . t. .. 
selves. 
(3) It also closely followed the 400, m. m. rainfall 
line, which marked the transition between the Mediterranean 
climate of the heavily populated Highlands and the semi-arid 
climate of the sparsely populated wilderness. The over- 
riding consideration was to keep the Arab population 
inside 
the security strip to a minimum. The only exception came 
in'the south, where the village of Duma had to be brought 
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within the proposed Israeli area, if terrain suitable for a 
north-south highway (the so-called "line of settlement" 
road) was to be incorporated. 
Second, Allon quickly reconsidered the desirability of 
one major implication of his original plan - the territorial 
severance of the West Bank Arabs from the wider Arab world. 
A couple of months after I proposed my plan, when I 
studied it again, I reached the conclusion that it 
would be wrong not to provide those two interconnected 
territories (the West Bank and the East Bank) with an (4) 
Arab controlled and even sovereign access or corridor. 
He thus formulated the notion of a corridor following the 
Ramallah-Jericho road, permitting the free movement of Arab 
civilian traffic to the Allenby bridge. The corridor would be 
c. five kilometres in width (figure $A ) and would have the 
added advantage of removing Jericho, the West Valley's major 
population centre, from the Israeli area. No Jewish settle- 
ments would be erected in the vicinity. 
(ii) In Judea the original Allon Plan was very tentative, 
even leaving open the possibility of incorporating the entire 
West Bank south of Jerusalem into Israel. However, within weeks 
Allon decided to exclude the populated areas, making this clear 
"in my remarks at Cabinet sessions as well as in my talks with 
the Prime Minister, fellow Ministers and Members of the 
Knesset. "(5) Hebron and Bethlehem districts would thus be treated 
in the same way as Samaria, with the Judean Wilderness between 
the Dead Sea and the fringes of the. densely populated areas 
becoming part of the Rift Security strip. 
In early 1968 the Judean Wilderness proposal became 
bound up with an unauthorized attempt by a group of settlers to 
re-establish a Jewish community in Hebron town. On 10 April a 
gröup of 73 religious fundamentalists, headed by a Rabbi Moshe 
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Levinger, booked in at Hebron's Park Hotel,, -ostensibly to 
celebrate the Passover. To-the-consternation of the- 
authorities they then announced that they had-come to. stay. 
The'National°Unity Government was deeply divided over the 
issue, eventually deciding to, postpone - any decision ýby shifting 
the settlers to the military administration, compound,,, thereby 
'reducing-the likelihood of,. clashes with the Arab population, 
and by setting up a commission to consider the question of 
Jewish urban settlement in the area. 
The Hebron settlement bid exposed the fundamental 
conflict in the Allon Plan between belief in the right of Jews 
to the whole historic, land and arguments that this could not 
be implemented because of demographic dangers to the Jewish 
State. Hebron, the city of Abraham, ranked second to Jerus- 
alem as a Jewish holy site and Allon,, with the majority of 
Ministersm(only Sapir, Eban and. the Mapam representatives were 
openly opposed), tended to sympathize with the settlers. Yet 
how could a Jewish presence be-established without absorbing 
.. 
40,000 Arab Hebronites into Israel? Allon resolved the 
dilemma,. by late 1968, 
(6) 
with the concept of, a dual city, 
similar to Nazareth, involving the building of a separate 
Jewish quarter on the hills immediately to the east of the 
existing Arab city. This quarter would form an integral part 
of the Jordan Rift security strip with the Arab city excluded, 
the line of separation between the two sections marking the 
western border of the strip. 
Government approval for the first stage of the 
project, involving 250 housing units, came in September 
1970. 
The victory of the settlers, who had not dispersed after the, 
move to the military compound as some Ministers had hoped 
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but had instead increased in number to c. 200, set a significant 
precedent for later years, for Qeshet and Yonatan on the 
Golan Heights and for the Gush Emunim on'the'West Bank. ' As 
regards the Allon Plan itself the new entity, named'Qiryat 
Arba', represented an uneasy compromise between security, -" 
demography, emotion and history. Friction between"Jew-'and 
Muslim, both at the tomb of the Patriarchs and'in Hebron as 
a whole, was deepened rather than lessened. 
iii Unofficial Government acceptance of the refined 
Allon Plan for the Jordan Rift and consequent implementation 
of coherent settlement programmes took longer than did 
agreement and action concerning the Golan Heights, largely 
because the degree of Ministerial consensus differed between 
the two cases. In brief, the range of opinion was much 
greater for the more complex West Bank issue, which subsumed 
the Jordan Rift, than for the Golan. Minimalists, for 
example Eban and Sapir, perceived the Rift scheme as covering 
too substantial a territory (30% of the West Bank) to be a 
plausible negotiating stance, while maximalists, here 
including Dayan as well as the Gahal Ministers, saw it as a 
diversion from their ideas of' establishing Jewish urban 
settlements on the West Bank Highlands. 
However, simply because of the range of opinion, 
the Allon Plan tended to gather' strength as the'least 
objectionable alternative for the largest number of Ministers. 
On the one hand minimalists could use it-as a time-wasting 
device to stave off Jewish intrusion into Arab populated 
regions, hoping that settlement facts in the Rift would not 
become of such a scale to trap the Government into positions 
it could not withdraw from, but might nonetheless pressure-. 
I 
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the Arabs to negotiate. Maximalists, on the other hand, 
could rationalize it as a first step toward more compre- 
hensive colonization. In consequence, as time passed and 
pressure increased to 'create facts' in response to perceived 
Arab intransigence, the different sides gravitated toward 
the Allan Plan for their different, even diametrically 
opposed, reasons. 
Clear evidence of such gravitation was apparent 
by mid 1968. On 6 June the Labour Party's Political 
Committee considered the matter, with Allon's ideas receiving 
support from Eban (minimalist), Dayan (maximalist) and 
Eshkol (moderate). 
(7) 
Thereafter support widened and by 
the end of the year it could be observed that"a majority 
of the Ministers are in favour of the settlement dimension 
of the Allon Plan". 
(8) 
On the far right Menahem Begin 
had no objections "because he sees it (the plan) as the 
beginning of a colonization process which his party requires 
on a broader scale" 
(8) 
while on the left support came from 
Mapam's Minister of Housing, Mordekhai Bentov, although the 
main body of Mapam remained opposed. 
(9) 
Thus, eighteen months after the Six Day War the 
stage was set for the realization of the operational aspect 
of Allon's proposal for the Jordan Rift - the settlement 
system. 
II. The Settlement Alig 
Development 
(i) Allon's settlement concept for the Jordan Rift 
. 
involved two forms of activity. To begin with Nahal outposts 
would be erected as quickly as possible along the full length 
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, of the Rift, both on the, Valley floor and in the.. mountains 
these to be gradually converted to civilian agricultural 
villages and provided with necessary economic and social 
services by area centres. Then at a slightly later stage, 
the village development would be supplemented by the building 
of two urban-industrial communities - Upper Jericho and 
Upper Hebron. The idea of the urban dimension was "to 
(10) attract greater masses" to the region. 
The paramilitary phase in Rift settlement began 
even before the Allori concept had gained . widespread . support , 
with the founding of Nahal Qalia (February.. 1968), Naha1 
Mehola (February 1968) and, Nahal Argaman (November, 1968). 
However in this early period most Ministers, probably-, 
including Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, preferred not,, to. view 
these outposts as permanent establishments,, attaching little 
more significance to them than to normal army, camps. ,z 
They- 
came largely in response to guerrilla incursions and the 
intensifying War of Attrition with Jordan, each being located 
at or near major axes of infiltration. Nahal Argaman, for 
instance, overlooked the Fari'a Valley leading up to Nablus, 
while Nahal Mehola covered a ford used by guerrillas as well 
as the northern road to the highlands. 
Definite signs that Israel intended to stay became 
evident only in 1969 - 70, when settlement points multiplied 
and the Allon Plan, incorporated into the Unwritten Agree- 
ment between the Labour factions, emerged as the unofficial 
guideline for overall colonization. As Allon himself notes 
the War of Attrition had an accelerating effect - it helped 
reduce Ministerial doubts about extending Golan style policies 
4. 
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to the West'Bank, and "only encouraged us to estäblish"'these 
settlements'. "-(11) -' II1 --" 
By 1971 the number of settlement points had grown 
to ten, including six Nahal, three civilian villages and 
one urban estate (Qiryat Arba'). Figure 61 depicts the 
distribution, indicating a concentration of effort on 
creating aline of settlement on the Valley floor. Only 
two agricultural sites had been founded in the mountains, 
and one of these (Petzae]) eventually intended moving down 
into the Valley, where it had been allocated lands and to 
wh h its members commuted daily. There were two reasons for 
the uneven spatial development. First the Valley floor, 
where mid-Winter mean temperatures of 12 -'14°C allow the- 
production of lucrative out-of-season vegetables for, export'- 
to Europe, offered greater agricultural opportunities. "-"'' 
Second, the settlement movements' involved in Valley'activity 
(table 8a1)ýproved more dynamic in-organizing nuclei-for- 
colonization. `°ý 
Between 1971 and 1975 several major changes 
occurred in the settlement structure as it acquired a more 
elaborate form. 
Concerning geographical orientation all five new 
settlement foundations were made in the mountain area, 
creating a second series of sites behind the Valley line 
(figure 62 table 8a1). Whereas the Valley line was 
designed as much to exploit environmental advantages as to 
serve a military purpose, the new mountain line had an 
exclusively strategic function. Unlike the Valley sites, 
some of which would be dangerously exposed in a conventional 
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war, the mountain settlements are in ideal-terrain to play. 
the role of defence points, whether by themselves or as 
political stiffening for the military alignment. This 
alignment, which over. ooks`the Valley floor, is-designed '° 
first and foremost to'cover the whole of central Israel, 
but in a local context, it. can also serve as immediate 
sanctuary for the Valley settlers. The various military,. 
and civilian installations. in the, mountains are linked 
together by a north-south highway from Beqa'ot to Ma'a]e. 
Adumim (figure 6.0 )', which by. 1975, was largely completed, 
though still unsurfaced in parts. 
Paralleling the territorial, expansion of colon-, _ 
ization the incipient Jewish economy became more properly 
adjusted to local environmental conditions as the settlement 
Department acquired further experience and rectified early 
mistakes. First, by. 197L, it was clear that. Rift water 
resources would not support full agricultural, development 
on the basis of irrigated field farming, which demanded 
very large supplies owing to high evapotranspiration rates 
in the hot dry Valley climate. As a result a reorientation 
toward more water intensive agriculture took place, with 
plastic cover and glass-houses becoming increasingly 
prominent as, devices, to out down on evapotranspiration. 
Second, at some locations it was quickly discovered that 
wind strengths had been seriously misjudged. At Mekhora, 
for example, the original plastic cover structures were 
destroyed and the covered-agriculture branch had to be 
entirely re-located to more sheltered surrounds. Other 
Mekhora problems, including failure to provide a farmyard 
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branch (poultry or dairying), soon found necessary to supp- 
lement the economy, and a shift from moshav shittufi to 
moshav organization, combined with the wind difficulties 
to produce what has since been recognized as the Settlement 
Department's biggest single planning error in the Rift. 
(12) 
Finally, this period saw the decisive shift from 
paramilitary outposts to predominantly civilian colonization - 
in other words from a tentative structure to a more permanent 
one. By 1975 paramilitary camps accounted for only four 
out of the fifteen sites, as opposed to six out of ten in 
1971. 
ii Even in 1975, however, the Rift's Jewish population 
remained tiny, numbering a mere 1800 (table 8s1) as against 
a residual Arab population of 22000, which had increased 
by c. 8000 since late 1967. 
(13) 
Furthermore if the Qiryat 
Arba' urban estate is excluded the total for village settle- 
ment shrinks to 620, less than the annual growth rate of 
the Arab population. 
Clearly the Rift settlement structure still lagged 
behind the Jerusalem and Golan programmes, themselves only 
just beginning to inject a substantial Jewish presence into 
their respective regions. On the Golan the population per 
village in 1975 was 106, compared with 45 in the Rift, and 
the construction of permanent housing was considerably more 
advanced. The tardiness can be attributed in part to early 
Cabinet disagreement over Rift policy and in part to the 
severe environmental difficulties. In contrast to the 
temperate and relatively well-watered Golan, the most 
attractive region in the occupied territories for Jewish 
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colonization, the Lower Jordan Valley experiences an 
oppressively hot Summer (temperatures up to 50°C), when 
(l) 
agricultural working conditions are abominable, and 
has an average annual rainfall below 400 mm over its entire 
territory, being extremely arid in its southern section 
(ref. Chapter I, P. 23). These environmental' problems had 
two implications. ' First, aside from` the` professional 
pioneers of the Nahal movement, 'it was difficult to'attract 
people to settle in the Jordan Rift. Second, progress was-, 
slowed by the necessity to install'a piped water network 
prior to any substantial colonizatiön. ' In 1974 each colonist 
in the Rift north of Jericho required a piped water supply 
three times greater than his equivalent`on"the Golan, while 
6800 irrigated dunams north of Jericho-`consumed the same 
amount 'as c. 13000 irrigated dunams'on the`Golan. `(15) 
Presumably such differences stemmed both from'the"physical 
combination of lower rainfall and ' higher evaporation rates, 
in the Lower Jordan Valley and from the fact that the`area's 
Jewish economy remained almost exclusively agricultural, " 
whereas the'Golan economy already incorporated a significant 
light industrial component with minimal water damands 
(compare table 7i 6 and 812a). 
In the Rift strip as a' whole, including Qiryat 
Arba', the years mid 1975 - mid 1977 saw a similar process 
to that occurring on the Golan : the beginnings of an 
attempt to break through to mass colonization, with'a 67% 
growth in the number of sites. (from 15 to 25) and an 80%.. 
increase in population (from c. 1800 to c. 3300). 
(16) By 
late 1977 the village settlements contained just under 
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2000 people, ` almost evenly divided between the Valley and 
mountain lines, with an additional 1400 in Qiryat Arba'. The 
settlement distribution 'is depicted in figure 63 
indicating the various 'settlement types. 
A notable feature is the almost complete disapp- 
earance of the moshav shittufi, initial settlement form for 
one-third of the 1977 civilian agricultural villages. This 
decline may be linked to the increasingly lucrative character 
of Winter crop production in the Rift, the proportion 
designated for export rising from 20% in the early 1970's 
to 80% in 1977"(17) As income prospects expanded there 
was a growing desire amongst settlers'for independent small- 
holdings, rather than for collective farming, so that a"family 
might be free to make-as much money as possible on its own 
account. In 1977 moshavim accounted for a majority-of the 
civilian agricultural'villages (8 out of 15, table 8: l) - as 
opposed to the'Golan where they were greatly outnumbered by 
collective settlements (only -6 out of 22, table'7: -2 ). Apart 
from the income consideration, the terrain and soils'of'the 
Jordan Valley and adjacent mountain basins have generally. 
enabled enough workable land to be accumulated in the imm--'' 
ediate vicinity of living quarters for family farming to be 
a viable option. 
Another trend evident in 1975 -'77 was''Vthe'founding 
of several non-agricultural sites, with several purposes. 
First, the village settlement process had reached 
a point which both enabled and required the establishment 
of area centres, to furnish social and economic services. 
Here the most significant project is Ma'ale Efraim, intended 
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as a central focus for the region north of Jericho. Det- 
ailed plans call for a regional secondary school, -'shopping 
facilities and municipal services, as well as light industry 
to support additional population. The project has been 
located in the hills (figure 63 ) for climatic reasons - 
to avoid the heat of the Valley floor. In addition to 
Ma'ale Efraim, where 50 dwelling units were under constr- 
uction by late 1977, work also began on two small unpopul- 
ated centres, designed to provide economic services for the 
agricultural settlements (e. g. machine repair sheds, spare 
parts stores) - one for the Petzael Valley concentration 
and one adjacent to Hamra, for the far north. 
(18) 
A second objective was to create a base for more 
rapid population growth by extending urban - industrial 
development. This role takes in Ma'ale Efraim,.. Ma'ale 
Adumim and Qiryat Arba', all in the mountain line. Ma'ale 
Adumim (Allon's Upper Jericho), for example, has a number 
of functions - to add to the general Jewish presence in the 
Rift, to take industry away from the immediate surrounds of 
Jerusalem, to guard the eastern approaches to the capital, and 
to establish access and a Jewish controlled territorial link 
between central Israel and the Rift. I+ received Government 
approval in November 1974, though no settlers arrived until 
December 1975, when an unauthorized Gush Emunim group camped 
on a neighbouring hill-top; and only in 1977 did work start 
on constructing the first industrial plants. Initial plans, 
drawn up before the October War, had a grandiose flavour, 
calling for an industrial estate containing 700 enterprises 
and employing 14,000 people. 
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Such forced accelerationýin the growth rate of.., 
the Rift settlement system entailed some problems., In ,, 
particular rapid population expansion °in the village sector 
could often only be achieved by importing people who'had. 
not undergone any preliminary preparation. .; _- 
Youth movements cannot-mobilize settlement candidates 
on a large scale; -- absorption of new, settlers in the 
settlements today lacks the natural selection that used 
to operate in the preparation of youth groups -- in the 
existing method such a process comes into existence in 
the settlement itself and so turnover of members is 
higher than desirable. (19) 
Furthermore. it was, recognized, that. even with the 
acceleration the total Jewish population-of-the Rift still 
amounted to only c. 15% of the"Arab population"and_thatthe 
fall-in migration into Israeldid not, bode well,, for the 
future "-- growth must come from migration from other 
regions. Today it is difficult to foresee that the immi- 
"(19) gration of the 1970's will bring crowds to Rift settlements. 
III. Jews and Arabs : Resource Conflict 
A major consideration guiding the Cabinet, when 
it gave the Allon'Planfor the West Bank precedence over 
Moshe Dayan's, Plan, suggesting blocks of Jewish settlement 
in the densely'pöpuläted-Highlands, was` sensitivity 
concerning the massive conflict over land and water 
resources which would most certainly eventuate if the 
Dayan Plan became ' operational. 
(20) The advantage of the 
Jordan Rift as a locale"for colonization arose not'just 
from the strategic argument but also from the fact that 
extensive areas seemed to lie open to Jewish settlement 
without entailing friction with the local population. 
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Even in the Rift, however, ownership problems soon emerged 
regarding both land allocation andithe use of-water sources. 
The, situation, though not as potentially serious as that 
on the West Bank. Highlands, differed from, the Golan Heights 
case in that the residual Arab population was both larger 
and more dispersed; villages and individuals on the 
Highlands'also having extensive rights within the Rift. 
No "clean slate" existed here. 
(fl . Beyond-the domain owned and worked by Arabs 
still resident on ; the West Bank after. June 1967, -which in 
1975 covered the relatively restricted areas depicted in 
figure 6.4- ("Arab working lands") the Israeli Government 
saw four types of domain as being potentially available 
for Jewish colonization: 
a) lands which had been under the jurisdiction of 
the Jordanian Government, and which thus passed directly 
to the Israeli military administration (henceforth termed 
'government lands') 
b) lands 'owned by persons who fled to the East Bank 
during or after the June 1967 war, which also passed to the 
Israeli military administration in its capacity as; "cust- 
odian of absentee property. " 
c) lands without any owner. 
d) mountain lands belonging to villages situated: 
to the west of the Rift strip, but only cultivated in 
years of good rainfall. 
The most valuable tract of government land was in the 
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Petzael Valley, where 14,400 dunams of fertile soil 
provided an agricultural base for five settlements 
(figure 64 ), while "lands without any owner" were prom- 
inent south of Jericho, in the territory used by Qalia and 
Mitzpe Shalem. 
During the Labour, decade (1967 - 1977) land 
conflict in the Rift had two-chief dimensions. To begin 
with Israeli and Arab perceptions of the categories des- 
cribed above differed markedly, particularly concerning 
government and absentee lands. What Israel viewed as 
government property, in strict legal terms justifiably, 
the Arabs frequently used as 'common', whether for past- 
urage or other purposes. -Hence even 
here the Israeli 
intrusion sometimes displaced a pre-existing Arab presence. 
Absentee lands caused greater problems. Israel's use of 
the fact that owners resided outside the West Bank as an 
opportunity to take their lands for. colonization purposes 
tended tobe fiercely resented by the Arabs, while 
Israel's official stand that "the State has full right to 
lay its hands on absentee tracts" 
(20) 
was clear and firm 
throughout. 
11 11 "1 
In addition, in'the Samarian mountain basins - 
and on. the Valley -floor north of Damiya Israel had little 
option but to secure Arab private lands if enough workable 
tracts were to be accumulated to provide a viable base for 
Jewish agricultural villages. The Settlement-Department's 
tactic here was to offer an exchange of government and/or 
absentee property for the desired private tracts, a 
process termed "land concentration". This would either 
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take place entirely within the Jordan Rift, or, where a 
Highland village beyond the Rift strip owned territory 
within the strip, absentee property outside the Rift would 
be offered. 
It is true that absentee lands belong, in the final 
analysis, to someone= but in the concentration of 
about 15,000 dunams (i. e. throughout Judea and 
Samaria) out of hundreds of thousands belonging to 
the villages the State of Israel is executing a plan 
vital to its security and its existence - the barrier on the Jordan --- (absentee) lands are given to Highland villages and in exchange areas are taken (20) 
on the (eastern) fringes at the rate of one for three. 
The main effort of the official in charge of abandoned 
and government property in Judea and Samaria is now 
directed to the finding of additional tracts on the 
first level going down from the Highlands to the 
Jordan Valley, in concentrating and acquiring 
lands. All tracts found and concentrated up to the 
present have been handed over to the Settlement 
Department -- the official in charge of government 
property on the West Bank holds more than 1,000,000 dunams - includes 350,000 dunams of unregistered (21) desert (and) 328,000 dunams of abandoned property. 
Up to 1973 c. 9000 dunams of Arab private lands 
were 'concentrated' for settlement within the Rift 
itself - including 4000 dunams in the Mehola area, 1600 
dunams in the Bekai. 'a basin and 1800 dunams belonging to 
the village of Aqraba 
(20) (c. f. figure 64). In the 
first two cases the exchanges seem to have proceeded 
without trouble, though also without choice. For instance 
villagers at Tel el Baida, near Mehola, themselves observe 
that the owners were given fair compensation for lands 
(22) 
taken - about the same amount at a similar quality. 
The celebrated Aqraba affair, however, exemp- 
lified Arab-Jewish land conflict in its most severe 
form. 
(23) By 1971, after negotiations with "settlement 
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factors", this Highland village-(figure 64 ) had apparently 
made an informal agreement to hand over c. 5000 dunams in 
the Samarian Wilderness in exchange for all absentee lands 
within the village domain outside the Jordan Rift. It was 
clear from the outset that the Israelis wanted the 
Wilderness tract for colonization purposes and this is con- 
firmed in comments by both the Head of the Settlement 
Department (Yehial Admoni) 
(23) 
and the Minister of Agricul- 
ture (Haim Givatai). The Minister later observed in the 
Knesset that "on a rather long list of additional settlement 
proposals there was also found a proposal which mentioned 
(23) the matter of creating a settlement here" (Tel Tveil). 
Then, in the wake of the 1970 - 71 clearance of 
bedu in the Rafiah approaches to the Gaza Strip and the 
subsequent Israeli public debate over the issue of 
sequestering Arab lands, the Aqraba people had second- 
thoughts about the exchange arrangement and became unwilling 
to proceed. The Ministry of Defence responded by closing 
the whole 5000 dunam Wilderness tract for "military training 
purposes"; an action followed in early 1972 with the dest- 
ruction by aerial spraying of an Aqraba wheat crop located 
inside the new military reserve. These moves evoked 
considerable criticism in the Hebrew Press, but the authorities 
were not deterred. In a night operation on 24 August 1972 
Nahal Gittit established itself on the fringes of the 
closed area, thereafter being allocated 800 dunams for 
agricultural working. The direct and intended effect of 
the military reserve device was thus the expropriation of 
part of the Agraba land for Jewish settlement. 
(24) 1800 
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dunams remained in Israeli hands, the rest (3200 dunams) 
eventually being returned to the village. 
Military reserves also arose in other parts of 
the Jordan Rift with the same long-term intention of 
gathering together territory for colonization - territory 
which could not be readily obtained by other means. One 
prominent example was the Ma'ale Adumim site, where the 
Army closed off 70,000 dunams in October 1972, ostensibly 
to enlarge a firing range but in fact for the purpose of 
erecting a Jewish industrial estate. 
(ii) Despite its largely arid climate the Jordan Rift 
is considered relatively rich in water resources, in part 
because of surface and subterranean flow from the neigh- 
bouring Samarian highlands, where precipitation is 600 
800 m. m per annum; and in part because of a geological - 
structure favouring the storage of large quantities of water. 
It has been estimated that 98 mill. cm. p. a. is available for 
exploitation - 56 mill. cm. p. a. for the Arab sector and 
42 mill. cm. p. a. for the Jewish sector(25) (in total, c. j 
of the amount used by the Jordanian East Ghor canal in 
1975). In 1975 the Jewish sector exploited only c. 20% of 
the potentially available resources (table 8: 2a). 
For several reasons, however, the water. sit- 
uation has been less favourable than such statistics might 
indicate. On the one hand 1975 Arab sector consumption 
already amounted to 73% of estimated potential, which did 
not leave much room for further expansion. Arab water 
usage has been extremely inefficient, with perhaps 
11 mill. cm. p. a. being wasted because of such factors as 
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open canal channels vulnerable to both leakage and evap- 
oration; but complicated tenureship has-. made it difficult 
for the Israelis to institute any major improvement. On 
the other hand, in the Jewish sector it is doubtful whether 
the full 42 mill. cm. p. a. potentially available can in fact 
be exploited, owing to project expenses and water quality 
restraints. In any case, because of the high water demands 
of Jewish agriculture, even the 42 mill. cm. p. a. is not 
enough to enable all suitable lands to be farmed. 
(26) 
In certain localities these conditions - the app- 
etite of the Jewish sector and the fact that the Arab 
network is not far below its supply ceiling - have already 
come together to produce a situation in which Israeli 
pumping has lowered the water-table to the detriment of 
Arab supplies. Figure 65 indicates both the 1975 extent 
of the Israeli water system and the distribution of Arab, 
springs. The juxtaposition of the two patterns in the 
Bardala and Auja localities is to be particularly noted, as 
it was at these places that Arab-Jewish strain first became 
evident. The 1975 Jordan Rift Development Plan observes 
"these (Jewish) bores are liable to harm to some degree 
the flow of springs, chiefly in the Bardala, and Jericho 
areas, as a consequence of the lowering ofthe water-table", 
while the 1974 Water Supply Plan comments concerning the 
Bardala 1 bore that "drawing will cause a partial drying of 
springs which now supply the surrounds. "(27) 
Indeed Bardala, in the far north of the Lower 
Jordan Valley, provided the most acute case of water conflict 
on the West Bank during the Labour years. 
(28) Difficulties 
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began in 1973, when it became apparent that the bore put 
down for the moshav shittufi Mehola was drying up wells 
and springs used by the local Arab villages, especially 
Tel el Baida. In 1975, when Mehola accounted for 40% of 
total Jewish consumption in the Rift north of Jericho, 
Tel el Baida's irrigation sources failed completed. As a 
temporary solution Mekorot, the Israeli water company, 
proposed a diversion of part of the Mehola output, but the 
settlers were hostile, arguing that they were themselves 
30% below their requirement. The result for Tel el Baida 
was two dry seasons in which no crops could be sown, fruit 
trees had to be uprooted and even drinking water had to be 
brought in from the outside. 
IV. Israel in 'the Rift $ Future Planning 
After 1975 Israeli activities in the bulk of the 
Jordan Rift were guided, at least in their broad outlines, 
by two Settlement Department Master Plans - the August 1975 
Jordan Rift Regional Development Plan and the 1974 Master 
Plan for the North-West Dead Sea, Together these covered the 
Valley line from Mehola to Mitzpe Shalem and the northern 
section of the mountain line, the zones of agricultural 
village settlement (figure 6,0,66). The southern section of 
the mountain''line, a zone of incipient urban-industrial 
development, was-partially excluded. Discussion here first 
concentrates on village settlement-nörth of Jericho', and then 
shifts to a brief consideration of the urban-industrial zone. 
i The August 1975 Jordan Rift Plan, covering the 
territory depicted in figure 6-: 4 , envisaged that the 
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population of the northern settlements, c. 550 in 1975, 
would be raised to c. 3300 by 1980 and c. 8000 by 1995" It 
suggested massive investments, the financial input of 
1968-75 being increased by 300% for 1975-80 and by a further 
240% for 1980-95. Existing and projected investment, 
output and employment statistics for 1975,1980 and 1995 
are set out by economic branch in table 8: 2. The most 
important feature of these statistics was that they evid- 
enced. a clear determination greatly to intensify settlement, 
a determination undiminished in late 1977 despite Israel's 
constrained economic circumstances. 
Up, to 1995 agriculture. would remain the dominant 
element in the economy of the planning region (table 8s2b). 
Figure 4 shows both the distribution of the lands handed 
over to Jewish settlements by 1975 (36,000 dunams) and. the 
projected expansion of this domain (24,000 dunams).. Compar- 
ison with figure .5 
indicates the close correlation with 
tracts of reasonable soils, principally alluvium, outside 
the Arab private domain (itself under pressure in some 
localities). In 1975 areas actually being worked encompassed 
only 19% of the Jewish sector territory and hence, unlike 
the Golan, there remained considerable room for expansion. 
Particularly high hopes were held for the export 
of Winter and early Spring vegetables (e. g.. egg-plants, peppers, 
melons, onions), which could be 
-grown up 
to 50 metres above 
sea level in the natural hot-house environment of the Valley 
floor. This would provide valuable foreign exchange for 
the hard-pressed Israeli balance-of-payments and so, for 
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easier access, work was begun after 1972 on a road to give 
a direct connection between the Petzael area and Ben Gurion 
international airport at Lod, running across central, 
Samaria. 
Mountain basin villages, where Winter temperatures 
are 4°C or more below the Valley averages, "could not share 
in the early crop business, and had to be based on somewhat 
different agricultural foundations. Here the 1975 Plan 
proposed industrial crops (e. g. peanuts), olives, grapes, 
deciduous and citrus fruits (e. g. grapefruit), and livestock 
production. No dramatic climatic advantage for agriculture 
existed in the mountains but, as perceived strategic 
necessities made mountain villages vital, agricultural 
branches had to be found to underpin their economies regardless 
of environmental conditions -a clear contrast to the Valley 
floor situation where, as time passed, agricultural economics 
took greater and greater precedence over military require- 
ments. 
One major intention was to postpone industrial 
village construction in the planning region for as long as 
possible, to await the outcome of industrial settlement 
experiments at Tefen in the Galilee. 
ý29ý This could be 
afforded because pressure to find alternatives to agriculture 
for continued village colonization were not as urgent as 
on the Golan. Nonetheless the 1975 Plan recognized the need 
for non-agricultural projects in the planning region if 
mass colonization were to be achieved. In the long-term, 
agriculture could not support more than 8,000 people; and 
owing to the water supply constraint, could not use more 
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60% of the available land. 
Comparison of the size of the region (1.5 million 
dunams) with the area of the state (21 million 
dunams)"and its Jewish population (3 million).. raises 
the possibility and the necessity of increasing the 
Jewish population above that suggested herg , by 
urban development dependent on neutral (30) industry 
and services -- this also as a balance against the 
Arab population, numbering today more than 20,000 -- 
the directions given to the planning team restricted 
the frame to village settlements only -- necessary to assume that in future there will be a place for 
planning urban settlements. (31) 
ii The non-agricultural presence, on which work 
commenced in 1976 - 77p was to be located in the mountain 
line from Ma'ale Efraim southward, comprising part of the 
urban-industrial zone indicated in figure . 66 . Here, 
between Ma'ale Efraim and Qiryat Arba', possibilities for 
agriculture or tourism. were almost non-existent and 1977 
activities had more in common with. Qatzrin and-associated, 
developments on the Central Golan then with the village 
system in the` rest of the Rift strip. 
Inthe part of the zone covered by the 1975 Plan 
two projects were proposed - the regional centre at Ma'ale 
Efraim and the Kokhav ha Shaher block of settlements, to 
include a moshav and, after 1980, two industrial'villages. 
Ma'ale Efraim was expected to reach a population of 400 by 
1980 with a further 240 people in the Kokhav ha Shaher block. 
It was a tentative beginning and neither project ranked in 
scale with the ideas put forward for Ma'ale Adumim and Qiryat 
Arba'. Furthermore the Kokhav ha Shaher block in particular 
did not lack critics, who were sceptical about it ever " 
becoming anything more than an additional commuter belt for 
greater Jerusalem. 
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The purpose of this Chapter is to examine 
general trends in occupied territory colonization from: 
the October 1973 War to October-1978, using: -the analytical 
framework outlined in. Chapter 6 and developed-in the Golan 
case study. 
Three distinct phases may be detected in the 
periods 
a) an immediate post-war phase when settlement 
activity, especially new site establishments (table 9,1), 
slowed down considerably. 
b) the final two years of`Labour rule, when a 
massive'acceleration'in development occurred, leading to 
an unprecedented expansion of the settlement system. - 
c) the first sixteen months of Likud rule, which 
brought new dimensions to official settlement policy, in 
both geographical and ideological terms. 
I. The October Trauma 
Shock and recrimination characterized the months 
following the October War. Although Israeli public 
opinion was highly confused and it is difficult to draw 
simple conclusions. as-to the effect of the hostilities on- 
Public attitudes, it seems clear that the-, early Arab 
successes and the collapse of the Golan settlement system 
temporarily-sapped confidence in_the efficacy of defensible. 
boundaries and the-associated colonization policies. 
Fears expressed by Golan settlers that national support 
for their position had declined are discussed in Chapter 7 
and Appendix VIII. 
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Certainly within the ruling Labour-Mapam Align- 
ment November and December 1973 saw a considerable protest 
movement amongst the lower echelons, aimed against occupied 
territory policies, as well as against. individuals seen as 
responsible for mistakes connected with the wart particularly 
r 
Moshe Dayan. The view of one member of a Labour party 
group terming itself 'Etgar'. (Challenge) represented an 
opinion widespread amongst dissenters i "until the war I 
accepted what was said - that borders guaranteed. peace. 
We were wrong and now need to try a newpath. "(1) 
In early December, reflecting the criticism, the 
Labour leadership drew up a new policy statement to take 
precedence over the pre-war Galili Document. -This Fourteen 
Point Document laid much heavier stress on efforts for 
peace, mention of settlement being reduced to one extremely 
vague passage $ there would be action'to "strengthen and 
continue settlement and colonization according to Govern- 
ment decisions from time to time, giving precedence to 
security considerations. " 
(2) 
To some extent the shift in 
emphasis and the less specific content amounted, . 
in the 
view of the author, to window-dressing -. to preserve party 
unity and to give Israel a flexible international image for 
the projected Geneva peace talks. As has, been pointed out 
in Chapter 7 the Cabinet had only three weeks earlier 
(11 November) approved an urban centre for the Golan Heights, 
and for most Ministers the war had confirmed the need for 
buffer zones rather than the reverse. On fundamentals 
the new document explicitly stated that Israel would not 
return to the 1967 borders and that there would be no 
280 
Palestinian state on the West Bank. 
Nonetheless the fourteen points also represented 
an attempt by a powerful minimalist block comprising Sapir, 
Ofer and Rabinowitz to negate the concessions made to Dayan 
and his Rafi faction in the Galili document. Matters came 
to a head on 5 December, when the new statement was 
presented to the Labour Party Central Committee for, 
approval. 
(3) Yigal Allon, presumably unhappy with the 
aggressive explicitness of Galili'. s interpretation, opened 
the main debate by expressing support for the fourteen 
points. The pre-war settlement programme then came under 
extensive criticism from the floor as incapable of bringing 
security, in the light of events, and Sapir went as far as to 
claim that the fourteen points completely cancelled the 
Galili document. He asserted that in any case the more 
constrained financial position following the war made schemes 
like a Yamit port-city impracticable. 
A direct confrontation followed between Sapir 
on the one side and Galili and Golda Meir on the other. 
Golda Meir refused to accept the financial argument, saying 
each project should be considered independently, and she 
demanded a vote on whether or not the fourteen points 
cancelled the Galili document. Sapir, fearful of a party 
split, then backed down commenting that everyone could 
interpret the fourteen points and their relationship to the 
previous statement how they liked. In consequence Golda 
Meir, Galili, Dayan and Peres could, if they wished, regard 
the Galili document as still standing, while the dissenters 
and minimalists could take the opposite view. The vagueness 
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of the fourteen points, finally approved in the early 
morning of 6 December, made either interpretation viable. 
Despite the controversy the real effect of the 
October War on settlement policy was thus minimal, even 
in the immediate post-war period. 
a) The only impact of public disquiet, party 
criticism and intensified international concern was to 
cause the Labour leadership to cloak pre-war policy in 
more conciliatory semantics. Certainly Sapir felt that 
his control of the budget would, in practical terms, enable 
him to eliminate parts of the Galili programme which he 
considered undesirables but within six months he was no 
longer Minister of Finance. 
b) The strategic ideas articulated in the Allon 
Plan survived the war unchanged as the basis for majority 
thinking in the Cabinet. There is no evidence that the 
war altered the various images and convictions held by 
the leading Ministers, except to strengthen them 
(Chapter 7, p. 217). 
c) More difficult financial circumstances and a 
less amenable international environment, together with 
stronger individual opposition to. certain projects by 
minimalist Ministers, indicated that in the short-term 
there would be a slow-down in colonization, regardless of 
general policy. However, because the concepts under- 
pinning colonization remained firmly held by any likely 
Cabinet majority any loosening of constraints imposed 
by post-war external realities promised to open the 
way for renewed and accelerated activity. 
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II Labour in Decline : Official and Unofficial, 
Colonization, 1974-1977 
In June 1974, after the Syrian disengagement 
negotiations, the Golda Meir Cabinet finally resigned, 
paying a delayed price for the mistakes associated with 
the war. Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, Pinhas Sapir and Abba 
Eban retired to the back benches and ,a new leadership 
headed by Yitzhak Rabin (Prime Minister), Shimon Peres 
(Defence Minister) and Yigal Allon (Foreign Minister) took 
control. 
Table 911 provides a guide to the progress of 
colonization through the three years of Rabin's Government. 
Up to mid 1975 few new sites were established-and population 
growth in the settlement system came almost to a halt. In 
October 1973 c. -4000 Jews lived in the occupied territories 
outside East Jerusalem - in February 1975, according to 
one source, the number stood at 4158. 
(4) The reasons for 
the slow-down have already been analyzed in depth for the 
Golan Heights and the responsible external realities and 
political system factors depicted, in figure-54 hold for 
the general situation as much as for the Golan case. 
Detailed circumstances of course varied somewhat from region 
to region.. The 'freeze' was most marked on the Golan and 
in the Jordan Rift, whereas in East Jerusalem and the 
Rafiah area new construction was less affected. The latter 
regions came under less intense American scrutiny in 
1973-75 and Housing Minister Avraham Ofer, hostile to new 
Golan developments, proved an enthusiastic proponent of 
East Jerusalem projects. 
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After mid 1975, in sharp contrast to the 1973-75 
phase, the final two years of Labour rule saw the official 
settlement system expand more rapidly than at any other 
time since 1967. Excluding East Jerusalem, the number 
of sites rose from 53 to 77 (45% increase) and the popul- 
ation involved more than doubled to at least 10,000. 
(5) 
This section attempts to explain the 1975 change, which 
took place in-all the Allon security belts, and examines 
the simultaneous effort by the private settlement movement 
known as Gush Emunim to overturn the geographical limits 
of the Allon Plan and extend Jewish colonization throughout 
the West Bank Highlands. 
M Figure 67 portrays the factors either permitting 
or actively encouraging an acceleration in colonization 
throughout the Allon Plan territories in 1975-76. It may 
be compared with figure 55, which indicates the same 
transition for the Golan alone. Changes favouring an 
acceleration occurred'in both the inner workings of the 
Israeli political system and in the external realities. 
The relevant political system shifts had in fact 
taken place in 197k,. but'were not enough to counteract 
external realities which continued to be seen as unfavour- 
able. They may be divided into three categoriess 
a) Reduction of minimalist stre gth'with the depart- 
ure of both Sapir and Eban from the Cabinet. in June 1974. 
These two senior Ministers had acted as a significant 
balancing -influence against the Rafi faction led by Dayan 
and Peres, especially as Sapir controlled the Labour Party 
machine. Their Place was taken by Ao ham Ofer, but he did 
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not possess equivalent seniority., 
b) Corresyonding gains by Rafi. Like Dayan the new 
Rafi Defence Minister, Shimon Peres, was a vigorous 
proponent of a hard-line settlement programme, going. beyond 
the geographical limits of the Allon Plan; he apparently 
did not share Allon's sensitivities regarding Arab, populated 
areas, conceiving that demographic problems might be 
circumvented by cutting Palestine west of the Jordan into 
Jewish and Arab cantons, with a built-in Jewish majority 
at the 'federal' level. Further, Peres enjoyed a stronger 
position within the Cabinet than had Dayan, partly because 
he had built up a large following among Mapai adherents 
and partly because in 1974 there were fewer strong counter- 
balancing personalities. Bearing in mind the distance 
Sapir had moved to effectively resist Dayan, all this had 
disturbing implications for the viability of the Allon Plan 
on the West Bank. 
c) Maximalism in the National Religious Party. 
The National Religious Party, Labour's traditional partner, 
rejoined the Government in November 1974 after a seven 
month absence. During this period the NRP youth faction, 
headed by Zevulun Hamer and militantly attached to the 
'whole Land of Israel', had gained considerable power at 
the expense of the old leadership. In consequence the NRP 
exerted much greater pressure within the coalition for 
extensive colonization, especially on the West Bank. 
Such shifts meant that the natural balance in 
the Rabin Cabinet, bothcf images and of policies, tended, 
towards more aggressive settlement than hitherto. By 
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early 1975 this tendency was only held in check by Ofer's 
delaying tactics at the Ministry of Housing, by the moderating 
influence of Rabin, Allon and Galili and, above all, by the 
unprecedented American interest in the occupied territories 
between the October 1973 War and the August 1975 Israel-Egypt 
agreement. 
Movement continued through 1975, this time in 
the decisive external realities. Again three types of change 
occurreds 
a) In the domestic political environment. As noted 
in the Golan study, pressure groups championing accelerated 
settlement were gaining increased support both within 
party machines and in public opinion as the October War 
receded into the past. In particular the religio-nationalist 
Gush Emunim gained public prominence by attempting to 
force the Government's hand with unauthorized settlement 
bids from late 1974 onward, primarily on the West Bank 
Highlands. Added to the political system shifts these 
domestic pressures helped produce the beginnings of an 
intensification in official colonization after June 1975" 
b) In the Israel-America relationship. After August 
1975, with the signing of the second Sinai Disengagement 
Agreement, the heavy American pressure on Israel to make 
concessions to the Arabs began to slacken. The Golan and 
Sinai accords stabilized the post-war situation in the 
Middle East for the short-term, thus achieving the 
immediate American objective, and in 1976 the Presidential 
election campaign gave Israel greater leverage within the 
United States, due to the significance of the American 
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Jewish community. America also became diverted by other 
foreign policy issues in 1976-77, such as the Lebanese Civil 
War and Southern Africa. All this was decisive for Israel's 
official settlement policy because it removed the major 
block, both actual and perceived, (ref. p229)to accelerated 
colonization. The Government now saw its chance to 
implement new programmes without intervention from Washington, 
for the first time in two years, and thus proceeded to act 
with great speed. 
c) In the activities of the Arab States. A surge 
of Arab support for the PIA after the October 197+ Rabat 
summit, at which responsibility for the West Bank was 
transferred from King Hussein to Yassir Arafat, caused a 
strong reaction in Israel which further strengthened the 
hard-liners and reduced the credibility of minimalism on 
territory and settlement. The Government viewed events from 
Arafat's U. N. speech (13 Nov. 1974) to the General Assembly 
vote equating Zionism with racism (Nov. 1976) as a diplom- 
atic campaign aimed at Israel's isolation and as a series of 
provocations which required answers in the domain of 'fact 
creation'. The direct relationship between the Syrian 
sponsored Security Council debate on the Middle East 
(Jan. 1976) and new Golan settlement has already been 
remarked upon. 
Thus by late 1975 all six 1974-75 changes were 
operating together and, with the Rabin Government holding, 
a more militant world image than its predecessors (figure 
67) 
little now stood in the way of a massive building effort 
in the occupied territory security belts. In 1974 and 
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the first half of 1975 residents moved into 5 new sites 
(civilian and paramilitary), compared, -with 14 for 
June 1975 - December 1976 and 8 for'the last five months 
of Labour rule. 
(6) 
Acceleration on the Golan and in the Jordan Rift 
has already been discussed. 
In the Rafiah approaches Yamit provides partic- 
ularly striking illustration of the transition. Through 
1974 and early 1975 little was done beyond some site 
preparation. Then, in Summer 1975 the Ministry of Housing 
upgraded Yamit from a 'regional centre' to a town, 
(7) 
designed for a population of 25,000, to be achieved in 
several stages. Thereafter construction quickly moved ahead; 
the first settlers arrived in October 1975 and by mid 1977 
350 housing units had been finished with a further 1000 
either on the drawing boards or in various stages of 
building. The mid 1977 population totalled c. 1500. 
For East Jerusalem the increase in activity was 
less marked, as work had not been constrained during the 
slow-down. Construction concentrated on consolidating the 
suburban ring, work commencing on the southern are com- 
prising Gilo and East Talpiot in 1973-74 and with simul- 
taneous new building starts in the north at Ramot and Neve 
Ya'agov (figure 37). After 1975 the scope broadened with 
discussion of several plans to 'thicken' Jerusalem by 
establishing Jewish suburbs beyond the annexed area, perhaps 
to form an outer ring. In one version (Ministry of 
Housing (8)) it was proposed to erect urban estates at 
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Giv'on (near. Ramallah), Ma'ale Adumim and, Efrat (near 
Bethlehem) (figure 37) - an obvious extension of Dayan's 
1973 suggestions (Appendix VI). Another version (Israel 
Lands Administration (9)) proposed major developments in 
the Allon zone between Ramallah and Latrun, to'realize 
the long-standing intention to widen the Jerusalem corridor 
on its northern side (figure 36). None of these plans 
advanced. beyond the-drawing-board under the Rabin Govern- 
ment, -presumably impart because-of the-financial and 
demographic constraints to be discussed in-the next 
, section, 
(p. 302 ). 
It should be noted that all official develop- 
ments and proposals. for 1975-77 continued, to respect the 
ideas set. out in-the Allon Plan, and only in the western 
foothills of Samaria can an. extension of Allon's geograph- 
ical limits be detected (compare figure 38 with figure 39)" 
The extension had been foreshadowed in the Galili Document 
(Appendix VIc, P.. ref. to 'Q"algilia'Jand Tulkarm areas). 
During the same period, however, the entire official, 
concept was under strong pressure from the Gush Emunim 
movement, which twice successfully defied the Government 
through the planting of unofficial settlements outside the 
Allon/Galili belts. 
(ii) Gush Emunim (block of the faithful), a settler 
pressure-group founded in February 1974 by young 'whole 
Land of Israel! enthusiasts from the National Religious, 
Party, aimed to reestablish a Jewish presence throughout 
the densely populated West Bank Highlands, core of, biblical 
Israel. This goal automatically put the Gush in conflict 
with the Rabin Government, whose settlement policy 
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specifically avoided the Highlands on: demographic 
grounds (p. 172 ). Even so, by hard work within the. political 
system and by exploiting deep religious and nationalist 
sentiments emotionally shared by'many, Israelis, including 
senior Ministers, the Gush was able progressively to subvert 
the Government's stand. Figure 67 indicates the position, 
of Gush Emunim-in the author's model of the post 1975 
transition towards more rapid and extensive colonization - 
as'a group external to the political system and acting 
unilaterally, yet also seeking to manipulate the system. 
On a broader stage the Gush played-the same role performed 
by the'GSC on the Golan Heights (figure 54). 
Three matters are considered here .o 
historic- 
antecedents, - the Gush as a reaction to the October War, and 
the character and impact of the illegal settlement attempts 
in Samaria from late 1974 onward. ' 
Gush Emunim united a religiIous dogma with a 
secular vision. On the religious plane it held to the view 
propagated by Jerusalem's Merkaz ha Rav Yeshiva, headed by 
Rabbi Tsvi Yehuda Kook, that the Zionist return to Eretz 
Yisrael represented the beginning of the Messianic redemption 
of the Jewish people. Colonization of the biblical heart- 
land of Judea and Samaria was thus a religious duty, which 
even took precedence over peace with the Arabs. Furthermore 
in the secular sphere the Gush strongly emphasized the hist- 
oric right of the Jewish people to the 'whole Land of Israel', 
so linking with the Whole Land of Israel Movement. 
As already noted in Chapter 6 these convictions 
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pre-dated the founding of the state and had long been strongly 
held by many in Herut, the largest opposition party, in the 
NRP, and even in the Labour movement. Between 1967 and 
1973 the chief effort of the religious fundamentalists and 
the 'whole Land of Israel' adherents had been devoted to',, -'' 
two projects in Judea, south of Jerusalem -'the re-building 
of the-Etzion settlement block and the re-establishment 
of"the Hebron Jewish community (Qiryat Arba'). With some-" 
judicious line-drawing both could be reconciled with the 
Allon'Plan (figure 36), being located on the peripheries 
of the local Arab population concentrations, and by 1973 
both seemed securely rooted. 
Gush Emunim crystallized out of this background 
as a reaction to the October 1973 War and to the threat 
the post-war disengagement negotiations appeared to pose 
to the 1967-73 status quo. 
(10) 
Israel's territorial retreat 
in the first agreement-'with Egypt (Nov. 1973) was viewed 
by religio-nationalist elements as opening the way to 
withdrawal even--inJudea-Samaria, an eventuality winch had 
to be vigorously resisted. Qiryat Arba' and Gush Etzion 
settlers were particularly concerned and Gush Emunim arose 
largely at'their initiative, the founding convention being 
held at Kfar Etzion and a disproportionate number. -of the 
leading personalities coming from Judean, settlements, for 
example Rabbi Moshe Levinger (Qiryat Arba') and Hanan Porat 
(Kfar Etzion). The purpose was to carry the settlement 
process into the Arab populated areas of Samaria, largely 
excluded from the official programme, and to create facts 
as rapidly as possible to block any concession on Bretz Yiarael. 
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At first the Gush operated entirely within the 
political system, building up its position in the NRP 
through the youth faction, which it controlled. The youth 
faction had in January 1974 induced the NRP leadership 
to demand, as a condition for joining the Government, that 
there be no decisions on returning territory in Judea and 
Samaria without new elections, a condition which the 
Labour Party accepted. Thereafter the Gush and its sympath- 
izers, championed by Zevulun Hamer (Minister of Social 
Welfare in the Rabin Cabinet), gradually gained a dominant 
voice in the NRP, also receiving considerable support from 
the opposition Likud alignment and, of course-from the Whole 
Land of Israel Movement, which possessed a substantial 
following in the Labour Party. 
After June 1974 the Gush began to take direct 
action on the ground in Samaria. Early settlement attempts 
generally ended in removal of the squatters by the army 
but from 1975 onwards there were several major successes. 
Although only small numbers took part in these ventures 
the public impact of defiance of a divided and vacillating 
administration had by 1977 made official 'limited' 
settlement an object of derision. 
Three cases may be used to illustrate the progress 
of unofficial colonization attempts in the Sama'ian 
Highlands (figure 69) - 
a) Alon Moreh,, (Qaddum). The most significant Gush 
effort was that aimed at planting a Jewish settlement in the 
vicinity of Nablus, to be named Alon Moreh. At first the 
Government stood firm and used the army to remove Gush 
6 
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plantings within twenty-four hours of their establishment, 
as at a military camp southaof Nablus (5-6-74) and at a 
disused railway station to the east (26-7-74). The settlers, 
however, proved persistent and on 30 November 1975 tried 
yet'again at Sebastiya, a biblical site two kilometres 
north of. the Nablus-Tulkarm highway (Shomron in figure 69). 
By this stage they had greatly increased their influence 
within the political system, benefiting from the same 
domestic and external shifts encouraging the acceleration 
in official colonization (figure 67) - for instance tacit 
support now came from, among others, Defence Minister Shimon 
Peres. As a result the Government hesitated, being 
divided, on what action to take, and ultimately used the 
army only'to move the-settlers from Sebastiya, where they 
had incurred the-hostility of surrounding, Arab villages, to 
the nearby Israeli military camp at Qaddum, where they were 
less visible (9-12-75). A permanent decision on what to do 
with the group was postponed, in the first instance for 
three months. 
The transfer amounted to a Gush victory, with 
the settlers remaining in-the heart ýof Samaria, and : the -< , 
matter produced sharp dissension in the Government through- 
out 1976. On one side Allon, Galili, Rabinowitz and Ofer, 
along with Rabin himself, viewed the situation as making 
a mockery of Government policy, while on the other the 
Gush were protected from expulsion by Peres and the NRP 
Ministers, the latter hinting that they might leave the 
coalition. 
(11) 
Al. lon and Peres clashed sharply overt,, 
Qaddum at a Labour Alignment session in March 1976 
(11) 
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and Appendix IX gives the text of a stormy 5 August Cabinet 
discussion, as 'leaked' to, Yediot Ahronot. Meantime 
various Ministries, presumably with authorization from 
higher levels, openly assisted the settlers to consolidate 
their position. 
---branches-of'the-Prime Minister's office, of the 
Ministries of Defence, Labour, Transport, Health 
and Interior, and of the Jewish Agency, are party to 
what is being done at Qaddum - and not in secret. One specific cases an enterprise at one of the Jordan Rift settlements has for years been producing metal 
products for the defence establishment; members of the settlement are supporters of Qaddum and the 
enterprise decided to sub-contra. Qt to Qaddum -- the Defence Ministry gave its approval, once it emerged that this action was in full compliance with the Cabinet's first resolution on Qaddum--(12) 
The Defence Ministry also provided the Gush caravan cluster 
with electricity and piped water and by December 1976 the 
number of settlers had grown to 200. It was now clear 
that the Government either could not or would not remove 
the outpost, and that a Qiryat Arba' style fait-accompli 
had been created in the Nablus district. 
b) Ofra. This settlement was important in-two 
respects s it marked the beginnings of Gush Emunim intrusion 
into the Ramallah district (south Samaria) and represented 
the first case of open assistance from the Defence Ministry, 
the most powerful arm of Israel's bureaucracy. The latter 
factor greatly enhanced Gush Emunim's capacity to resist 
its numerous foes and to realize schemes aimed at over- 
throwing official policy. 
Gush success in gaining a foothold inside the 
Defence Ministry became apparent in the early months of 
1975, when members of the Ofra nucleus, who hoped to settle 
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near biblical Ephron (Taibeh), about ten kilometres north- 
east of Ramallah, became employed on 'security work' in 
the vicinity. The 'workers' then arranged with Shimon 
Peres for 'overnight lodging' at a Jordan army camp adjacent 
to the Arab village of Ain Yabroud, shifting into the camp 
on 20 April 1975. Peres had thus permitted a new settlement 
without a Cabinet resolution and even without an inter- 
Ministerial Settlement Committee discussion. He later statcd 
in the Knesset that he had approved the 'overnight lodging' 
after "I consulted with whom I thought it necessary to 
consult". 
(13) 
1 
Although 'overnight lodging' theoretically 
implied temporary rather than permanent status the Government 
made no subsequent move to terminate the settlement and in 
December 1975, after pressure from Zevulun Hamer of the 
NRP, it was even upgraded to a 'work camp'. By December 
1976 Ofra's population had expanded from an initial few 
dozen to 150, additional prefabricated buildings had been 
supplied, several small industrial workshops had been set 
up, and a small orchard had been planted on Ain Yabroud 
lands. 
c) Mesha. Alon Moreh and Ofra were only the 
beginning of Gush Emunim's ambitious master-plan termed 
Tokhnit Yesh (14), for Judea and Samaria. The plan covered 
c. 60 proposed settlements, some already being implemented 
in the Allon Plan areas as official policy, and others, 
like Alon Moreh and Ofra, suggested as violations of the 
Allon Plan. With regard to the latter the next stage was 
to create a presence in West Samaria, in an arc from Jenin 
in the north to Nabi Saleh in the south (figure 69). 
PLATE 21 
Plate 21 
West Samaria - Gush Eiunim hill-top site 
at i esha, Feb. 1978 (bulk of settlement 
on other side) 
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Unilateral implementation began in 1977, with moves to 
establish 'Faris' (February and May) and'Dotan' (May). 
For 'Faris' the Gush wanted to take over a 
Jordanian police station on a hill overlooking the Arab 
village of Mesha. After a discouraging response from the 
authorities 40 members of the 'West Samaria nucleus' took 
direct action, arriving on the site with building materials 
on the morning of 27 February. Initially the Government 
adopted a firm line, flying in troops to evict the squatters 
at noon the same day. However within three months the 
Ministers had given way and on 1 May the Gush returned to 
Mesha, this time with authorization from the Inter- 
Ministerial Settlement Committee. 
III Likud in Power s Fundamentalism and 
Reality 
U In the May 1977 Knesset elections Labour fell 
from power after twenty-nine years of rule. For settlement 
policy, especially as regards the West Bank, the advent 
of the new Likud Government headed by Menahem Begin 
(coalition composition in Appendix II) seemed to mark a 
further major shift within the political system towards an 
unyielding hard line. The romantic religio-nationalist 
drive to redeem the entire historic 'Land of Israel' by 
Jewish colonization, a drive which had posed such a threat 
to the credibility of the Labour Government in its last 
years, now-dominated the apparatus of state. Certainly 
Begin's June 1977 outlook was uncompromisings Judea, Samaria 
and Gaza were not 'occupied' but 'liberated' and there would 
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be no territorial compromise in these areas. On the face 
of it two significant implications for official settlement 
policy followed. 
a) There would be a major extension in the rationale 
underlying occupied territory colonization. Settlement 
based primarily on establishing defensible boundaries in 
thinly populated areas, 'historic rights' only being 
realized where they did not imply absorption of large 
numbers of Arabs, would be superseded by settlement partic- 
ularly aimed at implementing 'historic rights' in areas of 
dense Arab population. In short bible belts would over- 
shadow security belts. 
b) The changed balance between biblical and pragmatic 
considerations would be accompanied by a shift in the 
geographical orientation of colonization. Development would 
no longer be overwhelmingly concentrated on the Allon/Galili 
areas, primarily the Golan, the Jordan Rift, the immediate 
surrounds of Jerusalem and the Rafiah approaches, but would 
take second place to movement into the Samarian Highlands, 
explicitly avoided in the Allon Plan (ref. p. 154 ). 
In fact, however, the first sixteen months of the 
new Government witnessed a more complex juxtaposition of 
seemingly contradictory trends. On the one hand, in 
the first year, legalization of Gush Emunim activity and 
the beginnings of major official colonization programmes in 
central Samaria carried the move toward an increased role 
for religious fundamentalism evident in the Rabin period 
to its logical end-point. Yet against this, with President 
Sadat's 'initiative' and journey to Jerusalem making a 
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separate peace with Egypt, a real possibility for the, first 
time there were signs from late 1977 onward that the new 
Government would be prepared to make significant concessions 
on settlement policy, especially in Sinai. 
,, The reality behind the contradictions was that 
both the forces favouring extended colonization and the 
forces undermining the bases, of settlement policy achieved 
hitherto unprecedented potency simultaneously in 1977-78- 
Figure 68 depicts the balance between these forces and the 
implications of their, joint operation for occupied territory 
colonization. 
Forces pushing toward a continuation of moves 
for extended settlement on the West Bank chiefly comprised 
the entrenchment of religio-nationalist ideology in Israeli 
domestic politics. The composition of the new Government, 
dominated by the revisionist Zionism of Herut. (ref. p. 146), 
graphically represented this entrenchment, although it 
should be stressed that Greater Israel nationalism and 
biblical fervour for 'redeeming' Judea and Samaria were 
not equally shared by all elements in the new coalition 
and that occupied territory considerations were almost cert- 
ainly not a decisive factor in determining the outcome of 
the May 1977 election. 
(15) 
Nonetheless the Begin Cabinet 
had a more hard-line appearance as regards colonization 
than had any preceding Labour administration - in particular 
the new Chairman of the Inter-Ministerial Settlement 
Committee, Minister of Agriculture Ariel Sharon, was an open 
and enthusiastic settlement maximalist, a consideration 
encouraging high expectations and intense political activity 
from Gush Emunim. 
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Forces-acting against colonization programmes 
may be classified into. three groups. 
a) International factors which since 1975 had encour- 
aged accelerated colonization were in 1977 again become a 
restraining influence. First the new American administration 
took an early interest in the Middle East and began an uncom- 
fortable probe of Israel's intentions concerning the 
occupied territories just as the Likud came to office. 
Second secret contacts with Egypt in late 1977, culminating 
inýPresident Anwar Sadat's sensational November journey 
to Jerusalem seemed to indicate the best ever chance for 
achieving an agreement with the Arab World's largest state. 
Intensified American concern, leading toward the 
Camp David summit meeting of September 1978, possibly 
reflected anxiety held both by Washington and conservative 
Arab states (principally Egypt and Saudi Arabia) regarding 
a significant strengthening in 1977-78 of the Soviet Union's 
position on the eastern, western and southern flanks of the 
Middle East - in Afghanistan, Libya, Ethiopia and South 
Yemen. Certainly from the American viewpoint constructing 
a strong and stable Middle East core to safeguard western 
oil supplies was becoming a more urgent requirement and the 
Arab-Israeli conflict stood as the main block to this goal. 
It seemed America could less and less afford to continue 
treating such destabilizing elements as accelerated Israeli 
settlement across the 1967 borders with the same neglect 
evident through the whole preceding decade, only excepting 
the aftermath of the October 1973 War. 
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The interests of the Egyptian Government, 
perceiving its domestic difficulties to be greatly accent- 
uated by the economic burden of the confrontation with 
Israel and fearful of Soviet advances, were also in a 
stabilized Middle East core and hence in peace with Israel. 
Yet as a minimum for his own people Sadat had to have a 
full Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, a vital aspect being 
the dismantling of the Rafiah settlements (figure 39), as 
well as some West Hank. arrangement which could pave the way 
for eventual participation by other 'core' states, partic- 
ularly Jordan. In launching his 'peace initiative' Sadat's 
strategy was presumably to expose the more rigid dimensions 
of Likud policy, its stand on colonization being one of 
the foremost examples, and to place the Americans in the 
position of having to intervene decisively if 'such rigidity 
threatened to bring Israel-Egypt negotiations to a state of 
collapse. It may be hypothesized that Sadat was aided here 
by the 1978 turmoil in Iran and on the Middle East 
peripheries, which added to the crisis atmosphere created 
by the apparent failure of the 'peace initiative' to lead 
anywhere but deadlock by August 1978. In any, case at this 
point the Americans had little option but to. make their own 
'rescue' move by calling the Camp David summit at which 
they became, in Sadat's terminology, a 'full partner' in 
the Israel-Egypt negotiations. This may turn out to be the 
chief significance of the accords reached at the summit - 
Sadat's achievement of a full commitment of the power and 
prestige of the American Presidency to the success of the 
peace process. Never before had any American President 
. remotely approached 
the investment of personal time and 
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effort in the Arab-Israeli problem that Carter made at 
Camp David. The likelihood now existed that the Americans 
would take an unprecedentedly unfavourable view of continued 
Israeli settlement activities which might threaten. the 
Presidential investment. 
--b) The majorsinternational shifts of 1977-78 played 
a direct role in'stimulating intensified reflection within 
Israel on-the ideological' basis of settlement policy, 
whether strategic or religio-nationalist.. Here Sadat's.. visit 
to Jerusalem was crucial, as for the first time and, in a 
highly dramatic way, it, made the choice, between absorbing 
land and achieving-peace a practical rather than, an academic 
matter for a wide body of Israeli opinion., War-weariness 
suppressed since 1971, at least at the public level, 
resurfaced strongly and colonization moves that had before 
mid 1977 been acquiesced in by many simply because there had 
seemingly been no-one to talk to on the Arab side quickly 
came under more critical scrutiny. The re-assessment could 
be detected at two levels= 
1) Amongst the wider public the emergence of the 
'Peace Now' movement in early 1978 expressed an amorphous 
but widely felt view that Herut and Gush Emunim claims 
for a Greater Israel west of the Jordan should not be allowed 
to become an irremovable obstacle to successful Israel-Egypt 
negotiations. By September the Movement had grown to a 
point at which it could mobilize'a demonstration with an 
estimated attendance of 100,000 on the eve of Begin's 
departure for the Camp David summit. 
i 
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2) Within the Government continued extension in col- 
onization after the Sadat visit provoked division and a 
conflict of images between pragmatists and dogmatists in 
the various coalition factions, even in Herut and the NRP. 
Perhaps the most notable new pragmatist was the Herut Deputy 
Leader and Defence Minister Ezer Weitzman, who established 
an early personal rapport with Sadat and viewed provocative 
settlement foundings during the negotiations with mounting 
impatience 
(16) (for further discussion see P. 327). 
Some qualification should however be made when 
discussing the domestic debate. First despite the dissension 
it should be remembered that by 1978 irredentist religious 
nationalism regarding the West Bank had become more deeply` 
embedded both on the land and 5n Israeli political life than 
at any time since 1967 and that, in contrast to the issue 
of strategic settlement in North Sinai, the future of Israeli 
colonization on the West Bank after the Camp David summit 
thus remained highly indeterminate, with no visible national 
consensus in favour of settlement disbandment. Certainly 
there were indications by mid 1978 that the new atmosphere 
created by direct talks with Egypt might reverse the post 
1967 trend toward more support for hard line territorial 
maximalism and give renewed life to the position that although 
Israel had God-given rights to hold and settle occupied 
territory such rights should be compromised for peace; 
but up to October 1978 the indications remained far from 
decisive. Further, it would even appear doubtful that the 
bulk of opinion in 'Peace Now' is yet ready for a withdrawal 
on the West Bank and the Golan Heights to anything approx- 
imating the 1967 boundaries, especially in view of the 
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support given the movement by prominent Labour figures, 
for example Yigal Allon. Away from Sinai, the easiest 
issue, the central tendency in 'Peace Now' would seem to 
be toward a diluted version of the Allon Plan. 
c) Finally, and of perhaps critical significance 
for the future, , the post 1975 attempts to accelerate 
colonization. made it increasingly evident, whatever the inter- 
national and domestic political factors, that the settlement 
programmes faced serious resource limitations. Above all, 
whether or not, her economic capacity can support a rate of 
colonization much in excess of that pursued by the Rabin 
Government, Israel in 1977-78 came up against the probability 
that she would not be able to find the population to permit 
truly large scale settlement in the occupied territories - 
that in the midst of a large Arab population the whole process 
might well be fundamentally unviable. As noted, even in 
1977 Labour's 77 settlements beyond East Jerusalem contained 
only 10,000 people - c. 130 per site - and this had been 
during a period of considerable immigration, with ä major 
influx of Russian Jews in the early 1970's. Ominously, in 
the year the Likud came to power the number'of immigrants 
(11,336) amounted to only 25.8% of the 1973 figure (43,880), 
expressing a progressive decline throughout the period 
following the October 1973 War, 
(17) 
and there were few 
signs that Israelis living on the coastal plain would be 
prepared to come forward in sufficient numbers to 
compensate 
for the reduced immigrant contribution. After all, despite 
subsidization, shifting to the occupied territories has 
often entailed a drop in living standard 
(1O)iespecially 
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in the initial phase) living in a less pleasant physical , 
environment (the Jordan Rift), distance from urban amenities 
and increased physical and psychological insecurity, either 
because of a hostile surrounding Arab population (Samaria) 
or a front-line location (Golan). The insecurity is 
partially evidenced in the selection of hill-top sites 
(19), 
particularly noticeable on the populated West Bank Highlands 
(plate 21) and in the erection of floodlit perimeter 
fences for settlement outposts. In such conditions Israel 
faced a dilemma : there was little chance that an influx 
sufficient to exceed the West Bank Arab growth rate would 
materialize, from domestic or external sources, while conflict 
with the Arabs persisted, yet the only way to achieve peace 
and remove the disincentive was substantially to abandon the 
occupied territory settlement programme for which the influx 
was needed. 
For the Begin Government, as for its predecessors, 
the danger thus existed that founding. large numbers of new, 
settlements. would, after a certain point, simply-mean lower 
and lower average populations per site, reducing the 
exercise to a farce. As a warning the-consequences of 
financial investment exceeding population capacity were 
already evident in Qiryat Arba' and the East Jerusalem . 
housing estates, where hundreds of. appartments stood empty. 
At Qiryat Arb a' 1977 vacancies amounted to one-third-of 
available accommodation (20) and in Jerusalem, where the 
largest colonization investment across.. the June. 1967 
boundaries has taken place, the proportion of Jews in the 
total municipal population actually fell from 74.3% in 1967 
to 73% in 1975. Against this background worried Jerusalem 
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planning officials have advised that the Defence Ministry's 
proposed outer-ring urban estates, intended to accommodate 
75,000, may simply draw-off people from the capital itself, 
among other things detrimentally affecting the Ramot and 
Gilo inner-ring projects (figure 37). 
(21) 
To conclude, the demographic constraint is a 
decisive external reality and unless it alters calls by 
Sharon and others for new Jewish towns on the West Bank 
are as void of meaning as the original ten-year plan for 
45,000 people on the Golan Heights. The issue is discussed 
further on p. 331 , in general comments concerning the future 
viability of the colonization. 
(ii) In negotiations with Egypt and the United States 
over future-arrangements for the occupied territories the' 
central requirement of the new-Israeli Government; ' as- 
formulated by Prime Minister Menahem-Begin-in conjunction 
with Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan,, has been clear and con- 
sistent throughout the first sixteen months, with little 
apparent alteration as a, result of the-Camp David summit. 
Begin has always had a deep ideological commitment to 
preserving, in some form, the unity of Western Eretz' 
Yisrael, here incorporating metropolitan Israel, the West- 
Bank and the Gaza Strip (i. e. coterminous with-mandatory 
Palestine). Within such a unity civil self-government 
could be rapidly conceded to the Palestinian Arab population 
in Judea, Samaria and Gaza but there were three fundamentals 
on which Israel under Begin would find it almost impossible 
to compromises 
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a) Israel would maintain defence lines in the West 
Bank mountain block and in the Jordan Rift as national 
security insurance against assault from the east. Thus 
although internal security responsibility might be con- 
ceded to Jordan and/or West Bank local authorities conven- 
tional issues of defence and foreign affairs would remain 
under ultimate Israeli control even after a transitional 
period. 
b) Israel would retain settlements throughout the 
West. Bank, above all in the Judean and Samarian Highlands. 
Jews and Arabs would 'live together', the Jewish presence 
being justified by 'historic right' in the ancient core 
of the Jewish homeland. 
c) Jerusalem would remain united under Israeli rule. 
In the author's view the eventual Begin-Dayan 
concept was a radical inversion of the geographical and 
ideological emphases of colonization under the Labour 
Governments. Away from Jerusalem the Labour emphasis had 
been on fixing security belts, principally in the Golan, 
the Jordan Rift and North Sinai, and in avoiding the 
Highlands of Judea-Samaria; in contrast the main thrust of 
Likud settlement policy was towards establishing a presence 
on the West Bank Highlands, primarily for reasons of 
'historic right' (figure 69 demonstrates the inversion). 
To secure recognition of this presence the Labour security 
belts in much of the Golan and the whole of Sinai could be 
used as bargaining counters, to be 'sold-off' if this would 
bring agreements with Egypt and Syria holding out prospects 
of permanence for Israeli settlements in Judea-Samaria. 
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The evolution of the above approach up to October 
1978 took place in three steps, each permutation being a 
pragmatic adjustment to shifting internal and external 
pressures, but with preservation of the essentials. 
a) The first development was the formal abandonment 
of the Labour concept of a West Bank territorial compromise, 
as represented by the Allon Plan, in favour of Dayan's 
concept of a functional compromise, with Jewish and Arab 
settlement and authority mixed throughout Judea-Samaria 
rather than segregated between an Israeli Jordan Rift Strip 
and an exclusively Arab Highland entity. For the West Bank 
the July 1977 Dayan proposals contained much that was 
similar to the 1968 version (ref. P. 171) - administrative 
self-rule for the Palestinians, with the option of a 
Jordanian link, alongside continued Israeli control over 
security matters, a defence line of Israeli military outposts 
in the eastern mountains and, most significantly, a contin- 
uation of Israeli colonization. For Sinai and the Golan 
there were the first hints of readiness to give up settle- 
ments - in particular the offer of a Golan withdrawal which 
would entail some (unspecified) movement of settlement 
sites. 
b) In late 1977, in the course of the Israel-Egypt 
contacts at Rabat, Jerusalem and Ismailiya additional con- 
cessions on Sinai were made. These became. public in the 
December 1977 Begin Plan. Here Israel offered to restore 
Egyptian sovereignty to the whole Sinai peninsula, up to 
the 1967 international boundary. The offer was, however, 
quickly qualified by a refusal to disband Yamit and other 
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Jewish settlements in the Rafiah approaches (figure 70), 
the idea being that these would remain under de facto 
Israeli military protection, along with the"four Israeli 
air bases in eastern Sinai (the northernmost pair being 
Yamit's largest single employer). The most significant 
shift in the-Israeli position was in southern Sinai where 
the Labour idea of an Eilat-Sharm ash Sheikh'corridor-was 
completely given up and the need to evacuate the settle- 
ments along the-Gulf of Aqaba coast (figure'39). -tacitly 
accepted. 
On the West Bank the Begin Plan refined the 
'functional compromise', suggesting a removal of military 
government in most civilian spheres, Palestinian 'autonomy' 
and discussion of competing claims for sovereignty at the 
end of a five-year transition period. There would be dual 
civil authority for Jewish settlers and Arab residents - 
even triple if Jordan could be involved. Of. course it may 
be questioned whether such an arrangement, implying sep- 
arate but overlapping bureaucracies and inviting contin- 
uous friction (for example over the expansion of Israeli 
settlements) could ever be made to work. 
c) Nine months later the Camp David accords produced 
the ultimate concession in Sinai; depending on a free vote 
in the Knesset Israel would vacate the Rafiah settlements 
and the air bases. The whole east Sinai 'security belt' 
(figure 39) was now abandoned, for a full peace treaty 
with Egypt and the institution of normal inter-state rel- 
ations. At first sight the accords seemed an enormous 
achievement for Israel - agreement with the largest Arab 
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state had been attained while Israel's fundamental require- 
ments in Judea and Samaria had not been at all compromised. 
Full Arab self-administration would be implemented in the 
West Bank and Gaza with negotiations after two years on 
the final status of the areas, but Israel had made no 
detectable retreat from her stand regarding the mainten- 
ance of the West Bank Jewish settlements or on the need 
for a Tzahal defence presence in the Jordan Rift. Liquid- 
ation of the Sinai settlements was a small price for 
public Egyptian acquiescence in all this. 
Concerning the path ahead it may be presumed 
with some confidence that the outlook held by Begin and 
Dayan is quite different from that held by`the Egyptians 
and the Americans. As regards Israel all public utterances 
by the Prime Minister and 'the Foreign Minister both before 
and after Camp David indicate that the Sinai+arrangement 
and adjustment of West Bank details make further concession 
less rather than more likely - that Israel has paid the 
present price not as a first step but as the means of 
obtaining a separate'peace with Egypt to finally cement 
the fundamentals of Israel's position'on the West Bank 
and, if Syria is unwilling to join Egypt, the Golan Heights 
as well. 'In`contrast'the American-Egyptian outlook'woüld 
appear to be that the precedent provided by Israell with- 
drawal in Sinai and -disbandment of Sinai settlements would 
make it easier to accomplish a general and decisive 
erosion of the whole Israeli position in all the occupied 
territories over the coming two to five years. In partic- 
ülar'once-an operating Palestinian autonomous entity, as 
suggested in the accords, is set upon the West Bank and 
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1967 displaced persons begin returning a dynamic will 
have been created that will make the maintenance of the 
Israeli settlement structure in Judea-Samaria virtually 
untenable. 
It seems reasonable to assume that the clash 
between the two outlooks will cause serious difficulties 
between the three parties in the-near future unless, as the 
Israelis may hope, the schism between Egypt and other Arab 
states becomes so deep that it overshadows events in the 
occupied territories and allows the Israeli outlook to 
prevail by default. 
iii Likud colonization in the occupied territories 
between June 1977 and October 1978 comprised several con- 
trasting aspects, reflecting both the contradictions in 
underlying forces and the progress of the general strategy 
outlined above. Labour programmes on the Golan, in the 
Jordan Rift and around East Jerusalem continued but were 
overshadowed by official authorization for increased Gush 
Emunim penetration of central Samaria and the concentration 
of attention on the fate of Israel's presence in the Rafiah 
area.. The central Samaria and North'Sinai questions 
provoked clashes within the Cabinet, especially between 
Agriculture Minister Ariel Sharon and Defence Minister 
Ezer Weitzman, as well as friction between Israel and the 
United States, and such conflict was reflected on the ground 
in the erratic nature of activity, with a tendency for 
sharp alternation between bursts of construction and complete 
halts to expansion (figure 68). 
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a) Samaria 
Gush Emunim viewed the 1977 election result as a 
great victory, removing the last obstacle to comprehensive 
colonization on the Samarian Highlands. Its leaders 
hastened to present Begin with a scheme for the speedy 
erection of 12 new outposts, 10 in populated Samaria. 
(22) 
The Prime Minister proved highly sympathetic but, because 
of the newly intensified American interest and the atmos- 
phere later created by the Sadat 'initiative', he had to 
proceed slowly and with caution. As a result the Gush 
colonies were only approved two or three at a time and 
efforts were made to disguise them as 'army camps'. 
Figure 69 serves as a guide to the subsequent 
activity. In August Alon Moreh, Ofra and. Ma'ale Adumim 
received official sanction and three new sites were approved 
near the western border, though the latter were merely a 
continuation of Labour security belt policy. In December 
Gush Emunim nuclei were permitted to establish Giv'on 
and Beit Horon, again still within the Allon Plan area. 
The major move into the heart of Samaria took place in 
January 1978 when, after a debate in the Knesset Foreign 
Affairs and Security Committee, 
(23) 
the Likud and the NRP 
secured parliamentary confirmation for four additional 
sites already approved by the Inter-Ministerial Settlement 
Committee - Qarnei Shomron, Haris, Tapuah and Dotan. The 
new year also saw outposts arise at Nabi Saleh and Shilo, 
where Gush Emunim extracted permission to make an 'archaeol- 
ogical dig' (plate 22). 
The impetus for the steady spread came from Ariel 
PLATE 22 
Plate 22 
Central Samaria - Gush Emunim 
'archeological diet at Shilo, 
Feb. 1978. 
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Sharon, backed by the Prime Minister. Sharon's objective 
was to establish a. north-south strip of Jewish settlements 
between the Nablus and Tulkarm-Qalgilia areas (on hill-tops 
at some distance from Arab urban centres), along aline. 
from Dotan to Beit Horon (figure-, 69), which. would be 
intersected by an east-west strip through Mesha and Tappuah 
to the Jordan Rift regional centre at Ma'ale Efraim. 
(24) 
The central Samaria road from the Jordan Rift to the Tel Aviv 
area ('Hotzeh Shomron' - 'Samaria bisector'. see p273. ) 
would give the east-west-strip concrete expression in the 
landscape. A large urban centre at Haris, projected to 
achieve an ultimate population of 50,000. would stand at, the 
intersection of the 'cross' (figure 69).. 
Such a framework had major implications ý 
1) Samaria's Palestinian population would be cut into 
four unconnected blocks, separated from one another by the 
Sharon lines, from Judea by aJewish outer ring around 
Jerusalem, and from the outside by theýpre-existing Jordan 
Rift strip. On a West Bank segmented. in this fashion,. it 
would, be difficult to imagine any genuine self-government 
beyond the municipal level being a practical possibility..,. 
2) Because areas affected by the Sharon lines contain 
numerous Arab villages Jewish settlement of the extent`envis- 
aged'could not be°implemented without considerable expropr- 
iation of Arab private lands. Using the fact that much of 
the local terrain is rocky and hence unfit for intensive 
agriculture the Government has made it clear that any land 
not actually cultivated is open for take-over, irrespective 
of ownership. 
(25) For example at Haris, where 5000 dunams 
312 
would be required for the urban estate', few 'government 
lands' (i. e. property not registered as belonging to someone, 
according to Jordanian law) are available and 312 dunams of 
hill-top have already been closed by the standard 'security 
needs' device. 
(26) Similarly an attempt has been made 
to expropriate 200 dunams of cultivated farmland at Nabi 
Saleh, to establish permanent housing for the Neve Tsur 
Gush Emunim colony, though the order has been temporarily 
over-ruled by the High Court in Jerusalem following an 
appeal by Nabi Saleh residents. 
(26) Villagers on the 
Sämarian Highlands naturally fear that the above cases 
merely represent beginnings and that Israel will continue 
to use all available legal devices (technical suzereinty 
over 'mini' farmland 
(27) 
'absentee property', 'military 
reserve', 'waste', lack-of full registration) to acquire 
ever larger portions of their working lands. 
From the outset Sharon's approach aroused great 
controversy, with dissent coming from several quarters. 
1) For some Gush Emunim activists even the Sharon 
policy was not enough. They opposed the idea of keeping 
settlement away from Nablus, viewed the general pace as too 
slow and favoured comprehensive land expropriation. In 
September 1977 one group attempted to outrun the Government 
programme by unilaterally establishing an outpost near 
Jericho. Begin, who did not appreciate the open defiance 
of his authority, had the army eliminate the site. 
2) Defence, Minister Ezer Weitzman disapproved of 
Sharon's methods. He viewed the proliferationof new sites 
during the Israel-Egypt negotiations of early 1978 as 
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particularly tactless and,, in-March, when bulldozers began 
land preparation at Nabi Saleh while he was conducting 
talks in Washington, Weitzman threatened to cut short his 
visit if the work was not stopped. He also opposed the 
dissipation of effort involved in founding numerous tiny 
outposts, apparently preferring; a small number of compar- 
atively large urban estates - similar to Dayan's settlement 
blocks. In May 1978 his Ministry launched a plan for six 
such estates (figures 69 and 37), three in Samaria (Qarnei 
Shomron, Haris, Nabi Saleh) and three as an outer-ring for 
Jerusalem (Giv'on, Ma'ale Adumin, Efrat). Interestingly 
the Jerusalem outer-ring was little more than a restatement 
of suggestions mooted in the, Ministry of Housing under the 
Rabin Government, while the Samarian sites could be inter- 
preted simply as a reduced and concentrated version of Sharon's. 
west Samaria scheme. Thus on the fundamental question-of 
whether the West Bank Jewish presence should survive at all 
the six town plan would appear to indicate that, despite 
his opposition to the activities of settlement enthusiasts, 
Weitzman remained in favour of large-scale colonization in 
the region. It is of course possible that the whole thing 
was simply a political manoeuvre, advanced in full awareness 
of its impracticability. 
3) Comment from the Labour opposition consisted'ofý 
attacks on geographically extended settlement, re-assertions 
of the idea of a West Bank territorial compromise and sharp, 
criticism of the use of 'army camps' and 'archaeological, digs' 
as a front for colonization. Much of this came strangely 
from a party some of whose spokesmen were simultaneously 
asserting that Begin's autonomy plan opened the door for 
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a Palestinian state, which had allowed breaches in, its own 
limited settlement policy in 1975-77, and which had itself 
resorted on occasion-to the 'military reserve' tactic to 
acquire Arab land for colonization (p. 269). Such contrad- 
ictions made-it very difficult to tell where Labour under 
Peres differed from the Likud on substance as opposed to 
" procedure. 
By March 1978 there were', in total, -twelve Gush 
Emunim sites in Judea-Samaria containing c. 2,000 people 
(table 9: 2) compared with four sites containing c. 500 in 
May 1977. Yet despite the expansion the Gush structure 
remained extremely flimsy. First, the population per 
settlement remained low, reflecting the fundamental demo- 
graphic constraint discussed above. Second, the settlers 
were almost. entirely in temporary accommodation, either in 
Jordanian buildings (military, police) or in caravans and 
prefabricated housing. 
(28) 
Third, in economic terms the 
settlements were to a large extent merely commuter outposts 
of Jerusalem and the coastal cities, with many residents. - 
travelling daily to work inside Israel. As such people also 
maintained homes inside, Israel the economic commitment to 
living on the West Bank was not great, in contrast to the 
agricultural settlers on the Golan and in the Jordan Rift. 
The ideological commitment, however, was not to be under- 
estimated and the multiplication of sites had already been 
quite sufficient to introduce yet another exacsrbating factor 
into Arab-Israeli relations, both inside and outside the 
occupied territories. 
The potential problems raised by the Gush presence 
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on the West Bank Highlands were well evidenced immediately 
after the Camp David accords. Presumably under strong Amer- 
ican pressure, the Government agreed to suspend all new 
construction during 'negotiations', Weitzman taking strong 
action to prevent protest moves by religio-nationalist 
zealots from in any way threatening progress toward the 
Israel-Egypt peace treaty. Nonetheless Begin quickly made 
it clear that no commitment had been made to*evacuate any 
settlement and that the freeze would last a mere 90 days, 
settlement expansion resuming immediately thereafter. A 
sharp clash with the Americans seemed inevitable. 
b) Rafiah 
Moshe Dayan played a central role in both the 
creation and abandonment of the North Sinai. settlements. 
In 1973, before Israel's complacent immobilism and her 
illusion of unassailable power were shattered by the October 
War, Dayan had pushed strongly for the development of the 
southern approaches to the Gaza Strip as a huge port-city 
complex (ref. P. 178); in 1978, as Foreign Minister, he was 
apparently instrumental in persuading a reluctant Menahem 
Begin that, painful though it might be, the entire settlement 
block would have to be given up as the price of a peace 
treaty with Egypt. Dayan thus demonstrated considerable 
tactical flexibility in seeking to secure the fundamental 
requirements on the West Bank. 
Right up to the Camp David summit, however, it 
seemed that the Prime Minister's insistence on maintaining 
the Rafiah presence under some sort of de facto Israeli 
control would destroy the chance of a breakthrough in 
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negotiations with Egypt. On any appreciation. of Israel's 
objective national interests this was an absurd situation, 
but it-well illustrated the, psychological. power of settler 
maximalism after ten years of occupied-territory. colon- 
ization. 
Following the Sadat Jerusalem visit and the 
commencement of peace talks Sharon and the Settlement 
Department of the Jewish Agency determined that no time 
should be lost in cementing Israel's hold in the area 
separating Sinai from the Arab populationýof Gaza 
(figure'70). (29) In line with Begin's assertion that 
conceding sovereignty to Egypt did not-necessitate an 
Israeli retreat from the Rafiah settlements Sharon, in 
late December 1977, presented a plan for, '2$ new 'farming 
outposts' to the Inter-Ministerial Settlement Committee. 
The aim was to buttress the colonization, filling gaps 
between existing sites and extending the area of settle- 
ment deeper into Sinai. 
Because the Ministerial Committee could not 
reach a decision the matter went to the full Cabinet. 
What then happened is unclear, but Sharon apparently 
extracted limited approval for strengthening existing 
settlements. Putting, a liberal interpretation on this the 
Minister of Agriculture then had the Settlement Department 
begin work on clearing new sites and importing prefab- 
ricated housing, in some cases ten kilometres or more 
beyond existing sites. 
Major. repercussions follows, as the Egyptians 
naturally viewed the activity as Israeli bad faith, 
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especially after the sovereignty concession. By February 
1978 the Rafiah activities, prompted by the imminence of 
the Israel-Egypt negotiations, had helped bring those 
negotiations to a standstills an interesting case both of 
how shifts in external political realities can produce 
shifts in action on the land, and how the new action on 
the land can feed back and produce an external reaction 
(figure 68). 
At this stage Weitzman, who feared that the 
political consequences of bulldozer operations might 
damage the new peace hopes beyond repair, acted in the 
Cabinet to have Sharon restrained. His intercession quickly 
brought an almost complete freeze on activity, re-opening 
the door to negotiation in the Summer. 
Two interpretations may be put on these curious 
events between Sadat's Jerusalem visit and the Camp David 
summit. 
1) The brief spurt in construction was stage-managed 
to demonstrate the strength of Israel's position. There 
is, however, no concrete evidence for this hypothesis. 
2) More likely, in view of previous statements by 
Israel's new leaders and indications of the shock caused 
in Likud circles by the later decision to give up Rafiah, 
is that the North Sinai military buffer argument had become 
so seductive that Israel determined to keep the area 
whatever the cost right up to the final days at Camp David, 
only being dissuaded at the last minute by personal pressure 
from President Carter and erosion in Egypt's demands 
regarding the West Bank and Gaza. 
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The decision to evacuate the Rafiah settlements, 
confirmed by an 
S4/120 
majority in the Knesset-on 27 
September and to be implemented over a two year period, 
was little short of an earthquake in Israeli domestic 
politics. Whatever now happened on the West Bank and the 
Golan Heights, the general colonization process had entered 
a new era - the insistence that Israel would never uproot 
a civilian settlement had been broken, cherished and 
deeply held strategic arguments had been painfully comprom- 
ised and 25% of the settlement structure (table 912) 
outside' Jerusalem had been surrendered. 11 To settlers in the 
other territories it seemed like a first glimpse of doom 
and their agitation and fear of impending betrayal were 
amply displayed in the rush of Gush Emunim protest squattings 
and in a descent on Jerusalem to demonstrate and picket 
Government buildings. If the Government-wished to save the 
settlement structure on the West Bank and the Golan from 
major population defections due to despair regarding the 
future the signs were that it would have to act quickly to 
buttress and"expand the colonization once the Egyptian peace 
was safely concluded. 
(iv) In sum 1977-78 has been a year of transition, 
for settlement policy, though the direction of the transition 
is not yet clear. Up to 1977, under Labour, the colonization 
was established and expanded, at varying rates, in all the 
occupied territories without any hint of reversal. 
1977-78, bringing changes in the ideological and geographic 
bases of colonization, the dropping of the Allon-Plan, the 
accord with Egypt, and the decision to abandon the Sinai 
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settlements, ended all that - ironically under a Government 
which began as the most expansionist-minded in Israel's 
history. Looking beyond 1978 there appear to be two 
possible future perspectives 
a) The critical resource constraints, the revolut- 
ionary new American commitment at the heart-of the peace 
process and changes in the main body of Israeli opinion 
occasioned by the new prospects for peace will together 
act to overcome religio-nationalist tendencies and to ensure 
that the precedent set by the loss of the Rafiah salient 
becomes a prelude to a steady withering-away of the settle- 
ment structure in other areas. This outlook'of course 
relies absolutely on the assumption that Jordan, Syria, 
the Palestinians and Saudi Arabia will eventually be per- 
suaded to join negotiations, that American resolve will 
be maintained and that an atmosphere will thus be created 
which makes Israel amenable to security guarantees on her 
eastern front which do not have to rest on holding and 
settling Arab land. 
b) As a warning against excessive expectations the 
alternative is exceptionally bleak for prospects of peace 
in the Middle East. This takes into account the possib- 
ilities that Israel's strategic and religio-nationalist 
arguments for holding her present assets on the eastern 
front (West Bank and Golan) are unbreakable,, that they will 
be reinforced by strong and long-term rejection of the 
Camp David accords by Syria, Jordan and the majority of 
Palestinian opinion and that Egypt's influence and interest 
in events on the eastern front will wane with isolation in 
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the Arab World and'a closer relationship with Israel. 
Here Israel's agreement to retreat from Sinai would be 
merely the prelude to Likud efforts-to reinforce a 'more 
compact West Bank/Golan settlement'structure - in other, 
words following the Begin-Dayan strategy to'its logical 
conclusion. -This may even occur in defiance of America 
and against the risk that Egypt will abrogate-the peace ,.. 
treaty= giving up everything in Sinai has undoubtedly been 
a deeply traumatic personal experience for-Menahem Begin 
and the urge to compensate by vigorous colonization activity 
elsewhere may prove irresistible. Here it is possible, 
given. -sufficient ingenuity, that the underlying demographic 
constraint could be alleviated= the Rafiah residents have 
to be found new homes, a separate peace with Egypt might 
assist. immigration, and increased subsidization and other 
financial devices could be employed to increase the pool of 
potential West Bank/Golan settlers. -_ 
IV.. Settlement Policy , Issues f. for Debate 
In 1978 the landscape and demographic consequences 
of Israeli settlement in the occupied territories varied 
greatly from region to region (table 9*2 and figure 71). 
In the Allon security belts, location of the two case-study 
areas, an entirely new cultural landscape had emerged, with 
Jewish colonists. already. forming a substantial proportion 
of the local-population. .. With regard to the 
Golan Heights 
and the Rafiah salient the new landscape was dominant in 
the Jordan Rift and around East Jerusalem, where the Arab 
presence . remained the major element, it had become 
increas- 
321 
ingly prominent. On the other hand, throughout the areas 
of dense Arab population in Judea-Samaria and: the Gaza Strip 
Israeli colonization remained a mere ripple in an Arab 
sea ia scattering of makeshift Gush Emunim outposts, para- 
military camps and a few villages sanctioned by Labour 
administrations. 
Yet whatever its scale and wherever it was intro- 
duced the Israeli settlement structure in the, occupied 
territories had an exacerbating influence on the Arab- 
Israeli'conflict, the world's most dangerous regional 
dispute, out of all proportion to its-size. Perhaps nowhere 
else has such a smal% process (by 1978 involving c. 40,000 
people - equivalent to 1.3% of Israel's Jewish population 
and c. 3% of the occupied territory Arab population) had 
such potentially serious ramifications for the international 
order. It was here that the true significance of the 
settlements lay, rather than in their local landscape and 
demographic impact. With this in mind the author now con- 
siders two questionsi. the, validity of the military security 
theme which has provided a major part of the ideological 
support for colonization and the broader issue of the 
future viability of settlement policy in the territories 
unaffected by the prospective peace treaty with Egypt - 
the West Bank and the Golan Heights. 
Lia, As already noted (P. 308) Israel's prospective 
withdrawal from Sinai should not necessarily be taken as 
a guide to intentions for the other territories - indeed 
rather the reverse. First, Israel's strategic problem on 
the eastern front is considerably more difficult than in 
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Sinai; whereas no Israeli population centre except Eilat 
lies within 20 km. e°of the 1967 boundary-with Egypt, major 
Israeli population concentrations are immediately adjacent 
to occupied territory on both the West Bank and Golan 
borders. Second, it is to be strongly suspected that the 
Sinai concession, involving some perceived military risk 
and enormous costs in. relocating settlers and military 
infrastructure, has been made with the idea of actually 
improving the tenability of Israel's colonized buffers 
and other settlement structures elsewhere, which are based 
on historical as well as. security arguments. 
On the: eastern front, bearing in mindethe realities 
of small 
, scale, vulnerability of metropolitan territory, 
concentration of force and the, strategically dominant 
position of the West Bank and Golan uplands, it is-difficult 
not to sympathize with Israel's unwillingness to trade a x. r 
military presence and a colonized security zone for demilit- 
arization and other devices not under her direct control. 
Israel appears to fear that, in, a situation where she has 
been reduced to her 1967 boundaries and has turned over the 
West Bank to an independent Palestinian state, she may again 
one day face an emergency. Arab governments and«their 
intentions may change, a renewed desire to eliminate the 
'Zionist entity' may emerge and Israel may face a combination 
of massive conventional assault with guerrilla attacks from 
the West Bank -a combination which, in view of the topo- 
graphic defects of the 1967 lines and post 1967 technolog- 
ical advances in warfare, she might well be unable to handle. 
Further, in the far north, the Israeli population concent- 
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ration contained in the Hula and Tiberias areas is to some 
degree separated from the rest of Israel by steep hills 
and might be easily over-run by a quick thrust from a 
Golan returned to Syria. 
On the other hand, can a colonized buffer on the 
West Bank and the Golan itself grant real long-term 
security? Here there are two major problems-- 
a) The concept of buffers to contain enemy attack 
before it reaches settled metropolitan territory becomes 
a logical fallacy when the buffers themselves have to be 
politically secured by settlement. This particularly 
applies to the Golan where colonization has gone beyond 
establishing chains of rural outposts, which could be 
conceived as components of a defence system, to include 
vulnerable urban development. In such circumstances the 
army's freedom of manoeuvre becomes cramped by the need to 
defend and/or evacuate civilians, just as in metropolitan 
territory, and as a result the buffer in turn needs a 
buffer which, if it is to be anchored by civilian settl- 
ment, needs yet another buffer. The implications have 
been noted by prominent Israelis, for example Levi Eshkol, 
for the Jordan Rift (see P. 126) and Abba Eban, in comments 
on Sinai which could easily be transferred to the eastern 
front. 
There is a versatile range of methods by which (strategic depth) can be achieved - sometimes, but 
not always, by territorial change. The problem can be aggravated if we think of erecting vast population 
centres in Sinai - and then look for additional 
strategic depth to defend them - and so on into infinity or absurdity. (30) 
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b) The absorption of`Arab land and the denial of 
Palestinian aspirations to a truly independent entity on 
the West Bank necessarily involved in strategic and 
'historic rights' colonization mean that the policy almost 
certainly guarantees, "for obvious reasons, endless conflict 
with Israel's eastern neighbours. Regardless of any 
separate peace with Egypt continued settlement on the West 
Bank and the Golan would thus seem to consign Israel to a 
permanent future as a garrison state. Of course, with 
Egypt removed from the equation, the 'garrison' would be 
relatively much stronger, but this does not change the 
essential feature of long-term insecurity - not long-term 
security. 
The chief alternative to strategic colonization 
and a permanent Israeli military presence is comprehensive 
demilitarization on the eastern front, with a near-total 
Israeli withdrawal from occupied territory (including 
East Jerusalem). Proponents (31) argue that this would 
offer a chance of Arab consent and hence of lasting peace 
while at the same time preserving for Israel the defensive 
security position acquired in June 1967, by preventing any 
re-appearance of a substantial Arab military presence in 
terrain dominating metropolitan Israel. Israel's leaders, 
both Labour and Likud, have however been thoroughly 
sceptical of 'demilitarization with international super, - 
vision' as the primary security element in a peace agreement 
for the West Bank and the Golan. First it is pointed out 
that historic experience with the device has not been 
particularly propitious; what for instance became of the 
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demilitarized Rhineland between France and Germany? Second, 
it is easy to see where demilitarization could break-down 
in territories not possessing Sinai's depth, if. Israel's 
eastern neighbours became determined to subvert it. 
Although the bare open terrain of the Jordan Rift means 
few heavy armaments could be smuggled into the West Bank, 
ways could probably be found of infiltrating lighter and 
medium-sized weaponry, including missiles. 
(32) 
Similarly, 
on the Golan a Syrian assault across the demilitarized 
zone, if the zone only comprised present occupied territory, 
might arrive`°at the plateau edge long before substantial 
Israeli forces managed`to push up the scarp from the 
west', 
(33) 
T .. a The author, however, feels that such reservations 
may be outweighed by four basic propositions e 
a) that present Israeli policy almost certainly cannot 
bring peace on Israel's eastern front. 
b) that Israel has, in the Camp David accords, already 
accepted demilitarization to preserve the. Sinai buffer. 
Here, whatever the wider strategy, it is implicitly acknow- 
ledged that, in the new atmosphere-created by peace with 
Egypt,. a colonized security zone like Rafiah,, would become 
redundant, a feature the raison d'etre for which would 
disappear. (34) By definition Israel's own action regarding 
Sinai thus weakens the argument-it continues to put forward 
for the other territories (also, having seen Israel agree 
to disband the Sinai settlements it is improbable that 
Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians will accept anything less 
in their own areas). 
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c) that even the most adventurous administration in 
Damascus or Amman would hesitate to take direct hostile" 
measures against international forces holding lines between 
the two sides, certainly if such forces included a large 
American element. 
d) that any Palestinian state on the West Bank would be 
far more vulnerable to Israeli attack than vice-versa, 
considering Israel's power and the ease with which links 
across the Jordan could be cut. 
(35) 
Argument and counter-argument can of course 
continue at length, but something like comprehensive 
demilitarization, -for all its imperfections, would appear 
the only way of reconciling real Israeli security fears 
with irreducable Arab requirements regarding the return of 
territory on the West Bank and the Golan - including the 
removal of settlements and the restoration of lands 
absorbed by the settlement structure. Demilitarization 
might be combined with a detailed redrawing of the 1967 
boundaries, free civilian movement, a limited continuance 
of Jewish urban settlement on the West Bank under Arab 
rule, and provision for Israeli monitoring stations in 
strategic locations,, for instance the Jordan Rift and 
the Hermon shoulder - but, when this is added to recog- 
nition of the Jewish state, it is unrealistic to suppose 
that Israel's eastern neighbours could agree to anything 
more. 
ii One of the most important questions yet to be 
answered in the Middle East conflict is that of the future 
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viability of Israeli settlement policy on the West Bank 
and the Golan Heights. Here the regional and international 
background is so enormously complex and the possibility of 
unforeseen irruptions so great that any consideration can 
only be tentative and unsatisfactory. Perhaps ' the best 
means of approach is to identify a number of potentially 
relevant factors, examining how each may operate for or 
against a long-term survival. The factors should be seen 
as interacting components of the same general systems 
framework as has been used in analysis up to this'point. 
(figure 68). 
a) The balance of forces in Israeli domestic Politics I 
how might it develoD? 
In the author's opinion Israel's settlement 
policy'has always been chiefly dependent on shifting 
balances of personalities, attitudes and world-images 
within the domestic political system, these as affected by 
shifting domestic and external economic and political 
realities. On such an interpretation three phases may be 
detected' between 1967 and late 1978, the third as yet 
incipient and uncertain. 
1) 1967-1968 1 Balance probably favoured a view, of. settle- 
ments as atbargaining counter, but the view gradually lost 
strength with an apparent unwillingness to. -bargain on 
the 
Arab side. 
2) 1969-1977', Shift in the balance toward progressively 
greater strength for the concept of colonization as-. a-, - 
permanent strategic and, later, religio-nationalist commit- 
ment. It could be asserted, with hindsight, that the shift 
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was only an elevation of bargaining tactics to a higher 
plane i to give a convincing demonstration to the Arabs 
that if they did not 'come to the table' extensive fact- 
creation would render a return of the bulk of conquered 
territory impossible and that, in any case, there might 
be some permanent changes. There is of course no reason 
why sincere commitment and bargaining logic could not 
have existed side by side, especially as few Israelis, at 
any level, saw final agreement with any Arab state as at 
all likely, regardless of colonization. However all the 
author's evidence (gathered in an extraordinarily open 
society) points to the growing commitment to permanency 
in this period as being genuine and predominant - further, 
seemingly immutable Arab rigidity provided a perfect 
opportunity for 'creeping annexation' behind a screen of 
protestations that everything was negotiable (harmless as 
there appeared little chance that the bluff would be called). 
3) 1978 $ Egypt 'comes to the table' and the trend 
toward settlement permanency is fundamentally, shaken by 
the removal of one of its chief 'external reality', 
props s the perception of general Arab intransigence. 
There can be little doubt that the prospects of 
a radically new Israel-Egypt relationship are having a 
traumatic effect on Israel's political system. For some 
important personalities, for example Defence Minister 
Ezer Weitzman, there are signs that hard-line convictions 
on territory and settlement held in the context of pre- 
existing realities are being gradually modified with the 
shift in circumstances. Now that the largest Arab state 
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is seen genuinely to want full co-existence with Israel 
the choice between colonization, with all the associated 
assumptions and logic, and progress toward final peace 
treaties, previously not a practical issue, is causing 
deep schisms in the major political factions. The 
division is between those whose commitment to settlement 
for security or historic reasons remains little affected 
and the assorted ranks of pragmatists, those whose world- 
views are altering, and those who have always opposed 
permanent colonization beyond very limited areas. As 
'Peace Now' (P. 300) demonstrates the latter have gained 
markedly in political and public weight through 1978 and 
one may have here the beginnings of an. internal dynamic 
which will cause any attempt to expand the West Bank/Golan 
settlement structure to be stillborn.. and leave the. 
settlers and their supporters with only minority 'sympathy. - 
in the nation at large. 
` Certainly the Knesset vote' on disbanding the 
Sinai settlements has produced some very curious new 
political alignments, with traditional left-right 
differences' becoming meaningless. (see Appendix II, 
sections 11-14 and figure 68). 
1) In the Likud opposition and disquiet concerning 
prospective evacuation includes half the Herut members 
and most of La'am, these being joined with the vociferous 
Gush Emunim group in the NRP (headed by Zevulun Hamer) 
and, surprisingly yet consistently, with the socialist 
Kibbutz and Moshav movements and the Ahdut ha Avoda 
section of the Labour party, (headed by Yigal Allon and 
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Yisrael Galili). The latter harbour deep fears about the 
implications for their own heavy investment on the Golan 
and in the Jordan Ritt. 
(36) 
2) Support for the Camp David accords comprises 
Herut pragmatists led by Begin, Weitzman and Dayan, the 
Likud Liberal block (representing powerful business interests 
alarmed by the deterioration in Israel's economy), the 
pragmatic wing of the NRP led by Interior Minister Burg, 
most of the opposition Labour party and various small 
factions on the extreme left of the spectrum. It is strange 
indeed to see such figures as Begin, Dayan, Eban and the 
Sheli members, traditionally outright antagonists on the 
colonization issue, lined up together. 
Against this colonization on the West Bank and 
the Golan is a vastly different matter from the Sinai case 
and until final decisions have been made here the real 
potency of irredentist religious nationalism will not have 
been fundamentally tested. Indeed Begin's publicly decl- 
ared strategy is to reinforce the West Bank/Golan presence, 
alongside withdrawal from Sinai and on this matter Herut 
and other ranks may well close again behind him (the 
Labour party cannot be expected to oppose continued settle- 
ment in, for example, the Jordan Rift). Nonetheless 1) the 
precedent for withdrawal has been set, 2) the 'bubble' of 
ever-expanding colonization has been pricked, 3) the 
dynamic of new Egyptian and American roles may interact 
with changing Israeli perceptions to produce slow erosion 
in Israel's West Bank/Golan position, 4) the chance for 
peace makes the ultimate madness of the alternative more 
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obvious, if West Bank/Golan colonization is pursued. If 
the 1977-78 Sadat initiative had never taken place the 
current outlook within Israel would probably be very 
different. 
b) Does Israel have the demographic capacity t 
credible long-term colonization rroaram 
An important element in assessing the future 
prospects of Jewish settlement, above all on the West Bank, 
is Israel's severely constrained demographic capacity in 
relation to the rapidly increasing Arab population. In 
the period 1967-72 alone West Bank Arab numbers grew by 
59,000 (from 661.7 thousand to 720.8 thousand(37)), com- 
pared with a total Jewish in-movement of e. 32,000 for the 
whole decade 1967-77, and if East Jerusalem is excluded 
the 1978 Jewish presence is not even equivalent to one 
year's Arab growth (table 9s2). Only on the Golan has 
Israel not been fighting a losing demographic battle, a 
fact which must raise the suspicion that Israel is incur- 
ring grave risks in absorbing areas with a large and hostile 
native community. 
One must however cite several important qualif- 
ications. First, a separate peace with Egypt may produce 
circumstances encouraging a new wave of Jewish migration 
to Israel, allowing rapid and major infusions of population 
into the West Bank. Certainly the new urban schemes for 
Jerusalem and Samaria are based both on hopes for such a 
'wave' and an increase in the Jewish natural increase rate. 
Second, if the 'wave' coincided with a return to a settle- 
ment policy concentrating on less densely populated areas 
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(Jordan Rift, Gush Etzion, Judean Wilderness) it is quite 
possible that long-term viability for: a less extendedsstruc- 
ture might be achieved. Third, as long as Israel's overall 
military superiority is not endangered the West Bank/Golan 
structure can be easily maintained by 'force majeure, 
whatever its proportion of the local population. 
c) How potent is settler influence in Israeli politics? 
Disengagement from the West"Bank/Golan settle- 
ments would undoubtedly be an extremely painful process 
for Israel - much more so than the prospective withdrawal 
from Sinai. This is both because, of the weight of the 
ideological and physical commitment and because of the 
likely furious reaction of the settlers and their. support- 
ers within the political system. Here the. Sinai and 
West Bank/Golan issues stand in relation to one another as 
the peripheral to the central - the political resistance 
from the eastern front settler lobbies would be of an . 
altogether greater magnitude than that seen in the Rafiah 
salient case. Even so, if peace treaties on the eastern, 
front were perceived by the bulk of Israeli opinion to 
involve advantageous elements for Israel there is little 
doubt that a determined government (also probably under 
great external pressure) could impose its will, especially 
if evacuation turned out to be partial and piece-meal 
rather than immediate and total. The West Bank/Golan 
settlements have not yet become large enough to be a def- 
finite political trap from which escape is_impossible 
though even now the outcome of a political struggle between 
settler lobbies (here uniting religio-nationalist Greater 
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Israel supporters with the Kibbutz and Moshav federations), 
and forces favouring even partial retreat would be_, highly 
uncertain if a peace package proved in any major respect 
controversial. The relevant point is that, in any consid- 
eration of. the colonization on the eastern front the settle- 
went structure itself should not necessarily be assumed 
to be a neutral object. 
d) How might the American role evolve? 
American attitudes and actions will both influence 
and be influenced by, change in the political balance within 
Israel. In particular the fact that the general prestige 
and effectiveness of the Carter Presidency is so heavily 
committed to a successful implementation of the Camp David 
arrangement implies that heavy American pressure may be 
forthcoming if Israel moves to reinforce the'West Bank 
settlements, as such reinforcement would instantly eliminate 
any prospect of progress toward peace on Israel's eastern, 
front. In October 1978 it remains to be seen whether the 
mere likelihood of such pressure will encourage shifts in 
Israeli opinion, whether an actual confrontation will- 
eventuate, or whether American policy will once again 
become ineffectual. 
Theoretically the American factor should sooner 
or later weigh decisively against extensive West Bank/Golan 
settlement. First, the United States views the colonization 
as a contravention of international law and as an element 
which must not be allowed to prejudice negotiations. 
Second, as long as confrontation on the eastern front 
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persists (and it will not abate until-there-is some definite 
hint of Israeli retreat from the settlement structure),,: 
Israel will be substantially dependent on the United 
States, whether via public or private sources, for armament 
requirements and to support its economy. Third, America's 
considerable economic and strategic interests in the Arab 
World outside Egypt gives Washington added incentive-to 
continue working for a general peace in the Middle East 
core . 
In practice, however, matters may prove much less 
straightforward. First, much depends 'on the future posture 
of the eastern front Arab states, principally Saudi 
Arabia, Jordan and Syria. A flexible approach from this 
quarter, perhaps coupled with a cautious display of the oil 
weapon, may encourage deeper American involvement over the 
next two to three years -a posture of belligerence and 
rigid rejection may prove counter-productive and thus allow 
Israeli colonization to proceed more readily. Second, 
there is the matter of Israel's influence within the, United 
States through the 'Jewish lobby', though if Israel imple- 
ments new settlement programmes she may find her traditional 
allies reluctant to support her on this particular issue. 
Third, America's supposed economic and military strangle- 
hold over Israel is more-apparent than real as regards 
short-term effects of any sanctions - Israel has consider- 
able independent strength in both domains. and may react to 
intervention by defiance and a resolve to 'sit out' the 
Carter Presidency. 
In sum it is probable that the United States 
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will exert substantial pressure against continued Israeli 
settlement on the eastern front, but the practical effect 
of such pressure, on the Israeli political system is more 
uncertain. 
e) Future Arab roles -i 
Egypt, the Palestinians and the 
eastern front states 
The future strategies of Egypt and the eastern 
front Arab states and the attitude taken to the Camp David 
accords by Palestinian opinion on the West Bank will affect 
all the factors discussed above. (and vice-versa). . 'Both 
the Palestinians and Syria view the West'Bank/Golan colon- 
ization as a steady erosion of. their fundamental-land- -- 
holding rights and an eating away, of the vital territorial" 
base for Palestinian statehood : their hostility to it is 
absolute and likely to remain so. Two major possibilities 
appear to exist for the next few years, assuming the 
Israel-Egypt peace treaty is signed. These are to some 
extent congruent with outlooks discussed on p. 319. 
(38) 
1) Sufficient West Bank Palestinian opinion-, 'may be 
mobilized behind the-idea of autonomy to enable an elected 
West Bank authority to be established, perhaps with tacit 
Jordanian and Saudi backing. The elected authority would 
then join with the Egyptians and the Americans to under- 
mine the Israeli colonization by political and, public,, 
relations pressures. This would certainly make the Israeli 
position difficult and might achieve its objective simply 
by creating such an atmosphere of psychological insecurity 
that the West Bank settlements would be unable to maintain 
or reinforce their populations. (39) 
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2) On the other hand there might be so little sup- 
port for 'autonomy' amongst West Bankers that it-may prove 
impossible to create a credible Palestinian authority. 
Such an eventuality would almost certainly be-coupled with 
similar lack of support (if not outright hostility) from 
all the eastern front states. Paradoxically this situation. 
would probably allow expanded Israeli colonization to- 
proceed unhindered. Eastern front rejection of Camp David 
might lessen American interest in pressuring Israel (espec- 
ially if Egypt acquiesced, as it may if subjected to pro- 
longed propoganda attack) and would buttress pro-coloniz- 
ation forces within Israel at a time when their hold seems 
to be slipping. Certainly Syria's current objective appears 
to be a 'wrecking' one but this cannot have a detrimental 
effect on Israeli colonization unless Syria can assemble 
sufficient pan-Arab force to attempt a 'military solution', 
exceedingly unlikely in the forseeable future (at the least 
it is conditional on full reconciliation with Iraq). 
In short Arab hostility to the eastern front 
colonization will have no effect on Israeli construction 
activity unless the Arabs can bring the requisite power to 
bear on Israel. There are three means of exerting power, 
each entailing great risk for the Arabs : 
1) Diplomatic co-operation with the United States. This 
is the present Egyptian strategy and may bring an erosion of 
the colonization If a viable elected authority is established 
on the West Bank. On the other hand it may gravely under- 
estimate Israel's power and determination and hence both 
I 
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emphasize Arab weakness and pave the way for a successful 
implementation of Sharon's strategy to cut the West Bank 
into isolated segments by belts of Jewish settlement 
(p. 311 ), perhaps the final trap for Palestinian nationalism. 
2) Use of oil and economic pressure on the West., This 
could merely provoke anger and retaliation against the Arab 
oil states and so buttress the colonization. The latter 
was in fact the eventual effect of the last display of oil 
power in 1973-74. 
3) The military option. If Egypt is tied to Israel' 
by a durable separate peace this may cease to be a credible 
alternative for a very long period. 
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(1) Aronoff, M. J. Power and Ritual in-the Israel Labour 
Party P. 147. 
(2) Ha-aretz 29-11-? 3 P. 2. 
Jerusalem-Post 29-11-73 P-1- 
(3) Ha-aretz 6-12-73, P. 1 and P. 3. Detailed account of 
Central Committee debate. 
(4) a) Oct. 1973 estimate of 4000 - based on Golan figure 
of 1727 (Ma'ariv 11-11-73 P. 15) for 17 settlements. 
It is assumed that the average population per 
settlement for the occupied territories as a whole 
was somewhat less than that for the Golan, where 
development had advanced most rapidly. 
b) Feb. 1975 figure of 4158 - Yediot Ahranot 25-2-75- See also Ha-aretz 25-2-75 P. 15. 
(5) Ariel Sharon (Minister of Agriculture) in Jerusalem 
Post 10-2-78 P. 2. If this and the note 
es it mates are combined with official Israeli 
numbers (East Jerusalem excluded) first published 
in the 1977 Abstract of Statistics (Central 
Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem) the 1975-77 
acceleration becomes graphically evident. 
Population of West Bank, Golan, Sinai settlements 
Oct. 1973 4.0 thousand (author's estimate) 
Feb. 1975 4.1 thousand (Ha-aretz) 
Dec. 1975 5.7 thousand (official) 
Dec. 1976 7.1 thousand (official) 
June 1977 10.0 thousand (Sharon) 
As qualification 1) it is not known what exactly 
the official numbers comprise - for example do they include paramilitary (Nahal) sites? It is 
thus possible that the various statistics may not, 
at a detailed level, be measuring the same thing. 
2) Any statistic is only approximate, as the 
population of occupied territory settlements 
fluctuatesmarkedly from month to month, with the 
comings and goings of temporary groups super- 
imposed on a small permanent base. 
(6) The difference between these numbers and the table. 9 :I 
data is accounted for by the fact that total sites 
(table 9: 1 ) include both inhabited settlements 
and uninhabited area centres/ industrial zones. 
(7) Al Hamishmar-22-8-75 statement by-Avraham Ofer 
Minster of Housing). 
(8) Ha-aretz 2-10-75 P"9. 
(9) Ma'ariv 6-8-76. 
339 
(10) Kohn, M. Who's Afraid of Gush Emunim? P. 20. 
(11) Ha-aretz 2-4-76 P. 14. 
(12) Yediot Ahronot 6-8-76 P. 2. 
(13) Ha-aretz 29-12-76 P. 12. 
(14) Yesh-acronym for 'Yehuda ve Shomron' (Judea and 
Samaria). 
(15) Observors were unanimous in treating corruption 
and the parlous state of the domestic economy 
as the main factors. 
(16) Weitzman's outlook, apparently reflecting a re- 
appraisal of his previous 'hawkish' outlook, 
is surveyed at some length by Uri Avneri in_ 
Der Spiegel 28-8-78 P. 98-102 (Vom Falken 
zum Friedens apostel) 
(17) Monthly Bulletin of Statistics 
Vol. XX1X No. 6 June 1978, Central Bureau 
of Statistics (Jerusalem). Immigrant 
numbers for each year after 
1972 = 1973 - 43,880 1974 - 239348 1975 - 12,573 1976 - 11,222 1977 - 11,336 
. 
lst 5 mths. 1977 - k, 059 1st 5 mths. 1978 - 5,610 A slight recovery is evident since 1976. 
(18) There are notable exceptions in the Rafiah approaches 
and the Jordan Valley. Many Rafiah settlers 
have become extremely prosperous in a short time, 
on the basis of out-of season vegetable farming 
combined, in some cases, with cheap Arab labour 
from the Gaza Strip. 
(19) Hill-tops, generally the most barren land, are also 
selected to reduce conflict with Arab cultiv- 
ation. Further, choosing high ground for 
security reasons is of course an old tradition 
in the area, being a characteristic of many 
Arab village sites dating from periods of weak 
central government authority. 
(20) Jerusalem Post Magazine 12-9-77 P. 21 Ha aretz 
7-7-78 P. 10. In an article on the proposed 
town of Efrat (figure )7) Yehuda Litani notes 
the possibility that 850 appartments in Qiryat 
Arba' (current pop. c. 1400) will stand empty in 
early 1979. Questions the wisdom of building new 
cities when there seems little prospect of filling 
existing accommodation. 
340 
(21) Jerusalem Post 30-5-78#P-3- 
(22) Ma'ariv 1-7-77, P. 21. ' 
(23) Ma'ariv 10-1-78, P. 3. 
(24) Jerusalem Post Magazine 12-9-77, P"9. 
Jerusalem Post 8-8-78, P. 2. 
Ha-aretz 27-7-78, P. 1. Description of plans 
for the 'Samaria bisector'. 
(25) Jerusalem Post 23-5-78, P"2" 
a) Haris - note government argument that though 
state-owned tracts are inadequate for the 
scheme there is sufficient land 'not fit for 
cultivation'. 
b) NRP (Major coalition partner) mid-May resol- 
ution calling for the seizure of rocicyland. 
(26) a) Ha-aretz 26-5-78, P. 13. War of the Jews on the 
Lands of the West Bank "The erection'of i 
new settlements leads to'the need for requis- 
itioning (or closing or taking) of land from 
Arabs. According to spokesmen for the 
Ministry of Defence and the Military Govern- 
ment most of the lands are state-owned 
or rock strewn. But within these lands - 
state or waste - there are pockets of private land that the army seeks to seize. " 
b) At both Haris and Nab! Saleh the villagers have 
'tapo' certificates authenticating their 
ownership of the tracts closed for 'security 
needs' or fenced off by Gush Emunim. (Quiring, P., Middle East International, 
Sept. 1978 P. 10 and P. 12 
(27) Miri - c. 70% of the West Bank. 'Under Ottoman and Jordanian law it can technically revert to the state if it is not being actively cultiv- 
ated at a particular moment. The state may then use it as it sees fit. Significantly, 
within Israel all 'miri' land is considered 
private property to which the state has no 
rights (for an account of this and other 
aspects of land seizure for West Bank Jewish 
colonization see Quiring, P. 'Israeli 
Settlements and Palestinian Rights' (Middle 
East International, Se to 1978 Pp-10-12 
and Oct. 1978 Pp. 12-15). 
(28) In many cases the''prefabs' are substantial buildings 
with solid foundations. For example the cost 
of units for Nabi Saleh is estimated at 
150,000 lirot (c. £7,500) each - Jerusalem Post 19-4-78, P. 2. 
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(29) Jerusalem Post 141-2-78 P. 2 
(30) Eban address to Conference of Presidents of North 
American Jewish organizations - Jerusalem, 
27-11-73. As reported in Jerusalem Post 
Magazine 30-11-73 P. 5. 
(31) See, for example, McPeak M. A. "Israel : Borders and 
Security" (Foreign Affairs, 1976, Pp. 426-443) 
(32) The only certain prevention would involve international 
search and patrol procedures along the Jordan 
of similar rigour to those currently employed 
by the Israelis. As the present Israeli system 
is complete anathema to Palestinians travelling 
between the East and West Banks this would be 
neither feasible nor desirable in the context 
of a general peace agreement. 
(33) Some in Israel who favour returning the entire Golan 
to Syria (with evacuation of settlements) in 
exchange for a peace treaty argue that Israel's 
existing position should be used to bargain 
for a much wider demilitarized zone (perhaps 40 km. ) - M. K. Meir Pail in discussion with 
author, Nov. 1976. 
(34) Under the Camp David arrangement no major Egyptian 
armed forces would be permitted east of. the 
Giddi and Mitla passes - 200 km. from the border with Israel. 
(35) The argument is elaborated in Khalidi, W. "Thinking 
the Unthinkable :A Sovereign Palestinian 
State"(Foreign Affairs, 1978, Pp. 695-713) 
(36) 
(37) 
about withdrawal demand". 
a) Galili at Kibbutz ha Meuhad Secretariat 
meeting - abandoning 'defensible border' with 
Egypt a 'terrible risk' and precedent for 
concession in the Rift and on the Golan. 
b) Unease also noted in Kibbutz Artzi and 
Ihud ha Kevutzot ve ha Kibbutzim. 
Jerusalem Post 20-9-78 P. 2. "Settlement Movements worry 
Census of Population - West Bank of the Jordan 
aza Strip and Northern Sinai' Golan e is ems. 1967 (Central Bureau o Statistics, 
e rus a em 
voi. lll . L9( (Central -Bureau of statistics, Jerusalem). 
Census of Population and Housin 1972 (Central 
Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem) 
Administered Territories Statistical Quarterly. 
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(38) Yehuda Litani also discusses the West Bank's 
future in Ha-aretz 6-10-78 P. 13 "What 
will happen on the West Bank ?: 
Four possibilities 1. Persistence of the 
present situation 2. If Jordan joins the 
(Camp David) agreement 3. If Jordan 
does not join the agreement 4. If 
Egypt and the United States actively 
co-operate in the establishment of 
autonomy. 
(39) The unease was already strongly evident in 
October 1978. In a revealing report on 'Settle- 
ment : Life in the Shadow of Autonomy' 
Ha-aretz (Musaf Shevu'i) 20-10-78 P. 6 quotes 
the ead of the Committee of Jordan Rift 
Settlements on one of the chief concerns 
what would happen to lands seized for 
colonization from absentee owners if 
autonomy opened the way for a return of 
displaced persons? 
"Before all (problems) are the lands. 
Here in the Rift we work thousands of 
dunams of agricultural land which - 
why is the truth not said? - are Arab 
lands. What Arabs? - above all absentees, inhabitants of Nablus and Toubas who fled 
to the East Bank in the Six Day War. 
These people cannot return to Judea and 
Samaria because a list of their names is 
kept at the bridges -- Now there will 
be autonomy -- what if these absentees 
will return? -- they will go in a 
procession to the courts. " 
CHAPTER TEN 
REFUGEES AND SETTLERS : CONCLUSIONS. 
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The processes set in motion by the'June 1967 war 
have affected the settlement geography of all the regions' 
which came under Israeli "rule. "There has been, however, a 
very marked spatial differentiation`in the extent of the 
change, in the main because regions which experienced 
particularly heavy population losses as"a result of the 
June-December 1967'refugee movements'(lösses >'80% source 
population)' have also been the regions most substantially 
transformed by the establishment of'new Israeli settlement 
structures. On the other hand regions where Ärab"settle= 
ment'concentrations were less affected' by'out-movement' 
(losses < 30% source"population) tended, until the'advent ý-` 
of the Likud Government, to be placed outside the"boundsh 
öfIIsraeli official' 'ettlement policy. "The great exception 
has of course been East Jerusalem, where the historic pull 
on the'Jewish people was so great as to overcome, from the 
outset, anyýqualms'about incorporating, a large"new, Arab 
population ' into. the , state of Israel. 
"Geographical-unevennessAn the impact. of change 
was most visibly evident in early 1978, after a decade of, 
spatially selective Labour colonization policy. Figure 71, 
which plots the position of the-various regions against the 
two dimensions of settlement pattern transformation consid- 
ered in this thesis (scale of refugee outflow and scale of 
Jewish settlement),,, depicts'the six regions divided. into 
three groups. Gaza, the West Bank Highlands and Sinai form 
the minimum transformation group on both measures while 
the Jordan Rift and the Golan exhibit maximum change, again 
on both. The gap between the two groups is very great, 
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largely due to the fact that, "as'regards'Arab out-movement, 
there were no intermediate cases between near-total settle- 
ment desertion and minor to moderate population reductions. 
As may be seen Gaza and--the, Golan form the extremes while 
East Jerusalem occupies'the, peculiar position of major Jewish 
population infusion in-the midst of dense Arab settlement. 
Indeed East Jerusalem, with c. 25,000 Israeli settlers, -- 
has alone accounted for 63% of the Jewish settlement move- 
ment across the 1967 boundaries. Significantly the Camp 
David accords, deal specifically only with-the: 'less'trans- 
formed' regions while territories where demographic and 
landscape change since 1967 has been particularly marked are- 
either not mentioned at all (Golan), or remain the subject 
of acknowledged disagreement (East Jerusalem and colonized 
areas of the West Bank, the Jordan Rift being. the most 
important such area). 
Recently there have been signsýthat-the above 
noted divisions, may, tºe, beginning to diminish s 
a) The tendency toward geographically extended Jewish 
colonization' on the West Bank, heralded by Gush Emunim 
and fully inaugurated in, the Likud's. first year, would 
seem to indicate, if the process continues, a consid- 
erably augmented. Jewish presence on" the West Bank High- 
lands. If this occurred the East'Jerusalem case would 
become less 'peculiar' than, it has been hitherto. 
b) In the Jordan Rift'a'-high growth rate amongst the, 
residual Arab population is already" starting to com- 
pensate for 1967 settlement ' desertion. 
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c) A decision has been made to liquidate the settlement 
structure in Sinai. 
As a result only the Golan (excepting the Druze area) appears 
likely to survive as a substantial area of entirely Jewish 
settlement. Elsewhere, in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, 
Jewish and Arab settl¬; ment patterns will be geographically 
mixed with a tendency for the Jewish presence, its current 
magnitude relative to the majority population being barely 
equivalent to the position of the European minority in 
Rhodesia, to become ever more dwarfed by resurgent Arab 
numbers. 
None of this, however, is to imply that the impact 
of the June. 1967 War will necessarily be negated. Rather it 
is that, away from the Golan, the recent direction_of. change 
has been more complex than any simple substitution, of Jewish 
for Arab settlement, -. it has been toward an ever more intricate 
territorial mixing of the, two communities of Palestine. Hence, 
if the Camp David arrangements do not quickly reverse the 
tendency, territorial re-partition may prove increasingly 
difficult and the ultimate implications for Israel's, survival 
as a primarily Jewish state may, well be disastrous. 
ii The post 1967 phase, of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
has also affected settlement patterns beyond the new, cease- 
fire lines. The impact has been of twotypess 
a) Border-area hostilities. of 1967-70 were catastrophic 
for settlements in both, the East Jordan Valley and the Suez 
Canal zone. Although a rapid recovery occurred as soon as 
security conditions had returned to normal the threat of 
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another disruption remains as long as the`overall'conflict 
on the eastern front persists. As events in South Lebanon 
in March 1978 have indicated, all border areas away from 
Sinai are still very much 'hostages '-to, 'fortune'. 
b) Palestine refugee concentrations in the states 
neighbouring Israel, especially in East Jordan, were 
greatly supplemented by the arrival of c. L00,000 new refugees 
in June-December 1967, Even with some necessary deflation 
of official estimates (refugee statistics should only be 
used after making the sort of qualification the author 
discusses in Chapters 2 and 3) the scale of the 1967 out- 
movement remains very great. In East Jordan, where it 
added c. 15% to the total population, it had a clearly 
discernable destabilizing influence, both in promoting 
continued hostilities between Jordan and Israel up to 1970 
and in simultaneously threatening the integrity of the 
Hashemite power structure. Although the Jordanian Govern- 
ment has managed to preserve itself by a combination of 
rigorous internal security operations and astute political 
manoeuvering the existence of a deeply frustrated and 
embittered Palestinian majority threatens further instability, 
again as long as there is no peace agreement with Israel 
which goes some way toward satisfying Palestinian aspirations. 
In such circumstances, and with Lebanon as an example, any 
faltering of Hashemite authority could have drastic disruptive 
implications, being one of a number of contingencies which 
could lead directly to an Arab-Israeli war on the eastern 
front. 
347 
(iii) In sum, in both Israeli settlement policy and 
the repercussions of the 1967 Arab refugee movements one 
is dealing with processes, the implications of which have 
not yet been fully realized, even eleven years after the 
June 1967 War. Indeed, if a comprehensive peace agreement 
resolving their future is not soon reached both 'refugees' 
and 'settlers' have the potential to cause future hostil- 
ities, leading in turn to further disruption in the 
settlement geography of the Levant. 
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